CHAPTER IV

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PROFESSOR JAMES WARD

I

Of the current systems of pluralism the least unsatisfactory is that of Professor James Ward. It is an honest attempt to stand within the realm of thought and face the dangers and difficulties of pluralistic conceptions. Starting from pluralism, Ward attempts to show that by itself it is inadequate and must give place to a theism. Ward does not want to give up logic for the sake of his philosophy; he does not stifle the demands of intellect simply because intellect is inconvenient, and makes him conscious of the limitations of his views. He frames his system on the pattern of Leibniz's Monadology, though he does not slavishly imitate it. He knows that if Leibniz had followed out the consequences of his doctrines, he would have been led to the monism from which he sought to escape. The infinity of God and the world, the absolute determination of every event, the eternal dependence of the infinite number of monads on a central spirit would leave no room for real struggle and endeavour, but would lead to a monistic unity where all things are one. Ward assigns to himself the task of revising Leibniz's Monadology, dropping out all doctrines which are incompatible with a pluralistic scheme of things.

Ward accepts the fundamental motive of Leibniz's Monadology. He is decidedly against absolutism. Absorption of the all in the One he cannot tolerate. As a
psychologist, he takes his stand on experience, and the most patent fact of experience is the plurality of individuates. Materialism and absolutism both deny the reality of this plurality, and so Ward dismisses them as false theories. As against materialism, he argues for the reality of spirit; as against absolutism for the reality of many spirits. He knows that the time-spirit requires that he should recognize the manyness of facts. "It will be well, too, as regards method to let the spirit of the time lead us; turning aside from what has been described as 'naturalism's desert on the one hand, and the barren summit of the Absolute on the other,' to follow the historical method as far as possible in tracing the gradual evolution of ideas, but trusting to speculative methods only in the endeavour to divine the most satisfactory solution of the problems to which they give rise" (P. and T. p. 24).1

In the first series of Lectures on Naturalism and Agnosticism, Ward establishes the futility of the naturalistic and agnostic assumptions about the constitution of the universe and man’s place in it. Naturalism regards the world as a single mechanical system of constant mass and energy, and mental reality as an epiphenomenon or a by-product of the physical evolution. The three props of this system are (1) the mechanical theory which resolves all physical processes into movements of masses, (2) the theory of evolution which believes in the production of organic from inorganic beings, and (3) psychophysical parallelism which thinks of the psychical series as running parallel with the physical series without entering into causal relations with it. Ward points out that even the scientists recognize that the scheme of atoms and their dance is only a rough notation and not a real account of the actual world. When we take the real categories of science as distinct from the descriptive ones, such as dynamic causation, unity or nature and purpose, we see that they are all derived from the subject side of experience. While in all experience we

1 Unless otherwise stated all references are to Materialism and Theism.
have a subject-object relation, in science we confine our attention exclusively to the object side. Ward succeeds in showing that the physical series is something more than mere particles in motion, that the theory of evolution cannot account for the life and purpose of the universe, and that the events of the mental series are not simply parallel with those of the physical. The impossibility of a connected view of the whole universe of experience as a complete mechanical system is proved. Simply because matter and motion do not account for organic growth and mental processes, it does not follow that idealism is the true hypothesis; for it may well be that while materialism does not account for mind, mind does not account for matter. If materialism does not account for history, it may be that spiritualism does not account for science. The world may be broken into the two parts of man and nature, mind and matter. We should then have to be content with a dualism which posits the existence of two utterly disparate but equally real worlds, a world of matter and a world of mind. This theory is criticised as having its origin in an intellectual confusion between duality and dualism. Experience is a subject-object relation, and therefore a duality in unity. Though the two aspects can be analytically discriminated, they cannot be actually separated. Dualism mistakes logical distinction for actual separation. The hypothesis of abstract absolutism which holds that reality is something different from mind and body, a eternus quid, a neptunum behind mind and matter, is next considered, and dismissed as philosophically unsatisfactory. A spiritualistic hypothesis is suggested as the only satisfactory guide that takes account of all the concrete facts of life and experience. "It is only in terms of mind that we can understand the unity, activity and regularity that nature presents. In understanding we see that nature is spirit." (N. and A., vol. i, p. 19).

We have no quarrel with Ward thus far. As a matter of fact all idealists are grateful to him for the service he
has rendered it freeing idealism from the objections of mechanism and agnosticism. But when from the established conclusion that the world is spiritual, Ward proceeds to argue that nothing really exists but spirits, we feel considerable hesitation in following his lead. Once again the dominant motive is his interest in ethical and religious idealism. The progress from spirit to spirits is due to his terror of the monistic tradition which holds up a dead inhuman unity in which all life is extinguished and distinction abolished. Absolutism, or Singularity as Ward prefers to call it, believes that "beyond the universe of the many (minds or spirits) there is a single transcendent experient, who comprehends the whole" (P. and T. p. 228). Taking his stand on experience, Ward finds that it is impossible for him to feel that the world in which he acts is merely a shadow or an appearance of the one substance. The individuals in the world are experiencing subjects quite as much as God himself. The world is full of knowing, feeling and willing subjects. "This world immediately confronts us not as One Mind nor even as the manifestation of One but as an objective whole in which we discern many minds in mutual interaction" (P. and T. p. 3). Ward contends that while Hegel starts with the right premise of pluralism, he draws a wrong conclusion from it, viz. absolutism. When once we reach unity of this type, we cannot get plurality from out of it. Ward also refers to the panlogistic strain of Hegelianism which makes the historical development of the world the phenomenal unfolding of the timeless Absolute Idea, which is the sole reality. In contrast with this, he proposes to regard the historical development as real and not apparent. The development of the world is a process of creative synthesis. The world of moments is a real history. Its evolution is not merely the explication of the old but an epigenesis or a creative process in which the subjects themselves are the agents. Reality is a realm of ends, a progressive epigenetic process in which the ideal aspirations of individual subjects are realized. Though Ward recogni...
that there must be some unity among the minds of the world, he is not prepared to say that there is as much unity as absolutism postulates. For, if there should be so much unity, then the appearance of the many would be inexplicable. Absolutism seems to care nothing for the facts of experience but goes on its own "high prior road."

"In the nights of pure thought up to the Absolute, the atmosphere of empirical fact by which it is sustained is too diffuse to be detected, and when the summit is reached, the particular, the many of actual experience tend to disappear or to beexplained away" (P. and Z. p. 23). In whatever manner we may conceive of the Absolute, whether as Absolute Subject with Fichte, or as Absolute Substance with Spinoza, or as Absolute Self with Hegel, it cannot offer an explanation of the multiplicity of the world. The reality of the many is annihilated and abolished in it. Ward urges that we cannot call the Absolute a Mind, since the essential characters of mind as known to us are absent there. Mind, as we know it, is a relation of subject and object which are not separable, though distinguishable. If the Absolute is a mind without the distinction of subject and object, i.e. if it transcends this distinction, then its unity and nature are incomprehensible to us. We have no right to call it mind at all. There are thinkers who consider that the Absolute is in some sense its own other. But if we make the idea of the Absolute its other, then the finite minds are reduced to the passing thoughts of the Absolute. Or it may be contended that the necessity for an other points only to the limitation of finite minds, and it need not be a characteristic essence of mind as such, in which case there is no other for the Absolute.

We may at once admit that the crux of absolutism lies in the relation of the finite minds to the Absolute. But as we shall see, Ward has the same difficulty in exhibiting the relation of God to the finite centres. But no one absolutist of the present day thinks that Reality is a One exclusive of the Many, though the solutions
of the problem of the relation of the One and the Many till now put forward, may not be considered quite satisfactory in every way. On examination we shall find that Ward's theory is satisfactory only when it conforms to the traditions of concrete idealism, but is unsatisfactory when it sets itself up against them in its zeal for a pluralistic construction of experience.

II

Experience is the starting-point for the theist, the pluralist, and the absolutist alike; the differences arise later. Whatever point of view we occupy in philosophy, we cannot but "begin our inquiry about the universe as a realm of ends" (P. and T. p. 432). We take the many as given, but even Ward admits we cannot end with it. Pluralism can be accepted only 'within limits.' It has to be supplemented before it can be accepted as the ultimate truth. While the pluralist stops short at the totality of finite experiences, the theist tries to satisfy the religiously-minded by positing a transcendent God. The absolutist affirms that pluralism and theism should find their fulfilment in the reality of an objective spirit. It is inaccurate to say that while pluralism starts with experience and proceeds upwards, absolutism starts with the absolute and ends there. Absolutism also starts with the pluralistic vision, but while Ward says that pluralism has to be supplemented by theism, the absolutist contends that it has to be supplemented by absolutism. To both it is obvious that while we start with the many we cannot conclude with it. There is more unity than appears at first sight. Absolutism has no other basis than things as they are. But it soon finds that finite and human experience has to be transcended, and in the last analysis, absolutism recognises only one experience, and that is the real. The uncritical acceptance of pluralism has to be modified before it can be turned into the final truth of the universe. But
whether the modification should be in the direction of theism or absolutism, is the problem.

III

From experience, Ward says, we learn that all that is real is minds or individual centres of force and apperception. The world is an indefinite variety of psychical existences, of different degrees of perfection, all tending to self-realisation. Each of them is a self. No two of them are exactly alike. The world as it comes to us in experience is a many, a system of individuals which interact. The history of the world is a real creative evolution. We see in it a steady progress towards greater individuality as well as solidarity. Though we have at the beginning a number of free spontaneous independent monads acting at random, we have gradually more and more integration. The world is a slow organisation of conflicting individuals into an ordered whole. The history of biological organisms and human societies testifies to this growing unification. We may reasonably expect that perfect unification will prove to be the goal of the world. Yet this unity is not the starting-point, but only the culmination. It is the goal but not the ground of the process. The universe is not a unity differentiated into a plurality, but a plurality organising itself into a unity.

Our difficulties in regard to this theory may be stated thus: Is it possible to view the whole world as spiritual in the sense that everything in it is a spirit with its duality of subject and object? Does not this theory lead us in solipsism? And does not any attempt to get over solipsism take us straight to the hypothesis of an all-comprehensive absolute mind? Thus Ward's philosophy provides us with a freedom and immortality really different from the absolutistic conceptions thereof? Can the growing unity of the world be accounted for on the basis of a radical pluralism? If theism is necessary to supplement
pluralism, is not this supplementing unreal and ineffective unless the theist’s God is identified with the Absolute Spirit? These are some of the questions we propose to consider in this chapter.

