AN ESSAY

On Part I of F. H. Bradley's "Appearance and Reality"

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F. H. Bradley's Appearance and Reality is one of the most important and original books on Metaphysics. It is a contribution to the system of Philosophy known as Absolute Idealism, and is of interest to every one, whether Realist or Idealist. I propose to perform no more than the elementary task of expounding its subtle dialectic, to make explicit its deeply implicit premises, and to give the airy nothing of its argument, as it sometimes does appear, 'a local habitation and a name'. Bradley describes his book modestly as an Essay, which carries neither in intention nor in exposition, the design of an Essay. But, as in an Essay so here there is present a continuous and connected argument. It is not 'systematic' in the sense that it is guided by a desire for 'architectonic' like Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, nor is it a 'system' like the Deductive Metaphysics of Spinoza's Ethics, or the two volumes of McTaggart's The Nature of Existence and yet, the through and through implicated quality of its argument is present everywhere in its parts. It is lyrical, and has subtlety of logic of the highest order like Aristotle's Metaphysica, but lacks the clarity and precision of Aristotle's prose; is rich in paradoxes and wit and abounds in the lawlessness of a metaphysical mind. Very often the reader is left to discover for himself the premises of the argument (which is no doubt a compliment to the reader's understanding), but the reader understands Bradley's Appearance and Reality, in the sense in which Prof. G. E. Moore once said in his Metaphysics class, "there is a sense of the word 'understand' such that when you misunderstand something you understand it".

The Introduction is devoted to a defence of Metaphysics which is partly reminiscent of Aristotle, and partly of DesCartes; but there is, as a third part of the defence, an original view of the relation of Metaphysics to Mysticism. The refutation of Scepticism, the implications of a Rational

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Doubt, and the claim that metaphysics satisfies the ‘urgent’ demand of the mystical side of our nature, is the scope of the defence, which is not a ‘defence’ of Idealism or Realism but the general rescue of philosophy from intellectual contempt, prejudice, and ignorance. The ‘defence’ of metaphysics, however, is really no defence at all. For, those who study metaphysics must be always few and they know what it is about, while the dogmatic sceptic who will not say anything and will not grant anything, is wanting in training in Logic, as Aristotle said. It is necessary to dwell on Scepticism, for we are all sceptics, and, Bradley claims that his book is a ‘sceptical study of First Principles’. It is necessary to separate the truth from falsehood in Scepticism. There is a grand motive in Scepticism: the motive to have everything demonstrated. The sceptic will not himself demonstrate anything, but wants others to prove and demonstrate everything to him, while the truth, as Aristotle said, is, ‘the person responsible for the proof is not one who demonstrates, but one who listens’. But the sceptic will not say anything significantly. ‘These people demand that a reason shall be given for everything; for they seek a starting point, and they seek to get this by demonstration while it is obvious from their actions, that they have no conviction . . . . they seek a reason for things for which no reason can be given; for the starting point of a demonstration is not demonstration.”


Now the principle enunciated by Aristotle seems to me to refute also the modern Logical Positivist. Logical Positivism requires that every proposition must be verified. But we must ask the Logical Positivist, how is verification itself possible? Obviously, by some propositions that are already verified; as this gives rise to an indefinite regress, so the conclusion is contrary to the criterion laid down by the Logical Positivist. Logical Positivism must imply that verification is possible because there are at least some true propositions that are not ‘verified’. Demonstration and recognition of truth are two different things. “There is a principle in things, about which we cannot be deceived, but must always, on the contrary, recognise the truth. About such matters there is no proof in the full sense

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1 Plato: “And by reason of this smallest part or class of a state which is the governing and presiding class, and of the knowledge which resides in them, the whole state, being in the order of Nature, will be called wise; and Nature appears to have ordained that this, which has the only knowledge worthy to be called knowledge, should be the smallest of all classes.”

(Republic, Bk. IV. 429)

2 “Those that attempt, by means of proof, to realise a knowledge which reveals the proof itself, are such wonderful beings that they will burn fire itself by means of fuel”.

(Samkara on Definition of one’s Self.)
though there is proof *ad hominem*" (Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, K. 5). To admit the limits of demonstration is not to admit failure of Reason, but to assert it; and as in the moral sphere so in the intellectual, there is the principle of ‘die to live’.

Metaphysics is rooted in the necessities of our nature. To think, and to be free from open self-contradiction, is an absolute necessity of the human mind. To think, it may be only to doubt; yes, but the habit of ‘honest doubt’ is a liberating force. The intellect must be trained to have neither Hope nor Fear. Metaphysics is an “activity of the intellect to become aware of, and to doubt all preconceptions”. But rational doubt proves that consistent doubt and denial are impossible. If I doubt everything, I cannot doubt the fact that I doubt. There is, therefore, one proposition at least which is true. If I deny this, I assert its truth; therefore rational doubt ought itself to demonstrate truth, and so metaphysics can claim to be self-proved.

Bradley’s defence of metaphysics, apart from these arguments which are of a traditional character, has an originality about it. Metaphysics, he says, satisfies an “urgent” demand of our nature, the *mystical* side. What is it that is in our nature which is mystical? It is that simple and un-analysable demand of our nature to know (more); to be (better) and to love (what we know not), the desire for ‘transcendence’. “Lead me from the unreal to the Real, from death to Immortality, from darkness to Light” expresses the mystical tendency to which Bradley refers. This is an urgent and actual demand of our nature, and the main tendencies of our nature must be satisfied. In this effort not only metaphysics, but Religion and Art and Science have their origin and their being. The critic may say that there is concealed in this demand the error which is present in the ontological argument; but were he to deny this claim, then, he would make not metaphysics alone impossible, but every activity of the human mind. The human mind may be dissatisfied, and that which with it is dissatisfied may be true. This is inconsistent. In seeking to justify metaphysics by appealing to the mystical side of our nature, metaphysics is not exalted, but humbled, for, it is one manifestation only of the mystical tendency, *i.e.*, intellectual activity. The defence of Metaphysics by an appeal to the mystical side of our nature is, indeed, a defence of the higher side of our nature as self-conscious beings. Metaphysics is possible, *because* Ethics and Religion and Art and Science are possible. They are all derived from one original source, and are caused by one impulse urgent and actual, which is everywhere and in everything, and is brought to consummation, not in one way, but in several,
"Certainly the life of one man, in comparison with that of another, may be fuller of the Divine or again may realise it with an intenser consciousness; but there is no calling or pursuit which is a private road to the Deity."

An intrinsic part of the defence and justification of metaphysics is the search for, and the proof of, a metaphysical criterion. Metaphysics is possible because thought about the universe is possible. So, to think is to judge and to judge is to distinguish. Thought is essentially distinction: distinction of truth from falsehood, of appearance from reality. An identity as Hegel said is not a poor truth but a thin truth, and if thought were to cease to distinguish it would ‘commit suicide’. But to distinguish is to use a criterion. As the distinction between appearance and reality is the most universal, and holds everywhere in our experience, so the criterion required must be universal. It must be absolute, i.e., undervived from another criterion, etc., and valid for, and accepted as such, by the exponent as well as by the opponent and must be its own illustration. “Those, then, who are to join in an argument with one another must to some extent understand one another for, if this does not happen how are they to join in argument with one another” (Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, K. 5). A criterion such as this is the Law of Contradiction. *Whatever is self-contradictory is not true or real.* This is infallible, for, to deny it is to assert its truth.

The Law of Contradiction may be ‘respected’, but not ‘worshipped’. It is true, but is not the final truth of things. If the Law of Contradiction lays down the rule; ‘do not seek to identify in thought, what is really distinct’ it perpetuates a bare tautology, pigeon-holes the universe into distinct entities, and, if pushed to the extreme, ends in the doctrine of the Identity of Indiscernibles: (i.e., things are *not* identical even where thought is unable to discern any difference between them). So we have to avoid, in dealing with contradiction, the same mistake that we may commit in the nature of Identity. “We were there told to produce tautologies, and here we are by certain persons forbidden to produce anything else” [Logic, Bradley, Vol. I, p. 146 (1928)]. To say that ‘A is not-A’ is simply another way of saying that A is A, that B is B, etc., which is a ‘simple identification of the diverse’. On the other hand, it is not also the business of the Law of Contradiction to say: *Why* A is not anything else, why things are not other than what they are. So the Law of Contradiction must find its proper duty in metaphysics between merely saying that ‘A is not not-A’ and, why A is not anything else. Its proper business is to point the opposition there is in reality, between contrary things. This it does in Formal Logic, but in Metaphysics, it cannot be the final truth. We must start with Contradiction but we cannot stop with it. It is the business of metaphysics not to leave a contradiction as
contradiction, but to discover the ground of incompatibility. It is, perhaps, better to say that it is not the 'business of metaphysics, but rather its Faith. That 'somehow good will be the goal of all ill' expresses a poetic faith; that 'contradiction is not the final truth' expresses the faith of Philosophy. 'Philosophy demands, and in the end it rests on what may be fairly termed faith. It has, we may say, in a sense to pre-suppose its conclusion in order to prove it' (Essays on Truth and Reality, p. 15). If the Philosophy of Hegel left any element of permanence it is this: contradiction is not the final truth of the matter; opposition or contradiction is finally cancelled in the Absolute Idea. Contradiction, distinction, opposition—all these are given in experience. Thought does not create these; but philosophy or metaphysics does 'not rest simply on a datum, on a given fact or given axiom', and 'truth is not true because it is simply seen or follows logically from what is seen'. That Thought should go beyond and behind what is given,—to the implication of what is given, is the 'Faith' of Philosophy or Metaphysics. In so far as metaphysics seeks to do so, it must supplement the law of Contradiction by a wider principle which expresses its Faith, the principle of Coherence and Comprehensiveness or the 'Principle of Individuality'.

A defence of the law of Contradiction must answer two serious objections, which are generally urged against it. It is said that the Law of Contradiction is (a) a formal law, or only a formal law, and (b) that it is negative. These objections, if true, raise issues of a far-reaching consequence to Logic and Metaphysics. It is necessary therefore to dwell on these for a while. Let us take up the objections in the order mentioned. The first objection raises a question about the nature of Logic as a whole and its relation to Metaphysics, and has some elements in its objection which are true, but a great many which are false. There is a world of difference between saying that the law of Contradiction is a formal law, and that it is only a formal law. The qualification 'only' implies that it is nothing else; that it is nothing more than a Law of Thought. And the burden of proof falls on those who so assert than on their opponents. Yet it is the bounden duty of the metaphysician to clear the confusions, even if it be the case, as Bradley often says, that the primary function of a metaphysician is not the dialectical refutation of the opponent. Now, what is implied in the statement that the law of Contradiction is only a formal law? It is implied that the law of Contradiction is valid in logic or in 'Formal Logic', but is not applicable to reality or to things. It may mean (as Hume did in speaking of Mathematics though in a different connection), that the law of Contradiction as well as other laws of thought refer only to the 'agreement or disagreement
amongst our ideas”. This objection, if valid, raises an issue about the whole nature of Logic. Logic is, no doubt, a ‘formal’ science, but “many logicians who have laid stress on this, and pointed out Logic is a formal science, have understood by that expression more than seems to be true” (H. W. B. Joseph, An Introduction to Logic, p. 4). Logic is formal in the sense that it deals with what is common to many instances of thinking. In this sense, ‘formal’ means as Professor Joseph says, ‘materially different’. (But it should be understood that the material difference is in things, and identity in thought.) But thought is always about something and this is so even when thought has a reflexive function to perform while it examines or criticises its own canons.

