CHAPTER XI

THE NEW REALISM OF MR. BERTRAND RUSSELL

The realistic reaction deserves a place in any study of contemporary thought by its growing influence and novelty of standpoint. It is difficult to criticise it as the theory is yet in the making, and we do not have any systematic exposition of it. We cannot say that its way of looking at things is influenced by religious bias. Still, since realism is a departure from the traditional method and more or less satisfies the needs of a world which is impatient for new things, and has much in common with contemporary systems which oppose absolute idealism and support pluralism, it may be well to devote a chapter to it. Much of what passes for new realism is logical and methodological in its nature, and our interest is not so much in logic as in metaphysics. We shall here confine our attention to the views of the most influential of the realistic school, the Honourable Bertrand Russell, F.R.S. The fascinating facility with which he employs mathematical concepts in defending philosophical propositions and the free use of the concepts of science and strict logic, which meet us

1 Compare what Mr. Russell says: "Driven from the particular sciences, the belief that the elements of present and well must afford a key to the understanding of the world has sought a refuge in philosophy, but even from this last refuge it philosophy is not to remain a set of pleasing dreams, this mind must be driven forth. . . . In thought, at any rate, those who forgo good and evil and rank only to know the facts are more likely to achieve good, than those who view the world through the distorting medium of their own desires." (Mysticism and Logic).

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almost at every turn, give us the impression that the logic of realism is not faulty, though the instinctive feeling that its metaphysical conclusions are hardly convincing is not easily removed.

I

We may approach the study of Mr. Russell’s philosophy from the standpoint of its opposition to idealism. It is said that the realistic attacks of monism are the most damaging.¹ Let us briefly notice them. We shall take up first the oft-repeated criticism that classical idealism assumes that sense is perceived rests on a confusion. Professor Perry argues that the fallacy of what he calls the egocentric predicament vitiates all forms of idealism (see Mind, N.S., No. 75). Mr. Moore thinks that idealism is disproved, because the Berkeleyan principle is false in every conceivable sense (Mind, N.S., 48). According to him it ignores the fundamental distinction between cognizing on the one hand and what is cognised on the other. But Berkeley was chiefly concerned in demolishing the position of the earlier common-sense realism about the existence of matter. As we shall see, the direct outcome of Berkeley’s theory, viz. subjectivism, is the logical consequence of new realism. The subjective idealism of Berkeley is as much repugnant to the classical idealism of Kant and Hegel as to the new realism of Russell and Moore. If realism means only opposition to subjectivism, then idealism is also realism. While it is true that the idealist has emphasised the mind-dependent nature of reality, it is false to think that he identifies the real with the perceived. While agreeing with the new realist that the real is not the perceived, he still revolts against the realist’s sharp distinction of things and our consciousness of them. The realist affirms a dualism between the world of meaning and the world of direct