IV

Idealists will appreciate Ward’s thorough and searching criticism of pluralism and will assent to his proposition that ultimate reality is spiritual in its nature. But it is not easy to understand how all reality is psychical. Exposing the fallacies of the dualistic metaphysics does not necessarily amount to proving the non-existence of matter. To dichotomise the world into the two opposed parts of nature and soul is wrong, for everywhere matter serves as the environment for the soul. We cannot follow Ward when he says that in this world we have all persons and no things. We can understand his proposition that matter is not opposed to spirit in the sense that it is an element in the spiritual world, and that the distinction of matter and mind lies within the life of the spirit. We agree to the proposition that the ultimate metaphysical principle is mind or spirit, but we cannot consent to the view that matter is mind. Ward’s contention that experience is a subject-object relation, a duality in unity, may be admitted. For it only shows that matter is not an object in itself unrelated to a subject. Materialism is mistaken if it believes that matter can exist by itself. It can exist only as an element in a larger whole. Philosophers who are of opinion that nature is the object of spirit, the material universe the object of the world-soul, admit this plea. But when it is argued that physical facts are solved, that matter has its own duality in unity, we do not find it easy to follow. To say that mechanism can get its ultimate interpretation only in terms of mind is one thing; to say that mechanism is mind, quite another. To say that the world is not through and through mechanical is one
thing; to say that it is through and through psychical is another. The former emphasizes the relativity of
man and nature, but the latter asserts the identity of
the two. The former says that nature is only the other
of the idea but not its copy, while the latter reduces
the world to a series of spiritual atoms. The former
is the hypothesis of absolute idealism, the latter that
of panpsychism. Absolute idealism urges that there is a
part of nature which is mechanical but it is subordinate
to the spiritual. The mechanism of the world serves the
ends of spirit. It is an instrument for the life of mind.
Matter in not an end in itself. Ward recognizes this when
he says that just as machines contrived by conscious agents
for industrial purposes serve the ends of man, even so
the mechanism of the world aids man in his upward
ascent. But as the machine is not the mind of man who
made it, even so nature is not spirit for which it exists.

The first argument which Ward advances in support
of his theory of panpsychism is the inadequacy of mechan-
ism to account for mind. "While it may be possible,
setting out from mind to account for mechanism, it is
impossible setting out from mechanism to account for
mind" (P and T, p. 18; see also p. 431). "The con-
cepts of physics are inadequate to the description of life,
even in its lowest forms" (p. 31). Ward emphasizes the
distinction between matter and life, mechanism and
individuality, science and history. "The world of
science is a world of mechanism as much as ever, in-
variable in its ultimate constituents and absolutely
determined in all its movements. Given its state at
any moment, then all its previous, equally with all its
subsequent, movements are calculable." In the world
of history we find that facts, individuals, purpose
and meaning, progress or decline are the essential
elements of which it is composed." ("Mechanism and
Morals," Hibbert Journal, iv. 81-82). Ward contrast
law with fact, universality with individuality. He holds
that history describes unique individuals while science
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deals with laws. If science teaches an individual, it reduces him to a type, makes him an instance of a law. "The tendency of science is to diminish the seeming variety of the world and ultimately to eliminate it. Qualities in the end are to be resolved into diverse arrangements of prime atoms, corpuscles or electrons, differing in nothing but their positions and motions. For pluralism, quality is vital" (P. and T. p. 65).

The undeniable impossibility of explaining mind by matter proves not the psychical nature of matter but the ultimate supremacy of spirit in the world. Mind can account for matter; matter is intelligible to spirit. This shows only that nature is not an alien 'other' but has its ground and being in the same spirit, which at one stage expresses itself as matter and at another as the human self. Ward utters this truth in the midst of opposition. For he says, "The world of science and the world of history have little or nothing in common; their terminology, their categories, their problems are wholly different; and so too are the philosophical questions to which they severally and immediately give rise. The one never reaches the individual and the concrete, the other never leaves them; for the one spontaneity and initiative are impossible, for the other inexcus and rigorous concatenation; to the one the notions of end and value are fruitless, nay meaningless, for the other they are of paramount importance, and yet the two cannot be separated, for Nature not only provides the scenery and properties of history, but the actors themselves seem to have sprung from its soil, to owe their position largely to its cooperation and to come into touch with each other solely through its means" (pp. 2-3). While nature is opposed to life, it is still intimately related to life. There is continuity as well as discontinuity between life and matter. In contrasting law with individuality Ward makes the mistake Bergson does. We have creative synthesis even in the material world. When water is produced from a combination of certain proportions of oxygen and
hydrogen we have a synthesis which is creative, a novel production. The distinction between science and history is to be traced to Kant, who misconceived the nature of knowledge by confining it to the physico-mathematical type. The human and the historic cannot be reduced to this type. The world is not ultimately the working out of any mathematical necessity, but the realisation of an increasing purpose running through the ages. Mathematical science gives us the law or the concept which the historical deals with the real or the individual. Then we should require to aim at a direct and not a scientifically mediated experience of reality; for the moment science touches it it creates a barrier between the mind and the object. But this whole account is a misconception. The object of science is not the abstract universal any more than the object of history is the concrete individual. The two, fact and law, run together. The difference between naturalistic and historical knowledge is only of methodological value. The laws bind history too. The difference between science and history is not one of reason and unreason, law and anomaly. It is reason everywhere which manifests itself in diverse ways in different material. Knowledge is everywhere conceptual, trying to grasp reality in the fitness of its aspects. In naturalistic sciences the recurring aspects predominate and so the category of mechanism is applied; in historical sciences the non-recurring aspects predominate and so we employ the category of teleology. Both the scientist and the historian have the same end in view, but adopt different devices to suit different material. That is all the difference. Why should the disability of matter to account for mind point to the panpsychist conclusion? In Ward’s philosophy, it might to prove nothing. For, according to him, the progress of the world is made up of a series of accidentals. The growth of the world is characterised by epigenesis or creative synthesis involving new beginnings which are discontinuous with the old.
If epigenesis is a fact, then there is no surprise in the rise of life out of the womb of matter. When Ward argues that mechanism cannot account for mind, he rejects epigenesis and thinks that matter cannot give rise to something totally different from it in nature. In other words, i.e. denies the reality of epigenesis and disallows all new beginnings. When emphasis is laid on the inadequacy of matter to mind, Ward is under the impression that out of the material only the material can come, and not the vital or the mental. Idealists agree with this view that while the inorganic in the physical processes preclude those in which life and mind manifest themselves, still they cannot account for them. The lifeless cannot give rise to the living. While matter is the prelude to mind it is not an explanation of it. But when from this position Ward jumps to the conclusion that we are to get rid of the apparent breaches of evolutionary continuity by supposing that "the level of self-conscious existence of spirit, in the narrower sense is reached continuously by development through earlier stages of more or less conscious life" (P. and T. pp. 264-265), and that the world starts with a number of monads, feeling and striving subjects coative in their nature which, on account of their initial instability and impulse of betterment, come into relations with one another and help the onward march of progress, we must say that this is all a conjecture and not a reasoned theory. The apparent breaches of evolutionary continuity occur not only between the lifeless and the living, but also between the living and the conscious, and the conscious and the rational. Evolution fails to explain not only the progress from matter to life, but also from life to mind, and from mind to reason. Physics cannot account for biology any more than biology for psychology or psychology for logic. If there is continuity between life and mind, and mind and reason, then there is as much continuity between life and matter; if there is discontinuity between life and matter, then there is as much discontinuity
between life and mind or mind and reason. It is not only the material that cannot account for the mental, but the vital also fails. The animal mind cannot account for the human. Ward feels the "growing psychological discrepancy between man and brute" (p. 90). An appreciation of these facts should have led him to admit that nature comes into existence for us as something opposed to the self, and that from thence there is a steadily growing attempt on the part of self to overcome the externality of nature. The self begins by opposing the world to itself and ends by finding itself in it. The self becomes fully self-conscious through the mediation of externality. The initial opposition of self and object is broken down. The object becomes conscious of itself in us. This is what Hegel means when he says that nature comes to self-consciousness in man. In man matter loses its rigidity and becomes fluid. It becomes transparent to mind. From the historical point of view, nature is mind not yet come to itself, while from the logical, nature is mind out of itself (p. 154). In the historical world we see that nature in its isolation or pure externality, which is the ideal limit, gradually grows into the individualities of the physical bodies, biological organisms and human personalities. The process of nature, while not spiritual from the beginning, still helps the progress of spirit. The breaches of continuity in the historical world cannot be accounted for unless we suppose that there is an all pervading spirit of which the several parts are the lower and higher manifestations. These are the successive attempts of nature to return to spirit from which it has issued.

The second argument which Ward adduces to establish the psychical nature of the world is the consideration that mind is always implicated in life. In biological evolution there is a teleological factor. We have here the principles of self-conservation and subjective selection. Those "teleological factors imply not a nondescript force called vital, but a psychical something endowed with feeling and
will. Finally, recalling our survey of evolution in the wider sense, we have seen that, unless the cosmos itself is to be regarded as a finite and fortuitous variation persisting in an illimitable chaos, we must refer its orderliness and meaning to an indwelling, informing Life and Mind" (N. and A. ii. 302). But this only proves that there is an all-pervading mind and not that everything is a self. If the former hypothesis is enough, we do not need the latter. The law of parsimony requires that we should not multiply entities without necessity. If nature is teleological, if it conforms to human intelligence and is amenable to human ends, it only shows that the opposition between the two is not absolute (see N. and A. ii. 254). Ward argues that to call descriptive schemes "pure or rational science is to emphasize its source in mind; and when this intelligible scheme of our devising with which the scientific inquirer greets Nature is confirmed by Nature's response, are we not justified in concluding that Nature is intelligent or that there is intelligence behind it?" (P. and T. p. 5). The two alternatives are not the same. Nature is intelligible but not intelligent. There is unity between nature and mind but not oneness.