The Medieval logicians said that thought is about second intension, meaning thereby that thought directs itself, in the first instance, upon material things, their qualities and relations, and then upon its own modes. It examines its own modes and canons so that it may employ them correctly in thinking about things. Thus a ‘Law of Thought’ means, or is about, both the first and the second ‘intentions’, the direct and indirect employ of thought on the subject. Only an excessive devotion to, and indulgence in, symbolism could hide this elementary truth. Even a symbolic logician as Wittgenstein, with those modes of expression it is not easy to be familiar with, says: “No proposition can say anything about itself, because the propositional sign cannot be contained in itself (that is the ‘whole theory of types’)” (3, 332, Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus”). So a Law of Thought is really a statement about things. If laws of thought are only laws of thought, then, we could never know the nature of things. It is true, however, that thought is not thing; but, if thought is true or false it cannot be ultimately occupied with itself. Thought is about a thing, just as a picture is a picture of something; and in order that this relation between the ‘picture’ and that of which it is a ‘picture’ may hold, there must be something in common between the picture and that of which it is a picture (see Wittgenstein, p. 41). This is rather an elementary but fundamental condition which must be granted by a philosophy, idealist or realist. A law of thought is not only a law of thought. “We cannot think contradictory propositions, because we see that a thing cannot have at once and not have the same character; and

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8 It is rather in Symbolic Logic than in any other kind of Logic that the divorce between thought and the nature of things is exhibited. Symbolic Logic studies the properties of Extension, i.e., of classes and their relations, and, as thinking means in Symbolic Logic thinking in terms of class-relations, so there is divorce between thought and thing, and so it gives rather a distorted view of thought.

4 Wittgenstein’s Language.
the so-called necessity of thought is really the apprehension of a necessity in the being of things” (H. W. B. Joseph, *ibid.*, p. 13, italics in the text).

There is another aspect of this controversy of the formal nature of the Law of Contradiction, which concerns Logic and Ontology. It is this. How can I deduce a truth about existence from a truth of Logic? How can a law which is true of thought help to deduce a fact about existence? At a later stage of this argument, Bradley argues that Thought is less than Reality, and that its own nature must be transformed and absorbed into a fuller experience, which cannot be called ‘Thought’. It would appear as if there is an ultimate residue of agnosticism and mysticism in the relation of Thought to Reality. It seems wiser therefore to offer only a modest defence of the view we are expounding, and be content to admit some part of the truth of the objection. McTaggart puts the whole difficulty thus:

“we may notice that the proposition ‘nothing exists’, which we have rejected is not self-contradictory. ‘No proposition is true’ is a self-contradictory proposition, for, if it were true, then it together with all other propositions, would not be true. But the truth of ‘Nothing exists’ is not inconsistent with itself, though it is inconsistent with the assertion of itself or even the contemplation of itself, by any person. Thus ‘something exists’ is not a proposition of which we can be certain simply by pure logic, as we are of the proposition ‘something is true’” (McTaggart, *The Nature of Existence*, Vol. I, Section 58).

It is objected that the criterion what is self-contradictory is not true, or is not real, is not positive, but negative. It is objected that to say of a thing ‘it is not this’, ‘it is not that’, etc., does not give us knowledge. (It is presupposed that knowledge requires something more than mere negation.)

Now this objection raises certain important questions about the real nature of negation, but the objection itself rests upon a confusion. There are many questions which could be asked about negation: Is affirmation

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9 Stebbing says “there seems nothing to be said in favour of this view. We have already seen reason to reject the view that these ‘laws’ are laws of thought. It is also misleading to describe them as laws of things since such an expression suggests that they in some way determine what is actual or given. They are, however, purely formal principles which are independent of what is given; they are negative determinations of what is possible” (*A Modern Introduction to Logic*, p. 471. Italics in the text).

The opposition between these two Schools of Logic is such that they fail to understand each other. See the controversy between H. W. B. Joseph and Stebbing entitled “A Defense of Free Thinking in Logics” carried on in the pages of *Mind, N. S. Vol. XLI, No. 164, Vol. XLII, No. 168, XLIII, Nos. 170 and 171.
prior to negation? or is negation prior to affirmation? etc. But the question relevant to our discussion is, whether negation gives us knowledge.

Negation, or the negative judgment, says Bosanquet, is paradoxical in character, because "in negation the work of positive knowledge appears to be performed by ignorance (p. 277, Logic or The Morphology of Knowledge, Second Edition). Negation plays some part in knowledge, but it does so by assuming the external shape of ignorance. Prima facie it appears only to deny. When I say 'my coat is not green', I am denying a predicate 'not green' of the subject. But the judgment does not specify what predicate truly belongs to the subject. It appears merely to exclude a number of predicates. Although it does not specify what predicate truly belongs to the subject, yet, it presupposes some predicate which truly belongs to it. There is a positive quality which belongs to the subject, and in denying a certain predicate the negative judgment merely points out the inconsistency between the two. In a negative judgment the positive ground is not explicitly asserted, but presupposed.

The above conclusion must appear reasonable because of another consideration. It is impossible for a thing to be only not-A, or not-B. "It is impossible to realise not-A in thought". This is a point of some importance; and as a result, certain consequences follow with regard to certain attitudes in Metaphysics. For there are some philosophers who say that we know only phenomena. But the word 'only' is negation; and if the above account of negation is true, then, there cannot be sense in talking of 'only this' or 'only that'. These are negative terms; and negation presupposes positive knowledge. So agnostics and sceptics who say that we know only phenomena and who deny the possibility of Metaphysics, use negative statements, but do not appear to understand the real nature of negation. So Bradley says: "It is of the very last importance, whenever we deny, to get as clear an idea as we can of the positive ground, our denial rests on".

In the course of the argument Bradley appears to me to modify, consciously or unconsciously, the criterion of non contradiction. The criterion, it is true, is twofold: non-contradiction and coherence. And the former is extensively used in criticising the categories in Part I, while the latter, of Coherence and Comprehensiveness (i.e., as much of detail with as much of consistency and internal systematisation) is used throughout Part II of the Book. Both are aspects of the Criterion of Individuality. Generally, the two aspects of the same criterion must be taken together; for, truth does not mean just the formal condition of absence of contradiction, but the material condition of including as much of the detail and variety of exist-
ence with as much of consistency and concord as possible. Truth is, of course, consistency, but consistency with other things. The two aspects of the criterion may be described negative and positive. The negative aspect repudiates each and every category except the Absolute as appearance, while, the positive aspect ‘saves appearances’, and discovers the degree of reality in each and in all. ‘Reality is not-this, it is not-that’ is the watchword of the first. ‘All this is Brahman’, as the Upanishads say, is the watchword of the second, or as Bradley says: the presence of Reality in all its appearances is the last word of metaphysics.

But it is not to this, the double aspect of the criterion, that I intended to refer when I spoke of the conscious or unconscious modification of the criterion of non-contradiction. I refer to the Criterion of Possibility. At certain critical stages of the argument, Bradley uses, as a supplement to the criterion (what is self-contradictory is not real), the criterion what is possible that is necessary. This must seem somewhat extraordinary. And he is merely content to say this, and to pass on. It is a subtle, dialectical device, which is put in the form of rhetorical question to the opponent. Is it ‘impossible’ that error and evil are overcome in the Absolute? is it impossible that there may be succession, without the successive being the temporal? The answer is, it is not impossible. Therefore, what is possible is necessary. There seems to me to be some resemblance between this and the ontological argument, and I do not think that Bradley has altogether rejected the ontological argument. I think he has retained a good deal of it in formulating the doctrine: ‘what is possible, that is necessary’. And it has a subtlety about it, which lies in the implication that any other conclusion is impossible. At any rate, to show that this is impossible is a burden which rests on the critic. But the criterion, ‘what is possible, that is necessary’, is only a disguised form of the criterion of non-contradiction. What does the possibility of anything mean when it is asserted, and not merely supposed or believed. It will mean that in contemplating it, no inconsistency is discovered. ‘An asserted possibility must have meaning’. The possible is related to the actual. The possible is not merely the negative, it is the positive. So to say that the possible is the real, is no more an expression of ignorance than, whatever is self-contradictory is not real.

This must conclude the brief exposition of the so-called defense of metaphysics. If the metaphysical criterion of non-contradiction is accepted then, it will have yielded, not as yet, the ultimate and positive notion of Reality, but the notion of ‘appearance’. This is the next step in the argument, and so, let us go, in the next section, to the realm of appearance.
II

APPEARANCE

What is appearance? is a very difficult question to answer and, as we shall see, it is a meaningless question. Appearance may mean ‘appearing to some one’. This is its epistemological sense and Bradley considers this secondary. So we are not now concerned with it. Appearance is not Reality, and yet appearance is not nothing; for appearance is the appearance of something, and Reality must appear. Reality is not a Thing-in-itself. Appearance is not ‘illusion,’ so it is not nothing. It may be said to have an intermediate stage: neither true nor false. Yet appearance is nothing; for appearance means ‘that which is self-contradictory’. Now that which is inconsistent or is self-contradictory cannot mean anything. What has no sense, is nonsense; what is self-contradictory, and what is neither true nor false, cannot even be said or expressed; yet we shall manage to say a good deal about it. “The self-contradictory, I suppose most of us would agree, is unreal. And yet, since we discuss it, it is clear that the self-contradictory in some sense exists” (Essays, p. 269).

We may make an attempt to distinguish between ‘illusion’ and ‘phenomenon’. If I ‘misperceive’ (I borrow the usage of this word from McTaggart’s Nature of Existence) a piece of rope as a snake, and if no one else has this misperception, then, my misperception may be described as an ‘illusion’; while, if the same or some other misperception is universal, it may be described as a Phenomenon. For instance, Reality may be really non-spatial and non-temporal, but may be ‘misperceived’ as spatial and as temporal. What we perceive, then, is a phenomenon. This distinction between an ‘illusion’ and an ‘appearance’ is based on the usage of the words ‘private’ and ‘public’, but I have no intention to stress this too far.