¹ Miss Mary Sinclair in her Introduction to Defence of Idealism considers the realist attacks of monism to be the most formidable.
experience. To the realist every object in consciousness, whether a material thing, a feeling, or a universal, has independent reality. The idealist, on the other hand, believes that meaning and fact are organic elements in one concrete whole. The dualism which realism creates by holding the two worlds apart, idealism breaks down. If we want to make the universe intelligible the world should be conceived as one. But it is sometimes argued that realism is not committed to dualism. Mr. Moulton, in his paper on "Current Misconceptions of Realism" (Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, iv. 4), contends that realism does not logically involve psychophysical or metaphysical or epistemological dualism. None of them is implied by realism as such, though one or the other may have been held by individual realists. At that realism stands for is that things do not depend for their existence on the fact that we know them. They can continue to exist even when no subject is aware of them. While almost all realists in modern philosophy have held the theory of epistemological dualism, monistic realism is not self-contradictory. But idealism contests the central principle of realism that subject and object are completely independent. Realism and idealism are at one in repudiating subjectivism. The difference is about the non-realistic assumption that there is a residual reality which is not experienced. It is clear that idealism has the support of common sense and psychology. The subject-object distinction is one within experience. Subject and object are contrasted and distinguished only when there is a fact. So long as the course of our activity runs smooth, we do not distinguish between fact and meaning. While it is true that being in the knowledge relation to a particular ego does not constitute the existence of the object, still, if we admit the reality of a universal consciousness, existence seems to be constituted by a knowledge relation. God maintains objects to existence by knowing them. If realism is true in its belief in the absolute independence
of knowledge and existence, then the existence of a thing is no more dependent on God's knowing it than on my knowing it. Idealism is not solipsism; for, according to it, the finite self feels itself to be limited. A limit implies something limiting. To know that the self is limited is to know that there is something existing beyond the limit. But absolute idealism draws a distinction between a finite consciousness which is opposed by the objective world and infinite consciousness which has nothing opposed to it. Simply because an object can exist apart from human consciousness, it does not follow that it can exist apart from the Divine consciousness. To the Divine consciousness, which is creative, knowing means being. This is the meaning of the idealist contention that the process of the world is the externalization of self. In the finite consciousness we are dependent on a reality which we know but do not make; God makes the object he knows. Of course, it is not the human mind that makes reality. For it is a bare and abstract ego craving for content and concrete filling from a reality which seems external to it. So far as human thought is concerned, we require it to think reality, though this thinking is not the condition of the existence of reality. To God the whole universe is an object of knowledge. If the world is not dependent on God, then it means that nature has its own self-existent and distinct being independent of God. But it is obvious that nature is not self-existent. Professor Pringle Parry says, "How this real system of externality on which as finite spirits we depend, is related to or included in an absolute experience, is dark to us; but to answer such a question would mean to transcend the very conditions of our separate individuality. We can but dimly apprehend that, to such an experience, nature cannot be external in the way in which it necessarily is to the finite minds which it shapes and fills" ("Age of God," pp. 202-203). Nature is external to finite consciousness. Therefore Berkeley is wrong, and the realist right; but nature is not independent of
absolute consciousness, therefore the realist is wrong and the absolutist right.

Secondly, idealism, it is said, reduces concrete experience to an illusion. We do not know what exactly is meant by this charge. If it means that the concrete experience of the individual is not the whole, but only an element in the whole, idealism pleads guilty to it. Reality, while it lives in the concrete individual, is not exhausted by them. Things are not what they seem. The concrete experience of the individual has to be interpreted in the light of a whole in which it belongs, but this is not to deny reality to it, but Russell asks: how can the monist account for the apparent multiplicity of the real world? The difficulty is that identity in difference is impossible if we adhere to strict monism. For identity in difference involves many partial truths, which combine by a kind of mutual give and take into one whole of truth, but the partial truths in a strict monism are not merely not quite true; they do not exist at all. If there were such propositions, whether true or false, that would be plurality” (Philosophical Essays, p. 168, see also p. 169). But here Russell makes a mistake. The monist, no doubt, contends that truth is the whole. From this it follows that no part of truth is the whole truth, and this is a bare tenacity, but partial truths are not untruths. They are true of parts of reality, and serve partial purposes. Identity in difference is possible only in the monistic conception. In the realistic view, while each part is an independent reality, and while we, therefore, have an infinite number of independent absolutes and, consequently, whole truths, identity in difference does not obtain. Realism takes its stand on the experience of the plain man. To him facts are fixed ‘out there’; He does not admit degrees of truth. Truths are hard, absolute and immutable, since facts are bits of reality each independent, and accessible to apprehension. On this view identity in difference becomes a sham. It is realism that, by creating a dualism between the worlds of fact
and consciousness, runs the risk of reducing concrete experience, which is the unity of the two, to an illusion, not absolution.