The next argument is that based on the law of continuity. Granting that there is guidance or direction in vital processes, does this prove that it is a mind that is everywhere present? Ward appeals to the law of continuity. "Of such guidance or direction we have immediate experience only in the case of our own activity, as in building a house or organizing a business. It may well seem rash, therefore, to attribute such processes as the formation of chlorophyll in a blade of grass or of albumen in a grain of corn to guidance in this sense. But at all events they are processes pertaining exclusively to living organisms and found nowhere else... But it may be asked, what right have we to identify life and mind; what right, for example, to credit plants with souls as Aristotle did? The right that the principle of continuity
gives us. No sharp line can be drawn between plants and animals, nor between higher animals and lower" (Heredity and Memory, pp. 7-8). But continuity is just the problem to be explained. It is a neat summary up of the question and not its solution. The only argument which Ward offers in support of continuity is this. "Recent knowledge has shown the range of life to extend far into the region of what was once regarded as the inanimate, purely physical world, and it has further shown the lowest known organisms to be highly complex and extremely varied. But there is nothing to suggest that we have reached the limits of life; all we can say is that our senses and the artificial aids and methods of research at present available do not enable us to discriminate between yet simpler forms of life and their environment; not that they do not exist." (T. and T. p. 22). We cannot say that they do exist. It is an open question. They may exist or may not. But there is no doubt that we have a limit to life in there is matter or mere externality. And even though life were present throughout, it would not follow that it is present in the form of an object. Logically the argument would require us to consider continuity to be complete from matter to matter. The law of continuity brings out an essential truth that while matter is necessary to life, life is necessary to mind, and so on. But it does not ask us to reduce all the complex facts of experience to a single type.

The next argument of Ward is that we cannot have an inanimate object; for "what can neither do nor suffer, what is nothing for itself, is truly nothing at all; every individual thing, so far as it lies, endeavors to persist in its own being" (p. 21). Nature, if real, must be a plurality of sensitive individuals. Now it will be conceded that all objects tend to persist in their own being; but is this tendency an impulse? and is every impulse a causal? If pluralism believes that every object is a self with a concrete impulse localized in it, it is an assumption. "Pluralism assumes that the whole world is made
up of individuals, each distinguished by its characteristic behaviour” (p. 57; italics not the author’s). This is Ward’s belief that throughout we have spontaneity, though not absolute activity. Since the materialist’s atom is completely determined from without and has no spontaneity, it is unreal. Wholly inert things which are mechanically related to each other are unreal. In a world of pure matter thus conceived motion would be impossible. On the panpsychist theory, matter is to be regarded as “the manifestations of the interaction of perceptive and appetitive monads or entelechies” (p. 63). The changes of the material world are due to any transcendent cause, but to the “impulses initiated and determined by feeling” (ibid.). But all this is the statement of the theory and not its proof. When driven into a corner, Ward admits that panpsychism is simply a matter of faith. He only proves that there is no such thing as a mere potentiality unrelated to any mind. It is merely the lower limit which is always in conjunction with a higher limit. The upper and the lower limits are the ideal abstractions which are found present in all the monads. “So then it would seem that as the unattainable upper limit of pluralism points towards an absolute unconditioned Being transcending the Many, so the unattainable lower limit points towards an indeterminate Being that affords no ground for the discrimination of individuals at all” (p. 136). The lower limit is the Prakriti or the bare potentiality of matter or non-being. Any attempt to regress to the lower limit takes us to the notion of pure potentiality, and this, of course, Ward admits to be an abstraction. If it should exist by itself, then we would require a Prana Minor from outside to set it in motion. And so he says that the first concrete living individual is a mixture of both and has in it the tendency to act. What we have is only life or activity, though our intelligence is able to perceive in it these two aspects. The upper or the active is the principle of kinship or identity. The lower or the passive
is the principle of individualization. The former gives the unity of direction. The latter makes the moral LIFE different.

When the individuals strive to better themselves, it is the imperfection due to the lower limit that they are trying to get over. Thus the upper and the lower limits are the Being and the Non-being of the absolutes.

It is also argued that the adoption of the theory of panpsychism is needed to make freedom of action a reality. For according to it nature is not quite determinate, but is determinable still. What appears to be fixed routine is really fluid. 'All nature is regarded as plastic and evolving like mind; its routine and uniformity being explained on the analogy of habit and heredity in the individual, of custom and tradition in society; while its variety is attributed to spontaneity in some form' ('Mechanism and Morals,' Huxley Journal, p. 92). We shall return to this topic again and see whether panpsychism is the only hypothesis that has room for freedom if indeed it has room.

Ward thinks that panpsychism alone is needed for theism. 'We cannot begin with theism, nor, unless dualism is retained, can we ever attain to it. Naturalism which regards matter as wholly independent of mind and mind as wholly dependent on matter is the inevitable outcome of dualism and has ever barred the way to theism' (P. and T. p. 483). It is true that naturalism is an obstacle to theism, true that a Cartesian dualism leads to naturalism; true also that we must have a spiritualist monism; but this spiritualist monism need not be of the panpsychist type.

Ward's panpsychism is not very different from the primitive anthropomorphism which made souls of everything. It has had a long history. Thales believed that the world was full of gods. Leibniz thought that all nature was animated. Clifford regarded the molecules as possessed of mind-stuff, which became consciousness when present in sufficient complexity, as in man. The crucial that the panpsychist hypothesis contains is the
kinship of nature with spirit. It asserts that in spite of all apparent opposition and antagonism nature is not alien to spirit, but when it denies all distinction between them it goes hopelessly wrong. It is at the opposite pole to materialism. While the latter reduces all to the lowest limit, the former elevates all to the highest. But nothing is gained by spiritualising matter or materialising mind. Body is not soul and matter is not mind. The idealists are charged with confusing things with thoughts. Whether the idealists are open to this charge or not, Ward is. He dissolves the concreteness of the world into a white blankness. The mystic unity of mind swallows up all differences. While it is important to maintain identity it is equally important to maintain difference. It is useless and unphilosophical to exaggerate or minimise identity or difference. It is strange that the critic who is vehement in attacking the absolutists for minimising the significance of diversity should himself have succumbed to this temptation.

V

If the whole world is psychical, how is it that we have dead nature? If everything possesses a self, how does it happen that we have apparently selfless beings in the world of matter? With Bergson, Ward argues that matter is only the arrest of spirit. As Bergson urges that reality is life, so we read, and matter is the arrest of spirit, even so Ward thinks that throughout the world we have present the psychical in the sense of the historical, the purposive or the spontaneous, which becomes later mechanised. As in human life the behaviour which is first unique and purposive becomes later regular and automatic, even so in the world finitude and materiality are the products of spirit and spontaneity. The living purposes of selves get crystallised into inert solids. From this it follows that we have no finity at the beginning, but that the orderness and regularity come into operation in the
later stages. "In the historical world we place determinate agents first; the order and development which we observe we trace to their action and interaction" (p. 27). The whole world at the beginning is nature naturans, where the subjects make trials and efforts. When the trials succeed they get stamped in as nature naturata. The regular ordered aspects of the universe represent the natura naturata. At the start there is no order; it is yet to be. In the initial stages everything is indefinite. The individuals create order which is just the ground traversed. Freedom represents the natura naturans. "What is done, natura naturans—the decisions made, the habits formed, the customs fixed—constitute at any stage the routine, the general trend of things within which future possibilities lie. What is still to do, natura naturata, implies further spontaneity and growth: new decisions to be taken, fresh experiments to be made with their usual sequel of trial and error and possible eventual success" (p. 73).

Thus, according to Ward, the spontaneity of living agents underlies the whole uniformity and regularity of the historical world. But are we to suppose that the golden age was in the past, and the future which we are achieving at great cost and trouble will result in a complete mechanization of mind? Is this the goal of the epigenetic process of the world? Or perhaps, as epigenesis involves new beginnings, it can somehow create perfection of creative activity. While a dead automatism promises to be the goal of the process when viewed logically, still, as we allow new beginnings, it may be that perfect automatism becomes at the end transformed into perfect spontaneity. Ward has a way out of this difficulty which is not very convincing. He argues that the process of epigenesis is as continuous as that of mechanization and is therefore logically exclusive of any final stage of perfect automatism. Again, it is not easy to see how mental activities become natural states. How can the interaction of spiritual entities called manu...
account for the appearance of matter? That mind and matter are opposed in their features does not show that mind is real and matter is shadow. Ward knows that it will also be objected to the theory that "we have only in an insignificant extent shaped Nature. We have not made it" (p. 20).

Ward is not satisfied with this account of the genesis of matter. His system requires that nature should operate from the beginning of things. So he puts forward a different theory that nature is only an indefinite number of simple monads. The bare monads or the lowest forms interact directly without any intervening medium. These constitute the material environment which serves as the uniform medium for the intercourse of the higher monads. The inorganic world consisting of bare monads constitutes the mechanical basis for the life of the higher monads. "The existence of an indefinite number of simple monads would provide all the uniform medium for the intercourse of higher monads which these can require" (p. 257). The bare monads and the higher monads are all monads and therefore alive. But in the one case it is life without memory and recognition; in the other it is life with them. As the consciousnesses of the bare monads are momentary, and as they do not learn by experience, they act in a naively manner. A bare monad is in essence its own body. It has only a momentary consciousness without memory, a pure sensation, an immediate of awareness. To use Bergson's phrase, the bare monad is self-repeating movement, while the higher is unique creative movement. The lower limit of the plurality of the monads is, according to Ward, the mass point or centre of force physical and psychical. He says it is a momentary consciousness devoid of memory and recognition. But why should we look upon it as psychical or conscious when it has none of the features associated with psyche or consciousness? It does not grow expert by experiment. When we do not see any signs of consciousness, why should we indulge in the
speculation that it is conscious? That the world of inorganic matter is made up of momentary consciousnesses is a pure guess. We are under an obligation to think that the bare monads have any consciousness at all, or possess perception and apperception, or sensation and activity. If they are not conscious, how do they generate consciousness? Even granting that they are conscious without memory, how is memory produced? How can a momentary consciousness without memory develop into a synthesising mind with memory? Ward calls the primitive condition one in which the monads are not differentiated. It is an indeterminate something in which the "many" is nascent. How does this indeterminate something of a material environment move out into the world of motion and life? It cannot be said that the bare monads and the higher monads exist together from the beginning, for Ward proposes to be faithful to experience, and in the historical evolution of the world matter comes first and life later. What is it that quickens the bare potentiality called by Ward "matter" into the development of the universe? Are we to follow Aristotle and hold that a prime mover is needed to set the ball in motion? Is not the way of escape offered by Absolutism, which on the hypothesis that matter is spirit gone out of itself can account for its coming back to its nature at the end of things? The lowest limit, which is mere externality, forces us to posit the highest limit as well. If the bare monads which in historical evolution precede the conscious living monads are to develop into the rich universe, we must either postulate an outside cause, which is illegitimate, or grant that the monads themselves are prime movers, which is a speculation, or admit that the bare and conscious monads are the lower and higher stages of the one spirit, in which case the Absolute spirit becomes the creative ground and the final cause of the universe.