The inconsistency or contradiction in anything is exposed by the regress which it entails. Therefore, it is named ‘appearance’ in Bradley’s philosophy. An ‘appearance’ is that which involves a regress.* This is generally true, but logically inadequate. A full discussion of the meaning of ‘appearance’ involves a discussion of the nature of infinite series, and of different types of regress. In going into the discussion, I shall be able only to touch the outlines of the subject. This is sufficient. Now, Bradley dismisses all regress as of the ‘vicious’ type. It is an evidence also of the inconsistency of a thing, to him, if it involves an ‘endless’ regress. On this or

* I have been asked to show where Bradley says this. This is, however, my interpretation of Bradley’s notion of appearance.
these grounds, almost all the categories, relation, quality, space, time, cause, etc., are dismissed. But recent logic has sought to overcome the contradiction by introducing a subtlety. This is not merely a technical matter, but one of philosophical importance. The subtlety introduced is the distinction between a vicious infinite series, and a merely endless infinite series. In section 329 of his Principles of Mathematics (Second Ed.), Russell makes the distinction between two types of infinite regresses. He names them: the objectionable type and the unobjectionable type, and states the distinction between the two as follows: (a) “In the objectionable kind two or more propositions join to constitute the meaning of some proposition; of these constituents, there is one at least whose meaning is similarly compounded; and so on ad infinitum. This form of regress commonly results from circular definitions”. Now, as we know what ‘circular definitions’ are so there is no difficulty in understanding the inconsistency of this sort of infinite series. There is really no infinite series; rather, in a vicious series, the series cannot at all get started. If we ask the question which came first, the seed or the tree there is involved a circular definition in the answer. So we must abandon any argument which is of this nature. But what about the second type? About this, Russell says as follows: (b) “But many infinite regresses are not of this form. If A be a proposition whose meaning is perfectly definite, and A implies B, B implies C, and so on, we have an infinite regress of a quite unobjectionable kind”. Our chief interest is to see why it is ‘of a quite unobjectionable kind’. There are two reasons. One of them is in the definition of Implication. Russell defines Implication as “a synthetic relation”. If A implies B, and B implies C, etc., the terms are not merely “included in” or “analytically contained” in A, but, between them, there is a relation of implication, which is synthetic. So far so good. Now, Russell adds another condition which is only partly clear. He says, “If A be an aggregate of propositions, and implies any proposition which is part of A, it by no means follows that any proposition which A implies is part of A” (Italics mine). Now, it seems to me as if we must suppose that, if proposition which A implies is not ‘part of A’, it must be part of a part of A. It must be part of B, which is part of A. So, the nature of this kind of infinite series is now more clear. It is not a series in which there are merely an infinite number of simple parts, i.e., parts not having other parts, but parts having parts, or a ‘set of parts’. (The notion of a ‘set of parts’ is necessary to define the nature of infinite series of the unobjectionable type. A set of parts of a whole, is one which makes up the whole, and does not more than make it up.) So, throughout the infinite series of this type, (a) any part will repeat the infinite complexity of the whole, and (b) there will be no part
which is the last or the lowest term, or the *infima* species; and, (c) the series does not involve a regress, or contradiction, because it is not necessary to actually complete the series; for there is a rule by which the sets of implications could be deduced. To actually complete an infinite series is a self-defeating task, possible only to an infinite mind. Even to it, the task will be needless, if the infinite mind possesses, in addition, direct omniscience. For us, finite minds that we are, who have no direct omniscience, nor the capacity to actually complete an infinite series, the possibility of obtaining a rule to complete an infinite series by implication, is not either trivial or superfluous. Russell says that Symbolic Logic must learn to deal with ‘infinite classes’. But there is the contradiction long ago pointed out by Kant, staring us in the face, *viz.*, of the ‘completed infinite’. Kant apparently thought of completing an infinite series by enumeration and said nothing of the possibility of completing it by implication. If this possibility is open we must seize it. “Thus the solution of the difficulty”, says Russell, “lies in the theory of denoting and the intentional definition of a class”. There are many refinements of the theory of the infinite series, which I have only very briefly discussed. I cannot go into all its intricacies, but one consequence to symbolic Logic itself, I may point out. If Symbolic Logic learns to deal with ‘infinite classes’, it must do so by an *intensional* definition of a class. If so, will not this contradict the assumption, which is necessary to Symbolic Logic, of defining or interpreting a given whole in terms of *extension*? (But it is possible that this objection is only symbolic of my ignorance). (See *Note at the end.*

The distinction suggested between the two sorts of infinite series may be valid, but rests on an assumption. It rests on the assumption that the category of whole and part is a valid category. An infinite series, which has parts within parts, does not give rise to a regress, because any part can represent the nature of the whole. The infinite complexity of the whole is repeated in the part, and in the part of a part. But the category of part and whole is not a valid category to *adequately* represent the nature of a completed experience. Its unity cannot be split up into the terms of part and whole. So, the distinction between the two sorts of infinite series does not ultimately help us to adequately interpret the nature of Reality, which is *experience*. Therefore, in a philosophical system such as that of Bradley, the distinction between the two sorts of regress does not itself lead us anywhere. McTaggart uses the distinction, suggested by Russell, in constructing his system, and in overcoming the contradiction in the notions of quality and relation and substance, with which, he, like Bradley, is face to face. In
the chapters on "Derivative Characteristics" and "Determining Correspondence", the reader will find a very carefully worked out application of the theory of infinite series to Existence, in Vol. I of The Nature of Existence. The most interesting observation which McTaggart makes, is, that the peculiar relation which holds between the members of an infinite series without entailing a regress, is to be found not in Matter, but in Spirit, and in a Society of Selves. This is a most interesting conclusion to reach out of, what apparently seemed, merely technical distinctions of Symbolic Logic. Whether reality is One or a Many, is to me, a less important matter, than the truth that it is Spiritual.

But let us now return to Bradley's argument.

"Relation presupposes quality, and quality relation. Each can be something neither together with, nor apart from, the other; and the vicious circle in which they turn is not the truth about reality" (Italics mine; p. 26, Appearance and Reality). I want to bring out the sense of apparent implied, by a criticism of the above passage. In a very significant sense the whole dialectic in Part I of the Appearance is contained in the above passage.

It is clear that all our judgments do involve the notions of relation and quality. We cannot say what a thing is without using these notions. To say what a thing is, we have to assert relations (of space, time, cause, etc.), and qualities or adjectives of that thing.

Now this seems an apparently simple question, but gives rise, and has given rise, to logical and metaphysical difficulties in the History of Philosophy, between Realism and Idealism. Let me illustrate the problem with reference to the Philosophy of Leibniz. It is well known that Leibniz considered qualities to be more important than relations. He reduces relations to qualities; a relation, he said, is an attribute "which has one leg in one term and another leg in another term". Whatever is expressed by a relation, Leibniz said, could be expressed quite well by a quality. So he reduced all propositions to the subject-predicate form, and, because of this, as Russell says in his Philosophy of Leibniz, he denied interaction between Monads. The position of Leibniz has also been the position, in general, of Idealist Logic. There is only a slight difference between Bradley's metaphysics, and the general tendency of idealist logic. Bradley does not attempt to reduce relation to quality, nor, does he think that one notion is more important than the other. He keeps these notions logically distinct. And he also recognises the truth that nothing could be described without using these notions, or without using propositions which involve these notions. But he rejects the ultimate valid
and consistency of both relation and quality. So the logical position is this: nothing could be described without using these notions; and yet both these notions are ultimately inconsistent. They break up the intrinsic unity of reality into a series of discrete terms of qualities-in-relation. This point involves a great deal of controversy, but the substance of Bradley’s contention is, that quality and relation split up the unity of things. To the question, what is a thing, it is no true answer to state the relations that X has to other entities, or the relations that other entities have to X. So Professor C. D. Broad, an acute critic of Bradley’s Philosophy, admits the element of truth in Bradley’s criticism of these notions. “The alleged fact is that there is something both logically and psychologically prior to terms and relations. This something may be called ‘unities’. Both terms and relations are presented as such directly in sense-awareness or in feeling. They are, and are felt to be in some sense, complex and differentiated. Directly we start thinking about them, we substitute for them a diagrammatic scheme of independent terms and mutual relations. We cannot help doing this; but we are mistaken if we identify the scheme with the original Unity of which it professes to be the analysis” (Examination of McTaggart’s Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 86).

So, one point of interest has emerged out of the discussion on appearance. An ‘appearance’ is not merely that which involves a regress; it is also that which conceals the nature of reality by substituting for it ‘a diagrammatic scheme,’ and which splits ‘the original unity’ into a scheme of ‘independent terms of relations’. (This view of appearance corresponds to the Advaita view of the double nature of Maya: Avarana and Vikshepa.)

Let us continue the discussion of Bradley’s theory of ‘appearance’ by considering his criticism of the nature of Relation. There is a technical difference between the kind of regress that arises in the joint notion of Relation Quality and the exclusive notion of Relation. I should like to leave that out for the present. I want to confine myself to Bradley’s famous criticism of the notion of Relation. His criticism is: ‘a relation needs a relation’. Bradley’s criticism may be said to be a modern version of the argument of the Third Man in Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s Doctrine of Ideas. There seems to be a general impression that, Bradley’s criticism of Relation is a criticism of the theory of external relations only. This does not seem to me to be the case, and I want to confine myself to this one point. Many philosophers have answered Bradley’s criticism. They say that Bradley treats relations, which are universals, as if they were particulars.6 A relation is

a universal, and its proper function is to relate the terms. Why should relation need another relation? Does the form of a logical proposition, for instance, need another form to connect it to the constituents of the proposition? It is true that a relation is not "in" any of the terms; it is rather "between" the terms it relates. But the notion of "between" is ultimately and unanalyzable." This is the substance of the criticism of Bradley's criticism of the nature of Relation.

Bradley's criticism of the nature of Relation is not a criticism of the doctrine of "external" relations only. It is no doubt true that his philosophical position supports the theory of "internal" relations. What do these terms mean? An "external" relation is generally defined as a relation which makes no difference to the terms related. This is one of its senses, and there may be others. Now, this definition means at least three things: (i) that a term might not have had any relation at all; (ii) that it might not have had the kind of relation which it, in fact, has; (iii) that a change in its relation or relationship might not mean an alteration in the other relations or qualities of the term. This is a condensation but not an inaccurate statement of the doctrine of external relations. It entails the doctrine of mere "togetherness" and "conjunction", against which Bradley protests in his Essays, and in his Appendices to Appearance and Reality. A theory of internal relations implies propositions logically contradictory of the theory of external relations.