II

Russell believes that the difficulties incident to the idealistic conception will disappear if we take our stand on the facts of experience and adopt the mathematical method. He has quite a flattering conception of the value of mathematical logic to philosophy. He thinks that this new logic will help philosophy to come into its own for the first time in the history of speculation. He complains of the prevailing tendency to import ethical and religious values into philosophy and thus corrupt it. He deprecates classical idealism which ignores the limits of philosophical knowledge and aspires to a knowledge that is not possible. "Most philosophers—or at any rate very many—profess to be able to prove by a priori metaphysical reasoning such things as the fundamental dogmas of religion, the essential rationality of the universe, the immorality of matter, the unreality of all evil, and so on. There can be no doubt that the hope of finding reason to believe such theses as these has been the chief inspiration of many lifelong students of philosophy. This hope, I believe, is vain. It would show that knowledge concerning the universe as a whole is not to be obtained by metaphysics, and that the proposed proofs that, in virtue of the laws of logic, such and such things must exist and such and such others cannot, are not capable of surviving a critical scrutiny" (Problems of Philosophy, pp. 220-221). We have already protested against the view which confuses truth with desires. We have also pointed out that classical idealism as distinct from its recent aberrations allows our desires only to set the problems, and not furnish the solutions. The tendency to import ethical and religious values into philosophy is not profitable either to philosophy or to ethics and religion. Russell deserves congratulations for the force
and clearness will which he has impressed the truth that we have no right to cling to impossibilities simply because they happen to satisfy our religious hopes and aspirations. We have to depend on the report of reason. The essence of philosophy is logic. Russell's realism is thus the direct opposite of pragmatism. While pragmatism holds that every belief which agrees with our instincts and feelings is true, realism requires us to be logical even at the risk of coming into conflict with our cherished instincts. The central theories of neo-realism about mathematical infinity, external relations, immediate perception, etc., are all derived from mathematical logic. It is, however, risky to apply mathematical methods in philosophy, as objects of mathematical study are pure, while the real universe with which philosophy deals is complex. In trying to apply this method to philosophy, Russell is reducing the universe to its immaterial foundations. Thus the world with the kind of properties psychologists find in it, we pass, according to Russell, by means of logical construction to the scientific world with its particles, points and instants. The attempt to approximate philosophy to science results in reducing the data of sense to phenomena or appearances of objects. While science affirms the existence of real entities independent of consciousness, these real entities are not so much the data we apprehend as the invisible points, instants, etc. We shall see in the sequel how Russell's view by reason of his method becomes stale and flat, empty and unprofitable. No other result is possible when the real world we feel and live in is dissolved into a moving cloud of swarming abstractions, call them what you will, atoms, points or concepts.

III

The atomistic logic is applied to the universe without and within. Under its guidance, experience is broken up into an infinite number of classes or kinds of existences,
and an infinite number of existences within each class or kind. This analytic method of logic gives us a pluralistic realism. The complex world is broken up into simpler entities, which even when brought into relations somehow succeed in retaining their simplicity. When they become parts of a complex whole, they do not surrender their independence. Or this hypothesis we do not feel any need to postulate an Absolute. The necessity for an Absolute arises only if we regard the empirical universe as an appearance imperfect, abstract and, therefore, unreal, but when, with Russell, we hold that everything is absolute, time, space, concept, relation, or universal, we have no desire to seek for another absolute. The unity of the world is the central point. To the absolutist the world is a concrete synthetic whole where the entities are interdependent; to the realist it is an infinite number of things loosely crowded together. We cannot be satisfied with a world which is only a conglomeration of a number of repellent atoms, hard and imperious. The instinctive craving of the mind for a unitary conception of the world asserts its rights, and in obedience to its demands the realist distinguishes different kinds of wholes, for example, collections of single terms, collections of collections, and collections of propositions which relate or qualify (see Principles of Mathematics, ch. xvi.). Though the name collection makes out that the union is a mere putting together, still in the last case there seems to be a more living unity. Russell urges that 'an aggregate is “completely specified when all its simple constituents are specified; its parts have an indirect connection inter se, but only the indirect connection involved in being parts of one and the same whole.”' But he himself admits that wholes of propositions “are not completely specified when their parts are all known” (Phil. p. 740). “A whole is a new single term, distinct from each of its parts and from all of them; it is one, yet many, and is related to the parts, but has a being distinct from
tions" (ibid. p. 147). Surely this is not a mere collection or an aggregate but a unity, or an identity in difference. "Each class of wholes consists of terms not simply equivalent in all their parts; but, in the case of
unities, the whole is not even specified by its parts" (p. 141). Besides, the collections to be real must obey
the principle of identity in difference. When we analyse
complex wholes, we may get simpler entities which we
may think possess the same character even as parts of
wholes, but this impression may be incorrect, for Russell
admits that there is truth in the statement that
'analysis is in some measure falsification' (see *Principles
holds to complex units which cannot be analysed into
terms and relations. Russell believes that the absol-
utely independent simples can work themselves into
genuine unities by means of relations, but we cannot
conceive how there can be units together with simplicity
and independence. The simples may come together but
not get united. Appreciating the difficulty, Russell
calls the relations external, but this term only states
the problem. External relation means that there is
relating, while the relata are left absolutely independent.
If the related elements get united, they cease to be in-
dependent and become interdependent elements in a
whole. In all this account of the ultimate constituents
of reality and analysis of the world into many things
and relations, Russell believes that he has the support
of experience. But in the essay on the "Free Man's
Worship" he traces the many things to matter and
motion. In reducing even minds to collocations of
atoms, Russell transcends the data of experience and
emphasizes the numen of things. He thereby admits
that we are not in any way constrained to be faithful
to the superficial appearances of experience.