If Ward admits that mind-stuff is present as mere externality in matter, as vitality in plants, feeling in animals,
and thought in men, this is the same as the absolutist doctrine; only, mind-stuff is not a very appropriate term. Matter, life and consciousness are the different forms in which the one ultimate spirit objectifies itself. But we have no right to identify the lower with the higher and say that all is mind. To ignore the distinctions between the several kinds of reality is an unscientific procedure to which Ward as a psychologist very solicitously alludes, the distinctions of experience have no right.

Rover, if we consider that the world is created, it is quite possible that God might have created inorganic matter. There is nothing intrinsically impossible about it. But Ward thinks that to make God the creator of the world would be to attribute to Him two apparently quite distinct forms of divine activity (see p. 248). God has first to produce a world of mechanism and then to create man and call upon him to adjust himself to it at the risk of his life. Ward cannot admit God's creation of the mechanical world since that hypothesis would make God responsible for physical evil. As we shall see, the reality of evil which is the crux of theism is overcome by His conception of a limited God who creates free monads. God does not tempt man but evil is due to man's willful acts. As the individuals are free to try and venture, error and evil become possible. But if the natural would be looked upon as the creation of God, then He must be looked upon as the author of the evil which takes place in it. God is relieved from the responsibility for physical evil which is traced to the monads. It is said that the monads, on account of their inherent incapacity for progress, petrified themselves into dead matter. But to what is this petrification, which is the essence of evil, due? The monads are not responsible for it, and if God is not, who is? While Ward is inclined to make God the creator of the world of matter, especially when he is emphasizing the necessity of matter as a fixed stable system for the higher purposes of mind and spirit, still when he thinks of the bad effects of the world
called physical evil he makes his God wash His hands of all responsibility.

Another explanation which Ward offers is that the monads which do not belong to the dominant monads are to be viewed as material. Each dominant monad regards its own subordinate monads as alive and vital, while the subordinate monads of other dominant monads are viewed as dead and material. So to each dominant monad its own subordinate monads are not phenomena. They are not constituent elements of the objective world to their own dominant monads. They are objective only to the dominant monads which observe them from outside. This explanation is suggested to him by the way in which reality comes to be perceived by the growing individual. The bicycle when it is fully controlled by the rider is not distinguished by him from himself though he calls it an object when it gets out of control. While this is true as a psychological description of the perception of external reality, it is confusing to substitute it for the metaphysical theory of the nature of reality.

Ward contends that the monads are the real individuals while the material world is only an appearance. "We cannot affirm that a star or a meteor or a cluster of particles is an individual. But neither can we be confident that they are always or necessarily the merely inanimate aggregates we commonly take them to be. All that pluralism contends for, however, is simply that the real beings these phenomena imply have some spontaneity and some initiative; and these essential characteristics of all real individuals the uniformity, as well as the diversity, of the physical world is due" (p. 455). Mechanism is a phenomenon, an appearance. For pluralism, "Matter can only be phenomenal, it cannot be real" (p. 65). Meanwhile we may remind those who demand of us an explanation of the appearance of mechanism, that in the term he strictly taken there need for pluralism be no such appearance at all" (p. 14). So the appearance of mechanism is due to our defective knowledge.
The higher we advance the more completely shall we be able to interpret the world as a realm of ends. This only means that the illusion between self and the other is gradually broken down and not that the self is the other though it finds itself in the other. Sometimes Ward makes matter an appearance of a phenomenon due to our scientific habits. This is another similarity between Bergson and Ward. What exists is mind. But science describes its outer surface in terms of mechanism. Nature is something relative and unreal. It is a theoretical construction. The laws of science are statistical averages which do not express the behaviour of beings. The real significance of the world can only be understood in terms of mind. Science may give us laws mathematically valid for purposes of calculation. But it is essentially abstract and hypothetical as it does not give us an account of real concrete experience. "No two things are entirely alike and no two things are entirely different. An adequate and intuitive knowledge of the world would embrace both these aspects, and so doing would present the world in its true and concrete unity. Scientific knowledge, however, is neither intuitive nor adequate, but always more or less general and symbolical; its general concepts and symbols representing the likenesses among individuals and the likenesses among these likenesses, so tending indeed towards an abstract and spurious unity, but farther and farther away from the living whole" (W. and A. II. 97). The distinction of persons and things which we know to be real in the world of experience is dissolved by Ward in a dead unity of life. "The ordinary historian is content to recognise nature as indispensable so far at least as it is the scene and provides the properties of the drama. But this contrast plurality claims altogether to transcend. To the distinction of person and thing, of nature and history, it allows only a relative value" (p. 50). The gravamen of Ward's charge against idealism is that it disparages the distinctions of the many which experience tells us to be real and absolute as unreal and relative. But
is Ward faithful to this experience which also tells us that physical nature is a reality? When he dismisses the physical as relative and unreal, his ideal is not fidelity to experience but speculative consistency. And if this ideal requires the absolutist to consider the world of plurality by itself to be not the final truth, why attack him? He is but following the impulse of logic which, Ward well knows, sometimes overrides the testimony of experience. The result of our discussion on this point clearly establishes that Ward does not give us any logical or consistent view of matter, since he views it either as the product of the interaction of monads or the context of the bare monads or merely an appearance due to defective insight or scientific habit.

VI

In psychology the conception of an individual as an active creative agent is ultimate. Ward starts with the immediate experiencing of the experient individuals. He recognises that these experiences are exclusive as regards their standpoints. Each monad's experience is all "idiosyncrasy-allogenic in to say." But if each individual starts with his own private experience how can he ever get beyond it? Ward tries to escape from this difficulty by endowing the monads with windows. The monads are not mutually isolated but interact. "The actual intercourse and increasing integration of monads is a basal fact." (p. 489). The individual's experience is not exclusively subjective. It is always experience of a common objective world. The presentations are not merely subjective modifications. "What each one immediately deals with in his own experience is objective reality in the most fundamental sense" (N. and A. p. 155). Again, "the subject is continually in touch with one world, one environment" (Ibid. Part IV.). Ward tells us that though the dominant monad starts with its own experience, still as the subordinate monads are connected both with the dominant monad
and the environment, there is objective intercourse. "What is true of A’s organism in turn is also of B’s, and so we can understand how A’s acts may give rise to sensations in B through the double mediation of organism and environment, and how B’s acts in turn may give rise to sensations in A. Presently as like sensations meet they become gradually more and more assimilated with previous experiences of them, and the advance to definite perceptions is made. What were originally only immediate sensory data have now a meaning. A and B, that is to say, are on rapport" (pp. 258-259).

Ward admits that the attempt to systematize the contents of the different experiences leads to the conception of the objective world of science. Experience is private and individual, but there is the experience which is the result of social intercourse. The product of this intersubjective intercourse is the empirical knowledge we have in common. While empirical knowledge is an extension of the individual’s experience, rational or universal experience is a systematisation of empirical or common-sense knowledge. But this objective world is not an object of any individual’s experience. It has an existence even though this or that individual is not aware of it. There must be some kind of experience to which it is an object, for "an experience that is not owned is a contradiction" (N. and A. ii. iii.). Ward adopts Kant’s theory that since a particular object is not the object of any given consciousness, it must be an object for consciousness in general (see N. and A. ii. 170-171). "If we hold it true that all experience implies both subject and object, then we must find a subject for universal experience; and of such subject we must say that it is as essential to its objects—the sun, the earth and the rest of what we call together nature as the individual percipient to the immediate sensory and motor events of its own objective continuum" (ibid. pp. 178-179).

What is the nature of this universal experience? It is not an ideal or a working fiction but quite as real as
any individual experience. If the Absolute experience is only a regulative ideal, a methodological postulate which has no ontological reality, then our whole structure of objective experience tumbles to the ground and the escape from solipsism becomes a spurious and ineffective one. Scientific principles become useful fictions or working hypotheses without any objective validity at all. While they are useful for practical purposes, they cannot be said to be true. Truth and error become subjective. But Ward agrees with the absolute idealists in thinking they are objective. If truth and error are more than subjective and if scientific principles are more than working hypotheses then this universal experience is a reality. Though a matter of faith, still Ward asserts that God is the central reality and his existence a philosophical necessity. This means that the world as it would be for a completed philosophy is immediately present to the divine consciousness of experience. What is an ideal to science and experience is a reality to God.

What is the relation between universal experience and individual experience? Universal experience is one and continuous with the individual experience. "There is no discontinuity between universal and individual experience" (N. and A. ii. 184). The divine intelligence knows all that we as self-conscious beings know the possibility of knowing. God is all that men can become. Ward does not draw a hard and fast line of distinction between the two. The individual's experience is subjective and contingent on account of its sensuous basis, and as the individual grows, the subjectivity diminishes and the unity with the world increases. There is no absolute dissociation between reason or thought and sense or perception. Universal factors are present in all stages of conscious experience though they become more explicitly recognised in the higher stages. Even in the

\[1\text{ Speaking of error, he says that it is inconsistency. If the error individual is allowed to see what his error implies, he will be converted to truth (see P. and T. p. 376).}\]
immediate experience of the individual, the universal is operating. It is not devoid of synthetic activity. As the individual progresses, he advances to self-consciousness. Progress consists in attaining clear self-consciousness. As sense is a lower form of reason, the individual is a lower form of the universal. Our life is a progressive realization of the universal experience. "The subject of universal experience is not numerically distinct from the subject of individual experience, but is this same subject advanced to the level of self-consciousness, and so participating in all that is communicable, that is, in all that is intelligible, in the experience of other self-conscious subjects. Universal experience is not distinct from all subjects, but common to all intelligents, peculiar to none." Our life is only a realization in us of that perfect life or intelligence. We are guided in our knowledge, art and morality by the ultimate reality which is involved from beginning to end. Knowledge is the self-realization of that reality in our thought as art and morality are in emotion and will. The whole is striving in the part, and it is on account of this impulse of the whole operating in us that we feel the urge to know, love and do. Ward realizes that self-realisation is the safe way to advance. "The self to be realised is not the small petty self which is exclusive and individual but the Divine self common to all... peculiar to none." We have to transcend the narrow limits of individual experience, confined to perception, reminiscence and expectation." (W. and A. ii. 256). Knowledge means the transcending of the sensuous basis which makes an individual exclusive of others. The self we have in sensation with its own indelible characteristics has to be broken down. The standpoints of the experiencing subjects are strictly exclusive because of this subjective sensuous basis; the effort of knowledge is to transcend this subjectivity and realise the logical self. Muralism emphasises the finite-
ness of the individual, his contingency and sensuousness. If this were all, Ward could not escape from subjectivism. But in the attempt to save himself from it, he posits the reality of an Absolute Experience which every individual is trying to realise in his life. This is the ideal of the whole working in all, and when it is reached the individuality is transcended. What is, is a whole in the parts, and while pluralism apprehends the parts, absolutism comprehends the whole. The reality of pluralism is absolutism, as the reality of the part is the whole. In escaping from subjective idealism to which pluralism leads, Ward has transcended pluralism and affirmed absolutism.