A theory of internal relations briefly stated, means: (i) there is no relation which is not based upon the quality of its terms; (ii) therefore, to ask the question, whether a term might not exist without any relation, or without the kind of relation which, in fact, it has, is meaningless; (iii) therefore, no relation can be what it is, when other relations are altered; and no relation can alter without there being a corresponding alteration in the qualities of thing. So a thing, or the "nature" of a thing, (which is a system of qualities and relations), is a rigid, reciprocal unity. The doctrine of an internal relation implies, or entails, a "through and through implicated universe", such that, "you could start internally from any character in the Universe, and you could pass from that to the rest" (p. 580, Appearance).

This is, in brief, the difference between the doctrine of an "external" and "internal" relations. A discussion of the nature of Relation has

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8 The doctrine of external relations does not merely raise the question of "possibility", or "might" or "might not", but the question of "togetherness".
9 For a fuller discussion of the theory, see A. C. Ewing: Idealism,—A Critical Survey, Chapter IV.
tendency to change into a discussion of the difference between the two theories. I think we must be careful not to mix up the two. Now, the point which I wish to make is that, though Bradley’s philosophy supports a theory of internal relations, yet the ultimate truth of his Philosophy is: *Relational form is of phenomena*. I want to conclude the discussion on ‘Appearance’ by commenting on the phrase ‘relational form’, and to illustrate it.

I shall consider certain types of ‘relational form’ which are true of our experience and then to develop by a criticism of these notions the purely logical or philosophical notion of relational form and to consider this in relation to Bradley’s metaphysics. Let us begin, then, with the elementary notion of ‘relational form’ as exhibited in an *Aggregate*. An aggregate is not the absence of unity, but an instance of the lowest degree of unity. The ‘parts’ (if they could be so-called) of an aggregate could be ordered differently without affecting other parts, or, ‘the whole’. The words ‘part’ and ‘whole’ are used in a very loose sense in this instance. Then, there is the second type of relational form exhibited in such unities, as a whole of parts, like a watch, etc. This is a type of relational form rigid and well-defined and still inadequate. Even this improved notion of relational form has serious defects. In a type of unity such as a watch, the parts are *pre-existing*, and, between the parts and the whole, there is a relation of *one-sided dependence, i.e.*, of the whole on the parts. So the parts are conceived as more important than the whole, and, as a consequence, the nature of the whole is conceived as a *Unity of Composition*. But this defect is overcome in the third type of relational form, known as ‘organic unity’. In an organic unity, the parts are not independent of the whole, and, outside it, they are not parts at all. There is no one-sided dependence of the whole on the parts. The parts are related in a specific, determinate way; *i.e.*, to alter the mode of relation is to alter the nature of the whole. The parts do not exist for themselves, but for the whole; while the whole exists for itself. And the type of unity, therefore, may be named as a *Unity of Manifestation*. (It is possible that one and the same thing may be both a unity of composition and a unity of manifestation). And in a unity of manifestation the whole is conceived as more important than the parts.

So, this type of relational form has its own type of defects. So, by a criticism of these three notions, we shall have to develop a notion of relational form (which Taylor names *Systematic Unity*), in which the reciprocal dependence of the parts on the whole, and the whole on the parts, exists, such that, “no single element can be other than what it is, without the other
elements being other than what they are". The parts are for the whole, and whole is for the parts. There is one condition on which, and on which alone, such a type of relational form could be realised: the parts of such a type of unity must be conscious experiments, or, as Bradley says, they must be ‘sentient’. The content of this type of unity must be experience. There is nothing in the whole, then, which is not revealed in its parts, and there is nothing in any of the parts which is not in the whole. Such a position cannot be adequately described either as Monism or as Pluralism; either as Identity, or as Difference, or even as ‘identity-in-difference’; for this notion is ambiguous and involves regress. Whether it lays emphasis on the identity or on the difference it does not say. It is, still, relational in form, and is but an approximation to the intrinsic unity of reality; and, to borrow Broad’s language, it is only a ‘diagrammatic scheme’, which cannot be identified with ‘the original unity’, of which it is but an inadequate representation. It is yet appearance. It is relational in form, and so phenomena. If analysed, it involves regress, and that which involves regress is ‘that which takes beyond itself’. This, as I understand it, is Bradley’s final metaphysical position. His philosophy is not ‘monism’, but ‘non-dualism’. And so the structure of the Universe even where described as a ‘coherent system’ is yet relational in form, and so an appearance. It may be that a result of this philosophy is ‘epistemological scepticism and ontological mysticism’ as Ward described it. But ‘no one conquered logic but in the end logic conquered him’. If logical consistency leads to the notion of ‘coherent system’, it is again logical consistency that transcends this notion.

I have anticipated much of the argument of Bradley’s philosophy. The same conclusion will repeat itself in other parts of this essay, which is the defect as well as the merit of Bradley’s system. But I must now proceed to illustrate the inconsistency involved in the natures of Space and Time, Thing and Cause and the notion of Self. And it is quite an indifferent matter with which category we shall make a start. Hegel may be credited to have proved, in his Science of Logic, the proposition, any category except the Absolute Idea entails contradiction. If so, then, it is an indifferent matter with which category we start. The actual development of the dialectical process, and the arrangement of the categories, is secondary. The apparently careless manner of Bradley’s arrangement of the categories appears to me to be based on this principle. I shall begin with categories of Space and Time.

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III
SPACE AND TIME

Space

Bradley says that he is not going to discuss fully the nature either of space or of time, which is fortunate. Nor is he going into the question of their psychological origin, which is but right; for metaphysics is not bound to consider questions of genesis. Nor is metaphysics bound to consider anything real because it is real for science, or unreal, because it is unreal for science. Bradley’s discussion is concerned with merely stating what he calls “the main justification” for regarding space and time as appearance. We must see what this “main justification” is.

There is but a passing reference made in Chapter IV of Appearance and Reality, to the notions of “continuity” and “discreteness”, and these, says Bradley, “necessitate the conclusion that space is endless, while an end is essential to its being”. Hegel said that one and the same quantity could be both continuous and discrete; but modern philosophy of mathematics says that “continuity” and “discreteness” are not quantitative notions, but purely ordinal notions.¹¹ They are concerned with order. This distinction may lead to clear thinking in mathematics, but may not, I think, affect metaphysics. The question for metaphysics is: how is order itself possible? The notion of order does not appear, to me, to be a notion ultimate and unanalysable. There is the simpler and ultimate notion of relation, and the properties of relation presupposed. Besides, the problem for metaphysics is: is order consistent with the theory of “external” relations? or, is it consistent with the theory of internal relations? Space and time are kinds of order: one is the order of co-existence and the other of succession. But “space” and “time” mean, in science, “measurable” space and time, which are “abstractions” from the more fundamental quality of Nature, which is its creativity. So there is not too much disagreement between metaphysics and philosophy of science about the natures of these two concepts. The serial and measurable quality of space and of time is itself derived from a quality of Nature, which Whitehead calls “the quality of passage”. This quality of the passage of Nature must not be confused, he warns, with spatial and

¹¹ “The notion of continuity has been treated by philosophers as a rule, as though it were incapable of analysis. They have said many things about it, including the Hegelian dictum, that everything discrete is also continuous and vice-versa. But as to what they meant by continuity and discreteness, they preserved a discrete and continuous silence”. Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics, p. 287, Second Ed.
temporal transition. "The measurable time of science and of civilized life generally merely exhibits some aspects of the more fundamental fact of the passage of nature." 12 It is not only metaphysics, then, that regards space and time as 'abstractions', but a more reasonable philosophy of science too. In the following discussion, I shall content myself with raising a few issues, treating the subject for a while, in some independence of Bradley's discussion. What is the common-sense view of these notions: space and time? Are the definitions in Geometry any better than the notions of common-sense? How has recent philosophy of science attempted to reconstruct, and improve upon, the older definitions? What is Bradley's criticism of these notions? These are the questions with which I shall be generally concerned in expounding Bradley's criticism of space and time.

Space presents, at least to common sense, the paradoxical character of being endlessly divisible within, and without as capable of being extended into larger and larger spaces, which are yet finite. 'Space cannot come,' says Bradley, 'to a final limit, either within itself or on the outside'. We can imagine space to be like a chinese-box, containing endless boxes of decreasing size, ever growing smaller and smaller. Now the question is, has the series a limit? It is difficult to say that it has a last term. If there is a limit or last term, has this, then, magnitude or not? These are the sort of difficulties presented to common sense, and it is rather interesting to note that these paradoxes are not overcome in the definitions of geometry but on the other hand, well preserved in them. It is interesting to learn, on the authority of C.D. Broad, that the definitions of points contain two incompatible notions. "When we want to talk of an area as analysable into points we think of points as little volumes" (Italics mine), i.e., as having magnitude. "When we want to think of points as having exactly definite distances we take them to have 'position but no magnitude', as Euclid put it". And Broad comments as follows:—"Now nothing will make these conception of points consistent with each other. Either points are extended or they are not. If they are not, how can they fit together along their sides and edges (which they will not possess) to make a finite volume or area? If they are, in what sense can you talk of the distance between them, or the direction determined by a pair of them? To call them inmunitsesimal volumes or areas only darkens counsel; for the word infinitesimal here only serves to cover the attempt to combine these incompatible qualities" (C. D. Broad, Scientific Thought, p. 38). Now, this is a very clear and frank account of the paradoxical nature of space in the 'traditional concept of space'.

Geometry has got on somehow; as Bradley says: "this dilemma has been met often by the ignoring of one aspect, but it has never been, and it will never be, confronted and resolved". This is a little prophetic; but before we are in a position to admit it, we must yet see what modern philosophy of science has done about the 'incompatibility', which Dr. C. D. Broad has so clearly stated. We could then return to Bradley's criticism of space.

Now, the task before a philosophy of science is the task of rationalising such abstract concepts like Points, Instants, etc., and also to bridge the gulf there is between these highly abstract concepts, and the crude, but perceptible, relations of sense-experience. An area or volume, and relations between areas and volumes, are perceptible, while points are not. And yet mathematics states, exactly, the relations between entities which do not exist, but which are applicable to the facts of sense-experience. Metaphysics cannot altogether ignore the method by which the gulf between mathematics and sense-experience is attempted to be bridged. It cannot be neglected at least in discussing the nature of space and (of time); for, the laws of mathematics arise out of the problems of sense-experience, and again to return it in the language of applied mathematics. Now it is interesting to note that such an attempt has been made. I am not now going into the details of the theory, but give only the barest outlines of it. The problem is of general interest, as it lies, I think, on the borderland between Common Sense, Science and Metaphysics.

Whitehead has propounded a principle in order to deal with the 'incompatibility' which Dr. Broad notices in the definition of points, etc. It is a principle of the widest application. It is called The Principle of Extensive Abstraction, and is worked out in Whitehead's two 'epoch-making books', The Concept of Nature, and The Principles of Natural Knowledge. In the chapter on Time, in The Concept of Nature, the reader will find an interesting application of it to Time. Briefly stated, the 'principle' does not 'extend' abstractions; rather, 'dispenses' with them. It treats 'abstractions' in terms of their properties of 'extension'; i.e., in terms of classes. And, in doing so, it makes a great assumption, which metaphysics will seriously dispute. The assumption is this: it does not matter what the inner nature of a term is so long as we know what its mutual relations are. Then, any term will do the work of any other term, so long as it has the mutual relations. So in science, relations come to be looked upon as very important; more important than the nature of a term. Now let us apply this to the nature of space, and to the incompatibility in the definition of points, etc. The principle of 'Extensive Abstraction' interprets
such entities as ‘points’, etc., in terms of their classes. Space is analysable into smaller and smaller areas and volumes which form a series. It is out of this that the notion of a geometrical point arises. We can now see what a geometrical point is. It is not the limit of the series of volumes within volumes, but the entire converging series of such volumes. ‘We, therefore, boldly define points, not as the limits of such series, but as such series themselves’ (Broad, p. 44, ibid.). Thus, the phrase ‘converging to a point’, has meaning because of certain relations which hold between the volumes of the series. This principle is of very general application, and extends to such concepts as straight lines, instants, etc. There are many refinements of the theory which I have only touched. But the most significant point is the assumption made: viz., that the inner nature of a term is of secondary importance to its mutual relations. The Principle of Extensive Abstraction is of the highest importance to a Philosophy of Science; for, it has introduced an original and fruitful methodology in the sciences, and represents till now, the most helpful way in which the highly abstract, but exact concepts of mathematics, and the crude but perceivable or perceptible relations of sense-experience have been bridged. The method is fruitful and workable, but for metaphysics it is ‘theoretically unsatisfactory’ as Bradley would say. For, it substitutes one concept which is more difficult than another, and about which there is, in metaphysics, the greatest dispute: the concept of Relation. Science may not be interested in the inner nature of a term, but metaphysics is. The problem for metaphysics is this: is the nature of a term completely expressible in its relations? What is a relation? Are relations real? Science has not answered the question what is space, but it has stated that it is a relation. Now this is the precise point of the discussion for us to return to Bradley’s criticism of space, for, his main criticism of space which is in the nature of an antinomy is this: space is a relation, and yet it cannot be a relation.

Bradley claims to state the argument about space in “the form which exhibits most plainly the root of the contradiction and also its insolubility”. “Space is a relation which it cannot be; and it is a quality or substance which again it cannot be.” But I do not think that Bradley has worked out the logical consequences of the supposition, if space were a quality. Nor do I see the difference in the argument as stated in paragraphs 1 and 2 on pages 36 and 37 in his Appearance and Reality. If space is not a relation, it must be a quality, or a ‘thing’, for these are the most important of categories which are always used. I shall give a summary statement of Bradley’s argument as I understand it.
Space is ‘extension’. But it is not clear whether ‘extension’ means quality or relation. Descartes spoke of an ‘extended substance’, where the word ‘extended’, I think, is used adjectively, and so it may mean ‘quality’. Whether space is a ‘quality’ or ‘relation’, does not make any difference to the argument so far as I can see. If space is a relation, it is a relation between what, we must ask. If space is a quality, of what, we must ask. In neither case is space a relation between minds or a quality of them. Is space a ‘thing’? It may be. This pre-supposes that the notion of the ‘thing’ is free from the inconsistencies which beset the notions of quality and relation. In our discussion of the notion of the ‘thing’ we shall see that it is not the case. So it makes no difference whether space is a quality or a relation. Space may be an instance of the case where one and the same fact may be expressed either in terms of quality or relation. I have gone into this question merely to show that it is enough if we examine only one of the arguments about the nature of space, viz., space is either a relation or a quality, neither of which it can be.

Now the substance of Bradley’s argument appears to me to be of the following nature, and will revive memories of the discussion on relation and quality. Space is extension; and extension has extended parts, which are parts, but not kinds of space. These parts have again other parts, which again are extended, and so on. Now, space is a relation between parts of the extension, and these parts have again other parts. So, space is a relation of relations, which is an absurdity. Besides, what are parts of a relation? There is, here, therefore, the additional difficulty of a ‘relation having parts’, to the original difficulty of a ‘relation needing another relation’. The question, what are parts of a relation, should remind us of a similar difficulty in Plato’s earlier part of the Doctrine of Ideas. When Plato says, the ‘idea’ is present in the sense particular, the question is raised in the later theory, which is a criticism of the earlier, is the ‘idea’ present in the sense-particular as a whole or only as a part? Is the whole of whiteness present in milk or only a part? To answer it either way leads us to dialectical difficulties, for it entails the false doctrine that universals are divisible.

A similar difficulty appears to me to be implied in Bradley’s criticism of space. The proposition Space is a ‘relation of relations’, means that space has no terms to relate, for these vanish into relations. “Anything extended is a collection, a relation of extendeds and so on indefinitely. Space is a relation between terms which can never be found.”

I propose now to leave the argument about space without examining the question of motion in space and the contradiction which it entails.
Bradley appears to me to have in mind the kind of arguments used by Zeno and the Eleatics, for he says that motion has been criticised severely from an early time and has never been defended with much success. Instead of merely repeating Zeno’s dialectic against the reality of motion in space, I shall proceed to discuss Bradley’s treatment of Time.

**TIME**

Now, there is time under a ‘spatial form’ and there is the ‘pure form’ of time, which is independent of space. To the first, all the arguments urged against the reality of space, also apply. This I shall leave out altogether from discussion, and confine myself to a discussion of the sense in which time is independent of space. Whatever is in space is also in time, but that which is in time need not be in space. Now, with regard to time, Bradley appears to me to ask two questions, and the rest of the argument is merely a deduction from the answers to these questions. (a) What is time? or, how is it defined or is definable? (b) What is the essence or nature of time ‘as presented’? The answers given by him are: (a) that time is a ‘before in relation to after’; (b) the ‘now’ which is presented is not simple and indivisible but is a series. As the intrinsic nature of the pure form of time is ‘a before in relation to after’, and as the ‘now’ is time (presented), so the ‘now’ is a series within a series of ‘a before in relation to after’. All this is but a repetition of the argument against the reality of space. Although we intended to keep time independent of space, we have been unable to dissociate time from space altogether. And the argument repeated is apt to make the discussion tiresome, if not childish. The reader will be better advised, to read first Chapter XVIII entitled ‘Temporal and Spatial Appearance’, than worry himself with the futile subtleties of Chapter IV. In that later chapter, as the reader will see, nothing is sought to be demonstrated, but certain very important questions are posed. And the question raised is not about proof, but about logical possibility. Possibility is all that is required to prove reality, and the dictum is, ‘what is possible, that is necessary’. I said, earlier, that the metaphysical criterion of Contradiction and Coherence is modified, in an undetected way, by the criterion of Possibility. To say, ‘what is possible, is necessary’, has the appearance of a logical smoothness, and seems as if in that universe there is the promise of every wish being realised. But the real position is, I think, an expression of alternatives. Is it possible or, is it logically impossible, that time may be transcended in a higher experience? To assert the second is to be dogmatic.

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12 But see Chapter XLII, Russell’s *The Principles of Mathematics*, for a discussion and refutation of the logical implications of Zeno’s arguments.
Nothing is asserted by such questions, it is true, but the burden of proof is left to fall on the shoulders of the opponent, who becomes dogmatic, were he to deny the first.

I shall, therefore, leave out many of the arguments which Bradley advances against the reality of time, because they are usual. For instance, the argument such as this: that time and change are identical, and that both presuppose or entail something persisting and permanent, and that, only with reference to something permanent and persisting is time or change intelligible. Immanuel Kant worked out in greater detail the true conditions of time and change on the objective side, in the Analogies of Experience, and has pointed out the implications, on the subjective side, in the Transcendental Deduction, of 'perception of change'. The implication is that 'perception of change' involves, among other conditions, the ultimate condition of the numerical identity, and unity of the self. Nor am I concerned in any detail with Bradley's contention, which seems to me to be too obvious, that science itself involves a transcending of the temporal distinctions of Past, Present and Future. What is true, is always true, irrespective of time and place. This is the universal truth which is the foundation of science.

So, having cleared the ground, we may now concentrate on a difficult and brilliant possibility which Bradley asks us to consider. And, we can leap to it, if we understand or admit his theory, or definition, that time is 'a before in relation to after'. If it is so, then all events in time could be ordered into a series. The series may have sense or direction. That events form a series means, they exist inter-connected in time. Now, the question is, must there be an all-inclusive temporal series? There are the events of my waking life, and there are the events in my dream; but no event in the one is 'a before in relation to after' to an event in the other. And yet events in each are successive. Is it, then, possible that the 'successive' may not be temporal? This condition has got to be carefully explained in order to discover Bradley's meaning. In a syllogism there is succession, but no temporal antecedence or sequence. It is not, I think, this which Bradley means. Nor does he appear to me to mean by an 'all-inclusive series', a timeless series of terms in relation, such as the C-Series contemplated by McTaggart in the Second Volume of The Nature of Existence. The C-Series of McTaggart's theory, has direction or sense; it runs from the less inclusive to the more inclusive. At the end of C-Series, there is a Whole in which all the terms fall. And McTaggart's theory is, that time and change are phenomenal manifestations of the timeless C-Series. So, in McTaggart's theory, the timeless reality is yet a series, and within this fall
all terms. The timeless series of McTaggart appears to be like a straight line, and the sense or direction of the series would be from the less to the more inclusive. And so the series has sense. Now Bradley's brilliant suggestion is to ask us to reject even these conditions: (a) why should there be an all-inclusive (temporal or timeless) series? (b) why should there be an absolute sense, or, direction? "There might be," he says, "in the universe, several diverse phenomenal successions, and no succession would have a temporal relation to another succession, although within each succession the events would be related to each other in time". What does Bradley mean by "diverse phenomenal successions", which are not temporally related to each other, and yet, within each phenomenal succession, there being "a before in relation to after"? I can only imagine what the highly abstract possibility may be like, by the following illustration. Let me suppose that I hear a succession of notes, in which I can distinguish "a before in relation to after". And let me also suppose that I see a succession; and let me add, as a third, my experience of turning over the pages of a calendar. Now, each of these is temporal and serial, but no member of each series is in temporal relation to the other. Thus, I experience a "diverse phenomenal succession"; where each succession has no temporal relation to another succession, although within each series its members are antecedent and subsequent to each other. Thus there may be the "successive" without the same being the temporal; there may be diverse successions, but no "all-inclusive" series in which each of the three series I have mentioned, could be said to be earlier or later. They may, or may not, be simultaneous. In my experience all the three series are simultaneous, but simultaneity is, itself, a temporal relation. It is an act; and so, has a "before in relation to after". So even this will not do. It is not free from the difficulties of defining the "now". So it seems not impossible that: (a) there might be diverse phenomenal successions, where (b) no event is in temporal relation with another, although within each succession, there is "a before in relation to after". This is as far as I can tackle the problem. I must now go to others.