VII

Pluralism, Ward thinks, safeguards the freedom and contingency of human action, for which absolutism has no room. Pluralism contends that every individual is a genuine creator, while rigid determinism seems to be the logical consequence of absolutism. "Since the pluralistic view of the world necessarily involves an element of contingency in its very idea of a finite many mutually striving for the best..." (p. 86). Ward makes out that as the finity of the world is due to the action of creative individuals, the world at the start was wholly contingent when human agents were creators unhampered by limitations. Yet Ward repudiates absolute contingency which he calls Tychism, and distinguishes the contingency of chance from the contingency of freedom. But Ward's account of the genesis of law commits him to pure contingency, which Ward knows is illogical and
non-existent. We have to ascertain whether pluralism really provides a place for contingent conduct.

Ward thinks that as he has rejected the mechanical determination of mental events, so determinism disappears. The laws of the world are due to active individuals themselves. The world is quite plastic and fluent. "Since for pluralism there are no natural laws, so to say, in force from the beginning, but on the contrary all natural laws are evolved, there will be no rigorous and mechanical concatenation of things such as naturalism is wont to assume; the fluxity so far as it is real will embody the result of experience; so far as it is apparent, it will be due, as we have seen, to the statistical constancy of large numbers." (p. 78). Absolutism also rejects the mechanical determination of conduct, and so far is at one with Ward's philosophy. Absolutism is quite clear that if men were the creatures of a blind mechanical necessity, there would be no ideal standards of thought or conduct. It holds to the supremacy of spirit, and considers the whole universe to be an expression of spirit. Human experience is not completely determined by mechanical necessity. Life is a continuous assimilation of the non-self by the self. But this freedom from mechanical necessitation which absolutism secures easily, Ward is at great pains to reach. Apart from the difficulty of conceiving, e.g., an earthquake as effect of mind, the product of past experience, the solution is not brought nearer by simply explaining what mechanism is. Whatever it may be due to, it is there and the individual has to reckon with it.

Even though mechanism and matter be illusions, we may have psychical antecedents which determine our conduct. But according to Ward, psychical determinism is a misconception. The self "freely inserts those links in the chain of nature"; "it cannot be a part of the time order that it makes" (p. 304). In the realm of nature, "events appear as determined by preceding events; in the other (the realm of minds) actions are initiated to secure future ends" (ibid.). We cannot
therefore forecast the future course of events. Ward seeks to solve the problem of freedom by making out that as a human being is individual, his actions are not bound by any laws. The great contrast which he establishes between law and individuality, science and history, is designed to preserve the freedom and independence of the individual. We cannot bind an individual by rules; we cannot reduce him to a formula. Science which proposes to explain individuality by means of general principles reduces man to a lot of mechanism. But there is an element in the individual which baffles scientific treatment, an irrational and or mystery which science cannot explain. But in this attempt both law and individuality are misconceived. Man’s individuality does not consist in his foibles and oddities, his freaks and idiosyncrasies, but in that which is common to him and the world. There is no incompatibility between the significance of history and the reign of law. Individuality is not contingency, nor is law mere sameness. It is a narrow conception of self which opposes self to the whole world, makes it su ̂ ̈ generis and holds that no laws apply to it. If individuality and law are considered inconsistent, there must follow the unintelligibility of the individual. But an individual is intelligible and therefore subject to laws. The individual is not a mere freak, nor is creative synthesis a mere difference.

It freedom is a property of cognitive and conative subjects, then as the whole world consists of such subjects everything in the world should be true. What Ward says of Schopenhauer is true of himself: "The freedom that he allows is not confined to conscious beings: and on looking closer we shall see that consciousness has essentially nothing to do with it" (p. 233).

Ward says that only human individuals are free and not the lower animals, for scientific rules are more applicable to them. He thinks that though all nature is animated and all life physical, and so not resolvable into scientific universals, still these scientific rules give
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relatively more accurate views of the habits of the lower
monads than of the higher ones. Human conduct cannot
be reduced to laws. It cannot be predicted. It is this
unpredictability that he emphasises in his doctrine of
epigeneisis which he contrasts with evolution. Evolution
suggests the expatiating of what is implicit from the first.
Epigeneisis is a gradual ordering of elements which had
no order in them. It is a steadily-growing organisation
of products in the whole which the several constituents
in their isolation did not possess. It is creative growth,
novel synthesis. Though the higher stages depend for
their existence on the lower, still a knowledge of the
lower would not enable us to forecast the higher. Though
the future is grounded in the past, still we cannot infer
the future from the past. We shall have new unforeseen
beginnings. But we cannot say on that account that it
is contingent. It is true that it cannot be predicted, but
still it is not a chance product, as there are motives and
laws of the individual’s nature operating. The so-called
free acts are contingent only to others, but to one’s own
self there is nothing contingent. Nor is it a case of neces-
sity. Contingency refers only to the spectator. “Though
contingent for others, a man’s acts are not contingent
for him; if they were, we should have to admit absolute
contingency or chance” (p. 455). When Ward admits
that the laws of which the individual’s conduct are the
expression are the internal laws of the individual, he
admits that individuality is subject to laws. Ward is
wrong in thinking that everything which happens accord-
ing to law can be predicted and counted upon, while those
which cannot be predicted are opposed to law (p. 75).
Law or rationality may apply to the individual’s acts and
still we may not know how exactly the rationality would
express itself. Unpredictability is not the sign of absence
of law. There is a law in all growth, and this law can
very well express itself in a series of shocks and surprises.

According to Ward, man becomes material as his
habits increase. He steadily loses his freedom and grows
automatic. Contingency tends to decrease as time goes on. The mass of habitual acts will go on increasing and the free acts will be on the decline. Progress means a decreasing contingency. "As a necessary consequence of the interaction of a plurality of individuals, intent on self-betterment as well as self-conservation, there should be a general tendency to diminish the mere contingency of the world and to replace it by a definite progresson" (p. 57). But still, Ward believes that there will never come a time when all actions would become habitual. Contingency in the world is inevitable. But this is only a pious assumption. Ward allows that contingency is due in the friction between monads caused by misunderstanding and self-centeredness on the part of the higher intellectual monads. With growth in knowledge and love this friction and consequent wrong will be minimized until at last when the end is reached they will cease to exist. Contingency is also ascribed to the collisions between the intellectual monads and the habits of the petrified ones. But as the ideal of the intellectual monads is also to reach a condition of an equilibrium they also cease to be spontaneous and become petrified; or there is the other possibility that the petrified monads may become intellectual, in which case a unity of purpose and feeling may be achieved among the monads. But this possibility is shut out by Ward, since he believes that the petrified monads will never revive. And this again is an assumption. We have real freedom only in the primitive condition which is devoid of any unity such as phratism postulates. It is pure freedom which we may without impropriety call pure chaos. Stability is introduced by and by. Unity of the universe is the goal and not the ground. Definiteness and order manifest themselves as we move upward. But one would expect that the pure beings which were completely spiritual would have given rise to something better than matter with its automatism. The paradise is pushed into the past and not beheld as a vision of the future. Man is born free though
everwhere he is in chains. Only Ward tells us that the chains are of his own forging, if that is any consolation.

With regard to the theological difficulty of freedom and foreknowledge, Ward's view is that foreknowledge does not exist though there is continuous control by God. We are asked to "substitute providence for presence, continuum for eternal decree" (p. 192). God has made us free, and even he does not know how we shall act. This is not a weakness in a limitation, for Ward quotes Martinism with approval that "foreknowledge of the contingent is not a perfection" (ibid.). "All is not decreed; the world is not created like a symphony. Again, all possibilities are not left open; the Many have not severally unlimited freedom, that freedom of indifference which is indistinguishable from chance. God's creatures are creative, the pluralist maintains; their nature is partly his doing, partly their own; he assigns the talents, they use or misuse them. Not everything that is possible is possible to any, yet some initiative is open to everyone. None are left with no talent at all. The total possibilities then, however far back we go, are fixed; but within those contingencies however far we go are open" (p. 315). If the filling of the time process is eternally decreed, then there is complete determinism. But God is only the creator of creators. His foreknowledge extends only to his knowledge of the limits for the operation of human freedom. He does not know what definitely we will do. God is no doubt the ground of man's existence. But this dependence on God does not deprive man of his freedom. Nevertheless, man has only a limited freedom, and this absolutism grants to us. The natural equipment with which we are born is determined for us and not by us, and within these limits we are free to work out our future.

In trying to defend human freedom Ward frees it from law, mechanical determination, fate or predetermination, but if he carries out with courage the consequences of his opinions he will be forced to make man a prisoner bound
in chains which he himself has forged. Yet he shrugs off
of this conclusion and leaves human freedom in a doubtful
condition. It is satisfactory to note that the best he has
to say on this problem is just what absolutism gives, viz.
that real freedom means determination by an ideal.
Ward quotes approvingly Professor Bosanquet (p. 136),
and observes that determination by an ideal of the whole
is not the negation of freedom but the one real condition
of it. Ward is an advocate of the contingency of freedom
in the sense of self-determination and not of the con-
tingency of chance, which is absurd. Man is free because
his conduct is determined by him and not for him.
In other words, while Ward denies mechanical necessi-
tation, he admits rational determination. This is the
contention of the absolutists. The self according to
them is much more than the past deeds of the man
or his former character. None can anticipate pre-
cisely what another will do, but human conduct is not
on that account irrational.

VIII

Ward's account of future life and pre-existence is on
all fours with Leibniz's theory. It is defective exactly
where Leibniz is. A panpsychist theory is committed
to the doctrine of pre-existence. And Ward holds to
the doctrine of a succession of lives. The everlasting monads
must either have been created by God or must have con-
tinued from eternity to eternity. The former hypothesis
is ruled out by Ward's rejection of the creationist theory
of the soul's origin (p. 404). So the eternal pre-existence
and future life of the monads inevitably follow. But it
is no use telling us that the monads are eternal. It is the
pride of plurielastic systems that they provide for personal
immortality. Does Ward grant us that? An individual
is an organism in which there is a dominant monad that
rules the whole hierarchy of inferior monads. The
dominant monad we call the soul is what is characteristic
of the individual. These dominant monads are eternal, and birth and death are only phenomenal modifications which they undergo. These do not affect the nature of the soul. The soul's existence does not begin with that of the body, and so we need not fear that it will end with it. "If we know that the individual's existence began with that of the body, we might argue that it will probably end with it, but here again the empirical basis for such an argument fails us" (p. 334). So it is said that the individual has what is called personal immortality. Even granting that with the scattering of the other monads which constitute the body of the dominant soul, the individual is preserved (of which there is no chance), there are other objections to Ward's theory. It is not quite clear how God who is the conservator of values does his work of conserving the values acquired by the individual in Ward's system of pluralism (see p. 214). We do not know the exact relation between the law of the inheritance of acquired characters and the doctrines of the preservation of the soul and the real development of the individual (p. 212). The objection to pre-existence sometimes urged, that there is no memory of pre-existence, is not got over, as the dominant monads have no consciousness or memory of their antemortal lives. The personal immortality which the modern mind seeks is promised in the ear but, alas, the promise is broken to the heart.