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14 This is such an important and intricate point that I can hardly do justice to it in a summary exposition. McTaggart, however, thinks that between "a diverse phenomenal succession," it may be possible to establish "a one-one correspondence", and thus "construct" a "common time-series". See Sections 615 and 616, Vol. II, The Nature of Existence. But anything "constructed" according to Bradley, is an appearance. See the discussion on self in this essay for the meaning of "construction".
IV

THE THING

Commonsense says ‘sugar is sweet’, ‘grass is green’, etc.; and these propositions imply the notion of the ‘thing’ and qualities which qualify the thing. The qualities are predicated of the thing. All this seems perfectly intelligible so far as we do not care to go deeper into the problem. What does the ‘is’ mean in ‘sugar is sweet’? Does the ‘is’ mean ‘is identical with’? Obviously not, for a thing is not identical with anyone of its quality, or with all its qualities. The ‘thing’ is other than its quality or its qualities. It is a substance. It is, moreover, the unity of its qualities. The correct way, therefore, of expressing this double aspect is not by the verb ‘is’, but by the verb ‘has’. Not that ‘sugar is sweet’, but ‘sugar has sweetness’. This raises even greater difficulties. What is the ‘it’ that has these qualities? What is the ‘it’ that is so related to its qualities? The ‘it’ seems to be a thing in-itself; or, the ‘it’ seems to be mere Being, which the Hegelians say is Nothing. (I do not agree with the Hegelian Identity of Being and Nothing. The Nothing is nothing only in so far as my language and thought are concerned. If being is negative, it is only conceptually negative, but not ontologically negative.) Our difficulty here is how to state correctly the relation between the ‘thing’ and its qualities without falling into two opposite errors: (a) Phenomenalism (the thing is identical with its qualities), and (b) the doctrine of the Thing-in-itself (the thing is other than its qualities). But we seem to be always falling into these two types of errors. Neither phenomenalism nor the thing-in-itself is the truth about reality.

Perhaps the notion of the ‘thing’ is a mere fiction. There is, perhaps, no ‘it’ or ‘thing’. The ‘thing’ is merely a name for the co-existence of qualities. Propositions in which the word ‘thing’ is supposed to occur could be translated without loss of meaning into propositions in which there is no such occurrence. Now is this way of treating the problem any helpful? No; for we dispense with the notion of ‘thing’ and we shall be talking about ‘qualities’. These become our logical subjects. Instead of talking of ‘sugar’ we shall talk of ‘sweetness’, ‘granularity’, ‘whiteness’, etc. Can we predicate one quality of another quality in the sense in which we predicate sweetness of sugar? We cannot. So, co-existence gives rise to the same difficulties. It is not mere co-existence that we should be talking about, but ‘co-existence with concord’. The qualities are not merely co-existing, but are in an arrangement which implies relations. We must, therefore, talk about both qualities and relations. We must, therefore, say
that a 'thing' is not just the plurality of its qualities, but the plurality of its qualities in such and such a relation. We assert relations between the plurality of qualities. Is this device any the more helpful? It will be seen that we have merely split up the 'thing' regarded as a unity, into discrete qualities and relations. We alternate between the notions of quality and relation. 'The 'thing' is not mere-co-existence of qualities; it is a relation between its qualities, for the 'thing' is 'co-existence with concord'.' If a 'thing' is not its qualities, is it then, the relations into which its qualities enter? Is the 'thing' a relation? So, the 'thing' escapes contradiction by alternately disappearing into qualities and into relations. It escapes contradiction 'by a kind of suicide'. 'The whole device is a make-shift'. 'It consists in saying to the outside world 'I am the owner of these my adjectives', and to the properties, 'I am but a relation which leaves you your liberty.' 'Such an arrangement may work but the theoretical problem is not solved.'

This is an analysis of the somewhat elusive nature of Bradley's discussion of the problem.

Let us turn to another aspect of the same problem: the identity of things. We must note that we are not discussing the logical relation or principle of Identity but the identity of things. If a 'thing' considered in its relation to its qualities cannot be made consistent, let us ask whether the notion of a thing in its relation to time or succession is more consistent. Is a thing identical with all its states taken together? or is it something over and above its states? We shall find that in all these questions, there arises an antinomy such as is involved in what Kant calls 'cosmological' questions. One or two points are at the outset clear. The so-called identity of a 'thing' is not derived from, nor dependent upon, the identity of its 'parts'. An organism has not identity of parts, yet it is one and the same organism. I think we should agree with Bradley when he says, "It is not always material substance, for we might call an organism identical, though its particles were all different. It is not always shape, or size, or colour, or again, always the purpose which a thing fulfils". If this is so, then in what does the identity of a thing consist? A 'thing' to be a thing or a thing to be identical must have (a) duration and (b) be capable of succession. This is the elementary or fundamental condition which Bradley lays down. In other words, a thing must be capable of occupying two instants or moments—one present and another past. Yet this condition is too narrow and too wide at once.

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15 This is a radical difference between Bradley and A. E. Taylor’s interpretation of Bradley. For Taylor seems to think that the clue to the problem of identity lies in teleological interpretation, Bradley rejects this.
A flash of lightning, a sneeze, an atom, a mountain, etc., would be a 'thing'. This condition does not make clear whether the distinction between an 'occurrent', and a 'continuant' is a necessary and a real distinction. It does not make it clear whether the distinction between a 'thing' and a 'process' is a valid distinction and whether all things are not really Processes. On the contrary, it appears to me to destroy the notion of the 'thing'. For a thing means that which occupies two instants of time; one present and another past. But this condition reduces the so-called 'thing' to a relation of 'its passages in its own history'.

There is yet another difficulty. The two-fold condition laid down does not make it clear to us whether all identity is strictly limited to periods only when we speak of change, or whether we imply notions of 'indestructibility', and 'survival of states'. It is not clear whether these are essential part of the meaning of identity (of things) or whether these notions can be dispensed with. It is not at all easy to prove notions like 'indestructibility,' and 'survival of states', etc., whereas the restricted identity of things as continuants (i.e., limited only to periods when we speak of change) seems sufficient for the logical foundations of science.

Lastly, we can please ourselves by asking another question: is all identity qualitative? Is the identity of a thing based upon one or more of its qualities? Is there one or more quality which remains the same. Is qualitative sameness the ground of substantial sameness or continuance? We can ask all these questions no doubt, but it is quite another problem to know how to answer these questions. In one sense all these questions are meaningless for they presuppose the distinction between Quality or the 'somewhat' of a thing and the 'that' or Being of the thing. But existence is a unity of the 'that' and the 'what'. These are two aspects of existence. So the distinction presupposed by these questions is not ultimately valid. There is no existence which is a mere that. So we can answer these questions in any way we please. We can say that all identity is qualitative sameness, because there is no mere existence. (In another sense also all identity is qualitative, because there is no mere numerical identity.)

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16 On the logical distinction of these terms, see W. E. Johnson: Logic, Vol. III, Chapter VII.
17 Dr. C. D. Broad makes the suggestion that the notion of 'Things' may be given up in favour of the notion of 'Processes'. There are, what he calls, "Absolute Processes". He distinguishes between 'macroscopic' and 'microscopic' processes. The latter are absolute. He says: "those macroscopic processes which are commonly regarded as translations of things are really transmissions of microscopic absolute processes," p. 163. But the whole discussion from pages 142-70 in Vol. I of his Examination, is most interesting.
tinction in character there can be no distinction, and the opposite would seem to be nonsense." The conclusion of all these premises is this: identity of things is not proved. It is a matter of degree, and 'depends upon the view we take of it'. So I can only say that on this question 'there is a meeting of extremes' in Philosophy, Absolute Idealism and Human Scepticism.

V

'THE CAUSE' AND 'THE BECAUSE'

The discussion on Causation may be conveniently brief for causation repeats practically all the dialectical difficulties involved in the notions of Relation, Space, Time and Thing. Now the greatest pity about this poor notion is that it has been so thrashed out by opposing schools of thought that it appears mutilated and is full of sores. One school of thought sees nothing in Causation than mere uniform sequence; while another school would bring it under the logical principle of Ground and Consequent and see in Causation a temporal exhibition of hypothetical, logical necessity of the form 'If P, then Q'. The relation of cause and effect is looked upon by some as a form of the logical law of identity: whatever is, is: whatever is not, never is. As against this, there is the view that the Effect is new. Such are the varying views, to mention only a few, about the relation of Causality. It has become indeed very difficult to know what exactly Causality is. Two things appear to be certain about it; that causality is less than logical entailment or necessity, and more than probability. It is left in this intermediate position, and may remain there for ever. And even science is not feeling too sure of this notion nowadays, and, when talking about it, science is apt to become metaphysical. The uncertainty about Causality allows me also a little caprice to deal with this notion as I like. I shall therefore confine myself only to certain very general difficulties about it.

What do we mean by "cause"? Cause is a "condition", but it is not merely a condition. It is "a sum of conditions". This is how it has been defined in Induction and Scientific Method. Now the whole problem is that, this definition gives rise to antinomies or regresses insoluble in metaphysics, but of no dire consequence to science. But this definition is so wide that the "sum of conditions" means simply the entire state of the universe at one time, followed by another entire state of the universe as its effect. The "sum" of conditions is merely another name for an endless series of causes traced backwards and backwards, and there is no completed end to such a series. The entire state of the universe at any one moment is not the cause
of anything in particular, but the cause of everything. It is the cause of different effects. And yet unless we are able to isolate Cause in science, we have not really discovered anything or proved a causal relation between one thing and another. But it is this which is metaphysically difficult, it is difficult to isolate cause.

Let us now take up another aspect of the problem. Are cause and effect "different" from each other, or are they identical? Is the effect something new from the cause? Cause and effect are neither utterly different from each other, nor is the relation between the two simply the relation of identity. It seems to me that whenever we hold either of these views we hold it on other grounds. It seems to me that these notions are derived from our ontology. I am disposed to accept Bradley's views. "Mere identity, however excellent, is emphatically not the relation of cause and effect." If cause and effect then are neither different from each other nor identical with each other then what are they? Is there between cause and effect, then, the so-called relation of "identity-in-difference"? Like all other notions this is a make-shift; for if there is a regress involved in the nature of relation, it is also involved in this relation.

Why did the body fall? We answer "Because the support gave way". We use the word 'because' but we do not ordinarily understand the difference in meaning between "cause" and "because". On this point I can do no better than quote Bradley, "You may say that one reality is the cause of another, and you may, if you please, add to this the second is because of the first. But, if you venture to convert this assertion, and assume that whenever you have a because you have also a cause, you fall into the error of the worst description. A cause is real, a because is ideal; you may have the one and do often have it when other is impossible. They do not always coincide, and where they coincide they are not identical" (Logic, 2nd Edition, Vol. I, p. 200). The philosophical difficulty about causation is the ambiguity of language, which does not keep the notion of 'cause' and the 'because' distinct from each other, for the former involves a regress, the latter does not.

VI

THE SELF

All the categories, Relation and Quality, Space and Time, Thing and Cause, have now proved inconsistent. They involve a regress. They leave unsolved two problems: (a) unity in diversity: (how anything can be one and many), and (b) (how anything is what it is) the problem of identity. All these categories are applicable to Nature or the physical world; and as
these have proved inconsistent, so the conclusion is that Nature or the physical world is inconsistent. There is in it no identity; if there is any, it is a matter of degree. Nor is there a rational way of explaining unity in diversity. So the question is: where is this to be found? "But we had heard somewhere a rumour that the self was to bring order into chaos." So what of this rumour? We shall find, in what follows, that this 'rumour' is only a rumour. The category of self is no better, for its identity is as much a matter of degree as the identity of a 'thing'. There is also, not a way, here, where unity is reconciled with diversity. I must add that, in subjecting the category of 'self' to severe criticism, Bradley does not deny that reality is spiritual. On the other hand, he is exposing, so it seems to me, the inconsistencies of empirical psychology. The two chapters entitled: *The Meanings of Self, The Reality of Self*, do not raise, exactly, the same kind of metaphysical subtleties as, for instance, are raised in the Paralogisms of Pure Reason in Kant's *Critique*. The two chapters carry on the discussion about the reality of the self on a lower, empirical level. I think the discussion in these two chapters, and that of the chapter entitled *Body and Soul* could be fairly well summarised by asking, and answering, the following questions: (1) What does the perception of succession involve? (2) Is the distinction between self and not-self absolute? (3) How far is Memory a reliable basis for the identity of person? (4) Is Feeling a new experience in which diversity and unity are reconciled? (5) Is there an 'intuition' of self-consciousness? (6) What is, after all, a body? and what is a soul?

(1) Now there is not only change or succession, but perception of change or succession. This no one will deny. How is this possible? In answering this question, Bradley does not take us, as Kant does (so it seems to me) into the transcendental grounds or conditions of the possibility of time-experience or succession. It seems to me that he raises a question in empirical psychology and the answer he gives must leave us profoundly dissatisfied. Bradley's very brief discussion is as follows: 18 Experience of succession is possible because of a *kind* of synthesis. This synthesis is an act. Is this act timeless or has it a lapse? Bradley's reply is that this act is not timeless, but has a 'relative lapse'. This act has 'a before and after', and so it is not timeless. If one psychical act is timeless, then, why should not other acts be timeless? "Presence is not absolute timelessness; it is any piece of duration, so far as that is considered from, or felt in, an identical aspect. And this mere relative absence of lapse has been perverted into the absolute timeless monstrosity which we have ventured to condemn."

18 See the chapter entitled *Motion and Change and its Perception*, pp. 49-53.
Bradley admits that in the experience of time, there is a double aspect, but he denies that there is anything transcendental in this. The unity of act which makes experience possible, is said to be a 'felt unity'. What is the difference, then, between Bradley's views and of Kant's on this point? It seems to me that Kant worked out more fully the so-called 'felt unity' and always tried to discover the transcendental ground of everything empirical. It is also true, however, that Kant warned us against a hasty inference of an indestructible psychical substance, or ego, based on the unity of experience necessary for the possibility of knowledge. I suppose something like this is also in Bradley's mind when he says that 'a mere relative absence of lapse has been perverted into the absolute timeless monstrosity'. It is necessary to note the double aspect involved in experience of succession but not to exaggerate the unity or synthesis involved, to a metaphysical monstrosity. So, Bradley says: "In other words, there is a permanent in the perception of change, which goes right through the succession and holds it together. The permanent can do this, on the one hand, because it occupies duration, and is, in its essence, divisible indefinitely. On the other hand, it is one and unchanging so far as it is regarded or felt, and is used, from that aspect" (italics mine.)

We seem to be always in a hopeless difficulty on this point and have to be careful not to allow our enthusiasm to get the better of our reason and desire for proof. That experience of succession is possible because of only "something permanent" which runs through and holds these successive events, is admitted by Bradley. But is the something permanent which is involved in experience or succession, absolute? That is the question; and it is not at all easy to answer the question straight away in the positive.

(2) Bradley's attempt to fix the meanings of self in Chapter IX of his Appearance can be easily disposed of. What does the self mean, is a question which is both psychological as well as metaphysical. It is not easy to separate the two. Bradley's discussion in Chapter IX seems to me to deal mainly with the psychological side of the question, and the treatment of the subject appears to me both superficial and imperfect.

What is self? Well, self is not body, for it is distinct from it. Self is not identical with 'the total filling of the man's soul at this or that moment'. Self is not 'the momentary self'. It must be, and is, beyond present time. Is the self, then, the man's 'average and constant mass of feelings'? No; it is not even this. The self is not even what is called a man's habitual self; for it is difficult to say exactly what is a man's habitual self. Man is such a changeable creature! A man's habitual self is dependent upon, and relative
to, the man’s environment, and therefore a thing relative and very, very fluctuating. It is useless to go on asking such questions, for if the self is not identical with the body, it is not identical with any of its own states: pleasure or painful (waking or dreaming, I must add), etc. Self is not this, it is not that, and it is not a hundred other things too.

It is impossible also to determine the meaning of self by drawing a distinction between what is called ‘self’ on the one hand, and ‘not-self’ on the other. For everything that was part of what is called ‘one’s self’ will be part of the ‘not-self’. One’s own past seems cut off from one’s own history, and to stand out as an alien something, while, on the other hand, any part of one’s physical environment (books e.g.) and now and then claim rights of being part of one’s own innermost (!) self. Whatever can become an object to me is the not-self; and there is nothing that cannot so become an object! My own self can, and does, become an object very proud for me to contemplate about. It is useless, therefore, to fix the meanings of self by drawing a distinction, or making out the boundary between self and not-self.

(3) The third question, is there identity of person is more interesting, and might appear as if there could be no doubt whatever about it or about its being proved. No; it is not easy. First of all, it is necessary to distinguish between a mere psychical continuant and a person. It is necessary to do so, because what we mean by ‘self’ may be what is called ‘one experience’. But the phrase ‘one experience’ is certainly ambiguous. The phrase ‘one experience’ may either mean: (a) ‘one for a supposed outside observer, or (b) one for the consciousness of the self in question’. An experience that is one for an outside observer may merely mean ‘one and the same psychical continuant occupying a certain strength of duration and undergoing change’. This is not enough. For the psychical continuant which is for an external observer is indistinguishable from a physical continuant like a chair or a table. This ‘psychical continuant’ is a mere series. So we have made no advance in our attempt to fix the meanings of self by merely talking of psychical continuity. What we are in search of is personal identity, and not mere psychical continuity.

If there is personal identity how is this to be proved? Now, a general condition of identity is not mere existence, but qualitative sameness. Let us suppose that we give up the point of view of the external observer and take, as our criterion, memory. Will memory, then, prove identity of person? Memory distinguishes, it is true, life from matter, self from body; but will it prove identity of person? No; for memory has its limits
and defects. This memory, which is supposed to prove oneness of experience, is itself not one. "Whether you take it across its breadth, or down its length, you discover a great want of singleness. This one memory of which we talk is very weak for many aspects of our varied life, and is again disproportionately strong for other aspects. Hence it seems more like a bundle of memories running side by side and in part unconnected."

So the conclusion here must be the conclusion reached as regards the identity of things. "Personal identity is mainly a matter of degree." "He who is risen from the dead may be really be the same, though we can say nothing intelligible of his ambiguous eclipse or his phase of half existence. But a man wholly like the first, but created fresh after the same lapse of time, we might feel too much to be one, if not quite enough to make two." And yet, I do not know on what grounds identity of person could be proved if memory as a criterion is rejected. It has been retained under a big name, by Plato as "Transcendental Recollection"!

(4) It may be argued that there is feeling, and that it is a new experience which reaves the self in a way in which no other experience reveals it. It may be also argued that in feeling there is an experience which has not the diversity or contradictions of relational form. In feeling we might say, there is a plurality of content held in a unity. Feeling marks out in a special way the distinction between, and the boundaries of, self and not-self and reveals the self as distinct from the not-self. But all these arguments do not stand examination. Feeling as an experience has nothing special about it,

Feeling is not really free from the inconsistencies of relational form; it has not overcome or transcended the dualism implied in relational form. On the other hand, diversity and relational form are implicit in it. They are there, although at present indistinguishable. In feeling, we have not overcome or transcended, the duality of subject and subject, but we have simply not yet distinguished between the dualism of a subject and object. So feeling has in it, all the features that later on develop into a subject and an object, into a self and not-self. If these distinctions of a self and not-self are implicitly present in feeling, feeling is not a new or a special mode of revealing self as distinguished from not-self. There is no such distinction at the level of experience called 'feeling'. There is no self as such and as distinct from not-self, to be revealed by feeling. Feeling reveals the not-self as much as it does the self. "Feeling, if taken as immediate presentation, most obviously gives features of what later becomes the environment". Besides, feeling has in it, in an implicit form, all the diversity of
relation and relations, duality and multiplicity, distinction and difference. To understand reality we have to understand distinction and difference; on the other hand, if feeling displaces understanding we have not understood reality. In Metaphysics our main task is to understand reality; and to have knowledge of it; to know reality. Feeling "is an apprehension too defective to lay hold on reality".