IX

Ward recognises that in addition to the pluralistic aspect there is also the unitary aspect of the world. Knowledge and morality require the unity of the universe. Absolutism is wrong in making unity the central fact of the universe since it cannot account for the Many. Starting with the Many we can account for the One, but starting with the One we cannot account for the Many. So pluralism is a more satisfactory conception than absolutism. Our question here is, Can pluralism account
for the unity of the world. Ward breaks down the isolation of the monads and grants windows to them, as he thinks that the unity and interrelatedness of the world cannot be accounted for by the concept of windowless monads. Isolated monads cannot interact while distinct monads can. "That a plurality of individuals in isolation should ever come into relation is inconceivable indeed, but only because plurality without unity is itself inconceivable. That individuals severally distinct as regards their existence could not interact is however a mere dictum" (p. 137). The interaction of the monads can easily account for the unity of the universe. Ward describes the historical evolution of unity thus. A multitude of human beings of different tastes and temperaments find themselves in the world, each pursuing its own interests. Adventure and misadventure seem to be the rule at the beginning. The fittest survive in the struggle and regulate the conduct of the rest. Cooperation and division of labour soon set in, and we have in place of an incoherent multitude all seemingly working at random, a social and economic organisation wherein each man has his own appropriate place and function. Progress goes on, and at length we attain the level of human culture when "we reach a goal that is not diminished by being shared, and one that yields more the more it has already yielded. And here in form at any rate, the final goal of evolution comes into sight, not a Pre-established Harmony, but the eventual consummation of a perfect commonwealth, wherein all co-operate and none conflict, wherein the Many have become One, one realm of ends." (p. 135). The ever-increasing coincidence of private and public ends tends continually to enhance the unity of the whole (pp. 55-56). Life by a series of accidents gets itself moulded into a whole till we reach a condition when the whole of humanity is animated by a single, a wise and righteous will, when "the will of the Many and the will of the One would accord completely" (p. 136). The unity and the order of the world are the result of the
interaction of the individual and not its presupposition. The mutual intercourse of the quality of individuals happens to end in unity. When the Many regarded as existentially independent are found to be mutually complimentary, conspiring together to realize an intelligible organic whole, then the question suggests itself, Is God the ground of the Many? "Why should the Many tend towards one end unless they had in the One their source?" (p. 267). Ward carefully argues the point, and says that one alternative is to leave such questions unanswered. There is the fact and that is its sufficient reason. But Ward considers this answer to be inadequate for two reasons: "That we as rational beings are part of the world's evolution, and that the demand for a sufficient reason is thus a demand that the world itself has raised" (p. 267). Another alternative is "to deny that things show any tendency towards the realization of an organic whole or that the world is a single realm of ends at all" (bid.). To deny the tendency is to speak an untruth. There is progress towards a higher unity and it must be explained. We cannot put it down to chance. Absurdly, Ward thinks, is no explanation, as in it the distinction of God and the world disappears. So Ward adopts the theoretic hypothesis. God is needed to give the necessary unity to the world. The point of difference between Ward and the absolutists lies in the fact that while Ward considers that the unity is in the future, the absolutists hold it to be in the past. While Ward considers unity to be the goal of the historical process the absolutists consider it to be the ground as well. For Ward the unity of the universe requires only an upper limit of a supreme spiritual reality. This is enough to account for the apparent unity of direction in evolution.

According to this account, unity is only an accident. Novelties occur in the world, and one of these novelties is the gradual unification of the world which was at the start merely a togetherness of things. There is no logical necessity for the development of a unitary world out of a
juxtaposition of many monads. It is a stroke of good fortune that the many monads by their interaction collapsed into a unity. If monads are in order, and if, from a plurality of individuals, we can get a unitary universe, why should we not consider the naturalist theory to be quite sound and satisfactory? From matter and motion the whole universe with its spirit and spirituality can be evolved. Only we have to admit the possibility of sudden variations and creative novelties, and Ward allows them. We have no need to postulate any higher principle simply because at some stages of evolution we come across aesthetic qualities in nature and moral qualities in man. But Ward rejects the evolutionary theory. He cannot believe that the unity of the world is an accident of nature. There must be some necessity about it. We must have a guarantee that the work of the world will end in a final harmony, unity or system of ends. How can mere pluralism give us this security? As pluralism cannot by itself furnish the ground for the teleological unity and continuity, as in it there is no sustaining ground of values in the historical evolution in the Many it is supplemented by theism. A plurality of interacting subjects cannot account for itself or for the unity which interaction implies. We require a spiritual ground as the basis of the harmony. Thus Ward by his concept of God introduces more unity into his theory of the world than empirical pluralism warrants. He admits a principle which transforms the original plurality into an organic interdependence. God is the originating and sustaining ground of the lives of the Many. He is the purposing ground of the evolution process. He is the surety for the conservation of all ideal values. The world of Many is a realm of ends simply because the rational ground of the Many is the One. Without it, Ward admits, it would be "infinitely improbable" that the Many should freely posit themselves so as to form a harmony (p. 457). The growing harmony of free interacting agents is possible only with God. So beginning
from the many, “we are led both on theoretical and on practical grounds to conceive a more fundamental standpoint than this of the Many, namely, that of the One that would furnish an ontological unity for their cosmological unity and ensure a teleological unity for their varied ends” (p. 442; see also p. 441). And so Ward supplements pluralism by theism.

Our question is: How are we to conceive of God if he is to be the guarantee for the growing unification of the world? Ward says that he must be at least a spirit, “transcending the world, the ground of its being and yet immanent in it” (p. 431). God is the whole. To account for the unity of the whole or the common direction of the pluralistic endeavour, God must be the universal initial or the all-informing spirit. It is the spirit immanent in the whole that enables the different parts to rise upwards till they reach a common higher life. It is because the same whole operates in all the parts that the unity of the world is essential and not accidental. This is not the chance product of intersubjective intercourse but is the necessary result of the interaction of subjects who are all guided by the same impulse. It is obvious that a plurality of individuals impelled by the feeling of self-preservation cannot make for progress. So they must have the ideal of social betterment. What is this ideal due to? It is hard to conceive how the egotistic instinct of self-preservation tends to be displaced by the ideal of social welfare. It cannot be forced on the individual’s nature from outside. But if the devotion to the common good is there from the beginning, then its manifestation is due to development from within. The social instinct which makes for progress is not an accident of human nature, but is one of its structural principles. “Through this objective mind, pervading all its members, and not through any infusion from without, each one in being social becomes human” (p. 224). Here Ward emphasizes how the community of nature is not forced from without on the individual but is already in him. The object is involved
in the subject, the other in the self. Man realises his true self in society because that which hence him off from others is not the true self of man. That which binds him to others is his real self. Progress consists in the advance towards a higher or a more comprehensive unity and this is rendered possible as there is the same tendency to realise the true self operating in each part. We have " to believe in a universal tendency towards perfection as the very principle of life " (p. 139). With divergent units, harmony is possible because there are fundamental needs in common. They all aim at justice and social order and these common interests make for unity and coherence. And Ward also tells us that these interests are not forced on the individual from without but are rooted in his nature. How can we account for the presence of these ideals in the subject? Ward’s answer is that man has the interests of others because himself and others or subject and object are differentiations of a Datum or a whole into self and others. This unity of background accounts for the pervasion of the one by the other. If the starting-point is a world of self-defining monads, united merely by their co-existence, we cannot account for the impulse towards union and co-operation which is a fact of history. To account for this devotion to common ideals, Ward assumes the mutual implication of subject and others in a total objectivum. But the ultimate unity and the original unity are not the same. The original unity from out of which subject and object became sundered is different from the ultimate unity which is a new reality of a higher order. If there is a unity between the self and others to start with, and if the process of the world gradually develops an inward relation between the two, and if the end of the world is a complete realisation of this ideal, is this not absolutism? We have the original unity which gives the ideal, the process of the working out of the ideal and the end where the ideal is reached. The world process is animated by the ideal from beginning to end. Ward admits that the whole historical evolution
is due to God. "How far below us, how far above, the historical extends, we cannot tell. But above all there can be only God as the living unity of all and below it no longer things, but only the connecting acts of the one Supreme" (N. and A., ii, 283). When times Ward is seen to postulate unity both at the beginning and the end, it is hard to distinguish his system from absolutism. Can the hypothesis of an original unity be reconciled with the assumption of the all-inclusiveness of plurality? When Ward says that the ultimate unity is a new kind of reality where the self will find itself in the other without meeting any opposition from it, it only means that the original unity has become concrete, and this is the subjectivist theory. The original unity breaks up into subject and object, and the goal of the world is reached when they are reunited. Ward admits all this, but points out that it is inaccurate to say that the actual historical process is the realization of what is potential in the beginning. He admits that the ideals which the self has and which must be accepted to account for the growing unity of the world cannot be explained unless a primitive community between self and other is posited. He also admits that the goal of the process is the making of the unity explicit and clear, for the community is from the beginning and it has only to be consciously realized. But he objects to the view that the actual development is only the realization of the potential. This "potential" seems to be the real thing. He asserts that there is nothing else than the actual. "Reality is entirely actuality; the potential belongs exclusively to abstract thought." (p. 205). And yet Ward knows that if we should confine ourselves to actuality we cannot account for either the past continuity or the future certainty. If we do not grant the reality of an ultimate spirit or a higher intelligence, the whole scheme of the world becomes incomprehensible. And if we once posit an absolute spirit, the potential acquires significance. Nothing which is not rooted in the nature of things can appear at a later stage. The dispute
between pluralism and absolutism is represented as one between progress as the integration of a plurality and evolution as the differentiation of a unity. The question reduces itself to one of whole and parts. Is the whole prior to the parts? or are the parts prior to the whole? But Ward forgets that there cannot be any integration of a plurality apart from an underlying unity. Unity and plurality, integration and differentiation are two aspects of the one process, complementary sides of a whole. One cannot be without the other. If radical thinkers emphasize either aspect exclusively they caricature reality. If we start with the many, we cannot reach the one unless the one was prior to the many in the sense of the logical ground of the many. But Ward shrinks from absolutism, as he thinks its acceptance would be to open the flood-gates to mechanism, determinism, and other rigid inhumanisms. He cannot agree to the contention that the logical ground of the process is in the beginning as that would involve that the last day, of reckoning shall read what the first day of creation wrote. He believes with Hegelian that the future is unpredictable, though by reflecting on the past we may discover continuity between the past and the present. He cannot bring himself to believe that the world process is due to any collaborative design on the part of the Creator or is the logical outcome of the nature of the ultimate spirit. To save freedom he makes the world a series of happy accidents. Life becomes a scene of miracles. But Ward knows that in that case he cannot be sure of the ultimate triumph of good and so he posits an initial unity and an ultimate ideal, and when these two are affirmed he comes perilously near absolutism, and that is an impossible situation, and so we find him swinging from the one to the other extreme. His heart clings to contingency, chance, novelty and accident, but his head rebels against this whole list and takes him to unity, logic, necessity and absolute, and between the two his system vacillates. Ward cannot do without the conception of
the absolute spirit: nor can he do with it. Without it, his pluralism becomes a chaos where all connectedness is inexplicable; with it, it ceases to be a pluralism.

But Ward's difficulty is purely imaginary. Because there is an absolute spirit it does not follow that everything is determined. The Absolute spirit works in man. It gives him the spiritual ideals of truth, beauty and goodness, and the ideals can work themselves out freely and fully. There is no restriction of freedom on the absolutistic hypothesis. It is incorrect to say that the unity of the Absolute is incompatible with the reality of its differentiations. In another context, Ward says that "what development or differentiation an individual experience may undergo, it does not become but always is a unity" (V. and A. ii. 112). If in an individual's experience unity can be preserved in spite of differentiations, cannot the same thing be true of the Absolute Experience? The unity of the whole is only another aspect of the differentiations of its members. Absolute idealism does justice to both. It is wrong to say that in an absolutistic unity the difference between the One and the Many, God and the world, is abolished. The Absolute is the unity of the two and not one of them.

Ward urges that the unity which is the ideal is not the 1 of an Absolute Experience, but is the unity of a whole or a society of worlds. Though the many are gradually tending to become more and more one, still "what we shall reach will never be a single unity independent of the plurality beneath, but only the harmonious co-ordination and concordance of these—ideally an absolute harmony" (p. 111). While Ward admits that the interaction of the many involves the identity of the one, he holds that this one is only a logical one. "To resolve the logical universal itself into a personal individual, of which the several persons that it denotes are but modifications, is far from explaining the facts denoted, seems easy to contradict them" (p. 223). Since the one and the many are not opposed, Ward's
objection loses point. Ward has taught us that progress has been through the gradual mechanization of lower elements. Each unit is "the form for the function below it and matter for the function above it" (p. 440). The plurality of the world is the matter and the ideal unity the form. As many active centres have become mechanised in the individual's body, it is quite possible that further progress may mechanise the finite centres and make them parts of a higher whole. What we have may no doubt be an absolute harmony between society and animal world, and these and organic life and dead matter, but the whole itself will be what is designated an individual and not a society. What objection there can possibly be to this logical conclusion of Ward's premises, we do not know.

X

In the last section we have shown how Ward's God melts imperceptibly into the Absolute of the idealists. We will consider this question in greater detail, bringing out the affinities of Ward's theism with absolutism. Ward admits that there cannot be any intellectual justification of theism, for God is not an object of knowledge. We need not be frightened by Ward's statement that theism is a matter of faith. For he contends that our whole life has been a series of faith ventures. "Almost every forward step in the progress of life could be formulated as an act of faith—an act not warranted by knowledge" (p. 445). Probability is the guide of life. When we adopt a principle on faith, then knowledge may come to our aid and confirm it. In other words, our knowledge is slowly extended by faith. This relation of faith to knowledge is nothing new in philosophy; only Ward's use of the term faith for scientific imagination or hypothesis is new. When Ward says that the idea of God is a matter of faith he means that it is a hypothesis which has to be transformed into a theory by verification and
proof. If the hypothesis is confirmed by knowledge we accept it; if it is not, we reject it. Our question now is whether the facts of life demand theism, whether theism accounts for the complexities of experience. What is given is the world of spirits. The supreme spirit which constitutes the unity of the world is not a fact of observation but one of inference. Let us see if this inferred theism is exclusively adequate to account for the facts of life. We see that the world has been progressing in the direction of increasing moralisation; the higher ideals have increasing domination over it. We have faith that these ideals will be fully realised. This faith that they can be realised is a rational faith, for it gives completeness to life, and knowledge does not forbid such a possibility. Therefore we must consider this faith to be a reasoned one and thus a real one (see p. 488). This faith cannot be true unless God is real. Without the idea of a Supreme and Ultimate Being, least inadequately conceived as personal, transcending the world as the ground of its being and yet immanent in it, as it is his idea—the world may well for ever remain that renascens concordia discord, which at present we find it" (p. 421). Without the idea of God final unification is not certain (see p. 329). "If theism be true, then evil can only be relative and must gradually disappear: if theism be not true, though evils remain relative, they may never disappear" (p. 159). "The reality of God alone gives us the assurance that the hindrances to progress are not insurmountable. Without such spiritual continuity as theism alone seems able to ensure, it looks as if a pluralistic world were condemned to a Sisyphian task" (p. 215). But we here beg the question: Why should we presume that life is complete? A consistent pluralist who does not know what is going to happen would feel that life is not, and he would not know whether it will ever be, a complete unity. But still, Ward believes that life is bound to be a whole. "All things in the main and in the longer run work together for good" (p. 131). Taking this for granted
as a faith based on the facts of experience—and the absolutist has no quarrel with it, since to him it is a fact which every bit of experience confirms. What is the kind of spirit necessitated by this faith? When can we be sure of the ultimate supremacy of good over evil? Is it not when God is identified with the principle of goodness and a principle of evil is opposed to him? It is only if God becomes the Absolute of the idealists which is the principle of a perfection higher than good and evil, that we can put down evil for a negative principle which has a transitory life, and which is bound to be broken down ultimately. Wundt goes the whole length with absolute idealists in his account of evil, but only his tender and sensitive fibres shrink from the last conclusion of the Absolute. Good by its very nature is self-consistent and evil self-contradictory, and so good is bound to triumph.

"There is no such dualism of good and evil, they are not two co-ordinate powers, in a word, there is no principle of evil. There is a moral order, but evil is only disorder. When then we compare the unity and solidarity of the good with the motley many-headed shapes of evil ever at cross purposes with each other, the conservation common to all forms of good and no forms of evil, when we consider the close connection between the good and the true on the one hand, between error and evil on the other, have we not ground for believing in the eventual triumph of the good, have we not ground for maintaining that such moral evil as we find in the world, terrible though it is, is after all not such as to justify the atheistic position" (p. 376). But our regret is that it does not justify the theistic position. The identification of truth and goodness, emphasis on the impulse to truth and goodness being the springs of human endeavor and aspiration, insistence on the relative and negative nature of evil, all point to the absolutist theory. In the world nature confronts spirit with a number of discrete elements. Spirit is called upon to impose order. The question is, can it succeed in its attempt to transcend nature? The
past progress is cited as evidence for the future triumph.
Spiritual life has hitherto survived its scourges and gone on upward and onward. If it proves anything it is the identity of spirit which prevails behind both nature and man. The Real is the Absolute spiritual life existing as the ground and inspiration of all human endeavor and achievement on the one hand and as the basis of nature on the other. Apart from the hypothesis of an Absolute mind sustaining and pervading the universe, man can have little hope of complete freedom and personality. Without faith in an Absolute spirit, we cannot be sure of rising superior to the oppositions in a struggle with a hostile and superior world. Ward admits it when he says, "God is not simply a transcendent Being existing above and apart from the world, but he is also immanent and active within it and such active presence of the one spirit who alone knows all, affords an assurance that the pluralist's ideal will be attained" (p. 225). The Divine spirit is transcendent to the world as the primal source of it, and immanent in it as the mind is immanent in its thoughts. The world is his idea. God is "the ground of its being." Surely this is not the limited, finite, personal Godhead which theism craves for, but the Absolute spirit which is the all-embracing whole. This spiritual unity seems to have more in common with the Absolute of Singularism than with the God of Theism. Only we take care to point out that the unity is not one which annuls the distinctions but one which includes them all. Absolutism says that the unity which does not manifest itself in a plurality is a blank unity and the Absolute is the eternal spirit which binds together the several parts in a whole. If we ask Ward now on his hypothesis the world and God are related, he silences us by saying, "Any adequate idea of God and the world is beyond us."

It is wrong to think that the difference between Ward's philosophy and absolutism is that, according to him, God is both immanent and transcendent, while according to absolutists God is only immanent in the universe.
Absolutism is here confused with atheistic pantheism, which holds that God is the world and the world is God. But absolutism does not identify God and the world. Ward neatly sums up the absolutist position when he says, "God is transcendent to it (the world) for it is not God but his utterance and manifestation; yet because it is his utterance and because he ever sustains it, he is immanent in it; it is his continuous creation" (p. 249).