(5) The question : Is there an intuition of self-consciousness? is parallel to the previous question about feeling, and has similar difficulties. The main difficulty is about the meaning of 'intuition' and the relative claims of 'intuition' and 'understanding'. Are 'Intuition' and 'understanding' antithetical, or are they complementary? In metaphysics our main business is to understand reality; and 'the world is not understood' if 'understanding is left out'. Even if 'intuition' like feeling is a fact, it is not an understanding of the self or of the world. Intuition like feeling is a mere experience; and for intuition to claim to be a higher form of experience it must include understanding. And such experience is very different from the 'so-called intuition', which is not distinguishable from feeling. Besides, there is no intuition in which the subject and the object and the self and the not-self, are really the same. There is really no state in which the self intuits itself as an object. The 'self' has various meanings, and in one of its several meanings, it is possible, perhaps, to say ambiguously or vaguely, that the self is an 'object' to itself; but really and truly the self cannot be its object. It is a subject. There is no 'intuition' therefore, in which what is always a subject becomes, or is, an object; much less is there a perception or intuition in which the subject and the object, the self and the not-self, are the same. "The actual subject is never, in any state of mind, brought before itself as an object."

(6) What, after all, is a body and what is a soul? Are both these self-subsistent? Descartes said that body is an 'extended substance', and the soul a 'thinking substance'. Each is distinct from the other, but both are conceived as ultimately independent. Substance means in the Cartesian Philosophy independence and self-subsistence. Is this the case?

What is a body? A body is a part of the physical world or Nature. But Nature or the physical world is known only in relation to a body or body. Nature is known only in relation to my body, and my body is only known by my sense organs. These organs are physical, and so, like body or Nature, are themselves something experienced by some other organ, etc. Thus Nature presupposes body, and body is itself a part of Nature or the Physical World, and so on in a vicious circle,
It is a relation of one unknown to another unknown. Nature and body are experienced; and that which experiences these is not a part of either Nature or body. It is outside the physical series. These considerations destroy the self-subsistence of body. Body or Nature is a relation between two unknowns. Body or Nature is only an appearance, i.e., there is no self-subsistence either in Nature or body. Neither Nature nor body is a "Thing".

Is the 'soul' or the 'thinking substance', at least, a self-substent reality? Is it an independent "Thing". It is, perhaps, a higher reality than body but is it independent? If it is not independent, then it is an appearance, although it is more real than body.

Bradley's arguments bearing on this point are apt to produce total scepticism. To an enthusiastic and ardent idealist, Bradley's criticism of the self-subsistent character of Nature will make a welcome appeal, and probably afford him a sure foundation upon which he could conveniently base his idealism and the reality and independendence of the self or the soul. If the reality of the self or the 'thinking substance' is the main, or the only basis, for idealism, then Bradley's arguments against the independent reality of soul will have knocked away even that sole and secure foundation of a weaker idealism.

What then are Bradley's arguments to show that the 'soul' is an appearance? They seem to me to depend upon the meaning of the word "construction". For the 'soul' like the body, says Bradley, is an extension or construction of the 'this now'. Before we shall discuss this, let us ask the question whether the soul could be defined in terms of the body.

Is the 'soul' definable in terms of body? No. This part of the discussion is somewhat more metaphysical than the discussion on the meanings of self, and it is probably the reason why the word 'soul' is used in preference to 'self'. Now, what is a 'soul'? Can we say that the soul is a series of psychical events experienced within an organism, a body? No, for it is not proved that the identities of a body and a soul coincide. It is possible that a soul may have more than one body in succession and several bodies may be the instrument of a soul simultaneously. If the facts of abnormal psychology have any value, it is possible that one body may be the centre of more than one soul. The body, moreover, is only a part-condition of the soul, but not its entire condition or set of conditions. What is the body itself? It is nothing self-subsistent. It has its own conditions. If we suppose that there are intervals during which the soul is 'absent', then during these moments the soul may disappear into the body, and the body, then, may be
spoken of as a ‘potential soul’. But the body itself has its own conditions into which it may be dissolved when the soul is absent. So these ulterior conditions or set of conditions of the body cannot be strictly called "body". If so the continued existence of body is not essential for the sameness and unity of a soul. Therefore, a definition of the soul need not include reference to an organism as an essential part of it.

Then how is the soul to be defined? The soul must be defined exclusively in psychical terms. It must be defined in terms of the facts of immediate experience. These facts are psychical events. They are particular psychical events, some of which are directly experienced, and all are temporal. So, what is called ‘the soul’ is ‘group of psychical events’, in so far as these happen in time. From these facts we have to arrive at a progressive definition of the ‘soul’. We do not mean by the soul any one of the particular psychical events, nor even some part of the psychical series, for it would be less than the soul. We have to view the whole series in their continuity and identity. Thus what is called the soul is (a) a finite centre of immediate experience, (b) having a certain temporal continuity of existence, and (c) identity of character.

Now it is largely true that the whole of this series is not directly experienced. It is not given. It is largely ‘ideal’. It is necessary to transcend the momentariness of immediate experience; and yet when this transcendence is made possible, there is the unpleasant fact that this is not given or directly experienced or ‘presented’. It is a construction. So what is called ‘the soul’ is a construction out of particular psychical events. Now Bradley’s notorious complaint against this ‘ideal construction’ is, that it is treated as a thing. "Take a fleeting moment of your given, and then from the basis of personal identity of feeling, enlarge this moment by other moments and build up a ‘Thing’. Idealise ‘experience’ so as to make its past one reality with the present, and so as to give its history a place in the fixed temporal order. Resolve its contingency enough to view it as a series of events, which have causal connections both without and within". This is ‘the soul’ an ideal construction and yet seeking to be regarded as a ‘thing’. And yet this soul, this ideal construction, is still temporal. It has transcended the given moment, but has not transcended the temporal. And being in time, this soul, this ideal construction, yet seeks to reach after "the unbroken unity of content with reality". If this soul, this ideal construction, is not "an adjective of the body", it is yet "an adjective of the temporal series." This ideal construction of a psychical series, which is treated as a ‘thing’, has not overcome the conflict of the ‘that’ and the ‘what’, of being and content. It has not only not overcome the dualism between the ‘that’ and the ‘what'
but repeats the dualism throughout its indefinite past and the remote future. The soul is an appearance because it is an ‘ideal construction’. And an ‘ideal construction’ would still be *temporal*. It would make an indefinite extension of a given series possible, but would not make it *non-temporal*. This seems to me to be the point of Bradley’s objection against the self-subsistent character of ‘the soul’.

A distinction, however, would suggest to most of us at this stage. If it is true that ‘the soul’ is an ‘ideal construction’ by whom, or for whom, is this an *ideal* construction? May not this construction be a state of another psychical centre? If so, is there any vicious regress? Is this second psychical centre finite or infinite? These are rather difficult questions and we must proceed to answer these as far as we can. I do not, however, agree with Bradley’s view that there is a vicious regress here. “Just as the body was for Nature, and upon the other hand Nature merely through relation to a body, so in a different fashion it is with the soul. For thought is a state of souls and therefore if made by them, while upon its side, the soul is a product of thought.” This seems to me to be a vicious ambiguity of *language* and the word ‘thought’ does not mean the same in the two contexts. Any amount of such regresses can be constructed based upon linguistic ambiguity. I must deny therefore that there is any regress here, but it does not change the problem.

The problem remains unsolved. “You cannot show how the series becomes a system in the soul; and, if you could, you cannot free that soul from its perplexed position as one finite related to other finites”. In the end the question is ‘the soul’ real or unreal means, are souls real or unreal? So in denying the self-subsistence and independence of the soul, or the self, Bradley appears to me to deny the self-subsistence and independence of plurality of souls. In absolute reality the souls would be, but not as such. Like every other form of appearance, they would be transmuted and absorbed. (If body and soul are appearances, then the problem of the relation between body and soul is not of metaphysical importance, and any theory of their relation will be unsatisfactory. Thus, I dismiss that problem.)

This concludes the exposition of what I consider the significant portion of Part I of Bradley’s *Appearance and Reality*, and of the most important categories, and his theory of ‘appearance’. The result is negative. In Metaphysics to have come to the end of it, is really to have begun it. The interesting contribution of Bradley’s system lies in Part II of his *Appearance and Reality*, for it deals with the nature of *reality*. I propose to continue the more delightful labour of its exposition when the world is more delightful.
Note.—With reference to my discussion of the two kids of infinite series suggested by Russell I feel (in reading the proofs) that an additional Note is necessary, since it is the crux of the whole problem. The best way is to quote the sentence from the *Principles of Mathematics*, and to comment upon it and analyse its meaning. This is what Russell says: “If \( A \) be a proposition whose meaning is perfectly definite, and \( A \) implies \( B \), \( B \) implies \( C \), and so on, we have an infinite regress of a quite unobjectionable kind. This depends upon the fact that implication is a synthetic relation, and that, although, if \( A \) be an aggregate of propositions, \( A \) implies any proposition which is part of \( A \), it by no means follows that any proposition which \( A \) implies is part of \( A \)” (Second Ed., p. 349).

(a) If ‘any’ proposition which \( A \) implies is not part of \( A \), then, there is at least, *some* proposition which \( A \) implies, which is part of \( A \). Thus \( A \) may imply \( B \), \( B \) imply \( C \), so on, and, \( C \) might not be part of \( A \). It will be ‘part of a part \( A \)’, since, \( B \) is part of \( A \).

(b) On the other hand, it is quite possible to take the phrase ‘any’ literally, and say, that *even \( B \)*, which \( A \) implies, is *not* part of \( A \). So *no* proposition which \( A \) implies is part of \( A \). If so, then, \( A \) will be an unrelated monad or thing-in-itself. This would be but a consequence, or illustration, of the doctrine of ‘external’ relations.

(c) There is another line of argument. If \( A \) be an aggregate of propositions, and if Implication is a synthetic relation, and yet, any proposition which \( A \) implies is *not* part of \( A \), in what sense of “Implication” does \( A \) ‘imply’ *any* proposition? Now, in one sense it is true to say, that a proposition about the colour of my coat is *no* part of the proposition about myself. It is also true that a proposition about the colour of my coat is not *deducible* from a proposition about myself as a human being. In this sense it is true to say that “it by no means follows that any proposition which \( A \) implies is part of \( A \)”.

(d) Still, in what sense does \( A \) imply the ‘aggregate of propositions’? Whatever the sense may be, it is certainly distinct from that conception of Implication, which, according to Bradley, will enable us to start “from any one character in the Universe”, such that, “you could from that pass to the rest” (p. 580, *Appearance and Reality*, Seventh Impression, 1920).

(e) If this view of Implication be correct, the Universe will be ‘through and through implicated’, and, *any* proposition about \( A \), for example, will be part of \( A \). This is not of course proved nor, is it easy to prove. Nor, is it on the other hand proved, that any proposition which \( A \) ‘implies’ is not part of \( A \). Where then are we to draw the line between: What is part of \( A \) and what is not part of \( A \)? And what does ‘part’ or ‘part of’ mean in the context?