Besides the argument that God is necessary for experience, Ward mentions that his law of continuity requires an upper limit, namely, God, and he can only be a big man. To the pluralist, "like every other spirit, God must have his unique standpoint; but it is unique in a quite special way: it is the highest" (p. 193). It means that the difference between God and the other spirits is only one of degree and not of kind. God is the highest of the monads according to the principle of continuity. He is the dominant monad among a whole community of monads, and is not the Absolute including them all. But the religious soul does not hunger for the highest monad. It wants the Eternal Spirit transcending man infinitely, altogether of a different species. But to Ward God does not belong to a class apart but is only a "member of the realm of ends, albeit the highest, and, so to say, the central member" (p. 193). But if God is only the highest member of the series, if he is only the upper limit, how can we have any certainty about the unity of the universe, completeness of life and the triumph of the moral ideals? It is only if we conceive of God as both immanent and transcendent, as an all-embracing spirit, that we can have this assurance. But then, God ceases to have any particular standpoint and becomes the whole. Each individual mirrors the whole from a particular standpoint, and so represents only an aspect of the whole. If God has no particular, in the sense of distinguishing standpoint, then he is merely immanent and not transcendent. To avoid the difficulties of pure immanence, Ward gives God a central standpoint, which is, and makes itself,
central by maintaining the reality of the other stand-
points and by entering into these latter in a manner
about which we can only speculate. But this is the
position of absolutism. "Now, remove from such
an experience the relativity which standpoint implies
and you approach the theistic ideal of an absolute
experience, the experience of a living and active spirit,
whose centre is everywhere and circumference no-
where; an experience complete at all points and
including every one" (p. 259). This is not the God
with a unique standpoint but the Absolute of monistic
idealism. Not God but the Absolute is necessary to give
a real unity to the pluralistic conception of the totality of
beings. Ward tries to distinguish God from the Absolute,
but when he follows out the consequences of this distinc-
tion he finds that it is only the Absolute which has all
standpoints in it though it is not a standpoint by itself
that can complete pluralism. To impart the unity to
pluralism, Ward's God becomes the Absolute. But then
the law of continuity is broken. It requires that God
should be either a member of the realm where all are gods,
in which case we cannot account for the unity of life, or
He has no existence. If God becomes the Absolute then
Ward's pluralism becomes quite satisfactory, but only the
law of continuity is violated. So in obedience to the
conflicting demands of religion and logic Ward swings
now and fro. The god of religion is postulated to meet
the needs of the religious mind, which looks for inti-
mate living intercourse with God, an intercourse different
in nature from that which man have with their fellow-
subjects. By making God a co-member of the series,
Ward asserts that it is possible for man to have what
is called religious communion and fellowship with him.
"It would be reasonable to suppose that mutual commu-
ication between the Supreme spirit and ourselves—even
between other superior beings and ourselves—would be
possible of a more immediate, so to say, more internal
nature, than that which alone holds between ourselves
and our fellow-men" (footnote to p. 793). If God is one of the system of monads no special intimate communion with him is a fact; if he is not, he falls out of the scheme. Ward makes his God the creator of the universe. While absolutism asserts that finite minds are the unique expressions of the universal spirit, still the exact manner of the relation between the two is wrapped up in obscurity. But in Ward's philosophy, too, the creation of the world by God is shrouded in mystery. Ward is afraid that if he should adopt the ordinary theological view of creation, the independence of the souls will be sacrificed. He does not know how he can cling to both creation by the one and independence of the many. Creation as making out of nothing, and creation as the unfolding of a prearranged plan are both repudiated. Ward warns us that we should not employ the categories of transient or immanent causation which hold good only within the world of plurality. Creation means only that God is the central ground of the world's being. He is its root essence. At times, Ward is willing to give up creation, theism, etc. He says that pluralism alone would suffice, and we do not know whether theism is true or not. We cannot verify the "infinite regress which the existence of bare monads implies," and so we cannot decide between the alternatives of theism and pluralism. He thinks that pluralism is a simpler and safer hypothesis, as theism has a tendency to pass into deism, which separates God from the world as potter from his clay. But there is no such deistic danger in absolutism, as it does not allow a God who, like a human artist, does his work of creating the world and then withdraws from it. Whatever be the nature of creation, Ward admits that the created world is dependent on God. The idea of creation is just the idea of the dependence of the Many on the One. The Many not only exist along with God but live in him and through him. From God is the world born, and by him is it sustained. The world is the continuous manifestation of God. It is not a long step from this to say that the
Absolute is the reality which includes both God and the world. When we introduce duality into the Absolute, we see the diversity of created spirits over against the unity of the creative spirit.

As to whether individuals are free and independent when God is admitted to be their creator, Ward says they are free since God is only the creator of creators. "Unless creators are created, nothing is really created." God is no creator unless his creatures have independence. This is the crux of pluralism. Unless individuals are free, pluralism has no significance. As to how they can be free and at the same time the created products of God is just the problem. "Creator of creators" is unfortunately only a phrase which states the problem without explaining it. The reason why Ward makes his central spirit the theist's God and not the idealist's Absolute is that the former is supposed to have room for the freedom and independence of man while the latter has not. In systems of absolutism, the Absolute alone is free, while the subjects are all the instruments of the Absolute or puppets moved hither and thither by the strings of the Absolute. Ward makes man free and alive, and so he substitutes for the Absolute the living God who works and grows like man. God is a Primus inter pares and not an own antithesis, for this alone has room for "a living God with a living world, and not the potter god with a world of illusory clay." If we do not care for the independence of the Many, we may have the Absolute. "There might have been an Absolute, provided there had been no Many, but holding to the reality of these we can regard God as Supreme but not as Absolute; then we seem to save the Many, but we have only a finite God or rather the idea of one" (p. 43). The prejudice against absolutism that it is incompatible with the independence of the Many is unfounded. If the individual can be free, it is only in an absolutist system. It is true that the Absolute alone is free, but the individual is an expression of the Absolute. God is perfectly free, and man who is made in the image of God must also be
free. Again, the relation of the Supreme personality or God to the other minds, when logically worked out, results in absolutism or in degrading God to the level of man. If God is as weak as man, if he has to battle against opposing forces with uncertain results, if to him also there is much that is contingent, then he is as much in need of a God as man himself. If, on the other hand, he is sure of the triumph, if he uses man as man uses the lower mounds for his higher purpose, and if the world is only the idea of God, then God is the Absolute. He is the world-soul, while the world is the body of God, but then Ward’s pluralism vanishes. Professor Waitehead rightly observes "that just in so far as Professor Ward remains faithful to his pluralistic assumptions of the apprehensio creatio that he sets up does he fail to make good his promises, and on the other hand, so far as he makes good his promises, he does so by appealing to a principle which he owes to the philosophy he seeks to undermine and which is quite incompatible with his own" (Mind, N.S. 87, p. 324).

The next question is, Is God a person? Ward adopts this view. God is a person because he is a member of the Kingdom of persons. Ward is aware that personality involves limitations and so says that God has his limitations. Only the limitations are self-imposed. He has no forced limitations. What the future of the world would be depends not merely on God but on other free agents "whom he sustains but never constrains" (p. 478). But Ward sometimes feels that this would be to reduce God to the level of man, and so he urges that God is unlimited and all-powerful. He is not merely the knower of the world but the ruler thereof. "It is the providence that shapes our ends, rough-hewn them how we will. . . . But the modes observed. . . . is to us inescapable. . . . How God works with us or against us in the government of the world we must again admit we do not know" (p. 479). So though God is a person, he is not a person in one sense of the term. "To have experience is to be a person
among persons. But we are persons in a world of others who are independent of us. God is not in this wise a person; and though it be true that his is confronted by the world and active in it, still other persons are not for him merely objective (known through sense and intellect) or merely ejective (known through instinct or interpretation). Again, the world for God is the world in its unity and entirety; his is not a perspectival view, such as standpoint implies; nor is it in a discursive view, such as our limited attention requires. God is ubiquitous and omnipresent, to coin a term. Finally, self-consciousness and reason in God are not as with us incomplete and intermittent. There are no broken lights in him; he alone can say, I am that I am. We may then describe God as super-personal; or, following Locke, say, 'Perfect personality is in God only; to all finite minds only a pale copy of it is allotted' (pp. 177-178). It does not matter whether we call a God who is personal in a sense different from the ordinary, personal or impersonal. It is a matter of terminology. In Ward's sense, the Absolute Spirit may be called a person, as he has the mind of the finite without its finiteness. To the question whether there is anything else over against God which limits him from without Ward gives a negative answer. God has limited himself in the world. But these limitations which manifest themselves as other spirits account for pain and evil in the world. As the admitted evils of the world cannot be reconciled with God's goodness he postulates the hypothesis of a limited or finite God. Evil is due to the defective use the monads make of their freedom. God made them free and it is not his fault if they abuse the freedom he gave. God made man free to choose, but the foul deliberately elected his own damnation. If God had not granted man freedom, i.e. had made all command necessary and determined, then we might have had a world where error and evil were impossible, but it would have been a universe for stones and sticks, and not for men. But Ward wishes to make men free to choose within
limits, and still to relieve God from the responsibility for evil, he holds that the world is a plurality of monads. Evil is due to the friction of a growing universe. "Where the many have some initiative, where development is epigenetic, contingency and conflict, indubility and peculiarity seem inevitable" (p. 353). Absolute creation is not assigned to God, as then the monads cannot be rendered independent enough to bear the burden of evil. So only the conception of a limited God makes evil explicable. But the perfection of God is also to be maintained, and so it is asserted that the limitedness of God is due to his self-determination. He has created free spirits whose freedom sets limits in God (see p. 351.) God as a member of the realm of ends cannot be infinite. It also follows that the God of continuity should be a living growing God, as process and change are the central facts of the pluralist's universe (see pp. 434 and 436).

Is activity a characteristic of finite experience or is it true of God also? All mind whether human or divine has this characteristic. But activity, as we are acquainted with it, is conditioned by limitations. Life is a growth. It is a warfare where we have to overcome difficulties. "Experience in every case consists in interaction between individual and environment, an alternation of sensitive impression and motor expression, the one relatively passive, the other relatively active. Absolute activity and absolute passivity are limiting conceptions to which we have no answering experience, the one being commonly attributed to God only and the other only to primeval matter" (N. and A. i. 52-53). We are active only so far as we have a resisting environment which we have to bend to our purposes. Apart from it we cannot conceive of activity. Apart from an environment—a physical environment which is hostile to our ends, a social environment of other minds with their own plans and purposes which conflict with ours—activity to Wundt has no meaning. If activity is an ultimate characteristic of reality, it is the same as saying that the dualism
between organism and environment will be a final characteristic of reality. But in Ward the physical environment is unreal. And the social environment will lose its nature as an environment to which the individual has to adapt himself, since the individuals are all guided by a Supreme Intelligence. Ultimately we reach a stage where there will be no disorder and no conflict at all. There will then be no environment for man or God to act against. So the final stage of reality will be neither active nor passive. It will be dead. But if God is active at all, it must be in a sense different from the ordinary. Activity in Ward’s sense is possible only for created limited beings, and if God is active in that sense he must also be limited. But on the absolutistic theory the central spirit is active as a creative or artistic genius in active. The mere outflow of his feeling may be creation, and this activity does not mean any limitation in God. Such is really Ward’s God. He is the eternal purpose, the innermost ideal which finite wills strain after though they do not realise. But this conflicts with Ward’s other descriptions of God.

Our conclusion is that the difficulties of pluralism which Ward tries to meet by the theistic conception are not met so long as he keeps to the idea of God as the personal Creator. But when he succeeds in meeting them by making God the all-comprehensive spirit, his pluralism and theism have vanished. The lesson is clear that even the most brilliant philosopher cannot make pluralism philosophically sound and satisfactory.