Russell holds in the extramental reality of sense-
data, things, qualities, relations, universals, etc. To
prove the indepence of sense-data, he urges two
arguments: (1) What I see and what I hear are distinct from seeing and hearing. This only proves that subjective idealism is mistaken. All idealists, who are not subjective idealists, recognise that over against knowing stands something known. It is a mistake to think that to idealism the object ceases to exist when we are not conscious of it, and comes to exist when we become conscious of it. Realism has a good case against solipsism, but not against idealism. We admit that there is a world of reality independent of finite consciousness. The world may have existed for long without being known to a finite knower. It may be that when human beings arise, they found a world awaiting them which would continue to exist even if human beings are washed off the face of the earth. But there cannot be a world without absolute consciousness. When this absolute consciousness ceases to exist, the world of fact will also cease to have any being. We need not press this point since we have already noticed it. Let us ask for the reason why Russell accuses the reality of sense-data. When we say we see a table, "what we know by experience, what is really known is a correlation of muscular and other bodily sensations with changes in visual sensations" (p. 76). But how do we know that, besides sensations, there are extramontal sense-data? In this difficulty, Russell takes shelter under the involuntariness of sensations. In the history of philosophy, this involuntariness has been ascribed to a good God, a malignar devil or dead matter. The argument from the involuntariness of sensations to the extramontal reality of sense-data is not conclusive. (2) "Colours and noises are not mental in the sense of having that . . . peculiarity which belongs to beliefs, wishes and volitions." It is hard to conceive how sound and colour are sense-data rather than sensations. To the realist primary and secondary qualities are both objective though tertiary qualities are reserved as the sphere of the subjective. Aesthetic feelings and creative values are examples of
subjective qualities. Realists are not quite agreed as to what is to be included among the purely subjective products. Beauty and goodness are subjective according to Mr. Alexander, while they are objective according to Messrs. Russell and Moore. Can we not say that even aesthetic feelings and emotions are equally objective? Why should a distinction be made between love and desire on the one hand and sound and colour on the other? If tastes and colours, hardness and heaviness are in particles of matter that excite them, what is it that prevents us from holding that wonder and awe, love and fear are also out there? A thing may be beautiful or charming quite as really and truly as it is sweet or red, and if its sweetness or richness is mind-independent, so should be its beauty or charm. Again, we do not understand what exactly is the place of pain in this scheme of things. Is there any meaning in speaking of pleasure or pain except as the experience of some individual consciousness? To Russell sense-data like cold and loud, percepts like timber and glass, and concepts like smoothness and greenness and relations are all extramental. Sense-data are outside and self-subsistent objects of sense-data, percepts are outside of perception, and concepts outside of conception. Concepts are not mental existences, for that would be to rob them of their essential quality of universality (Problems of Philosophy, p. 155). The concepts are no more in the conserving consciousness than they are in the objects of perception. They have a world of their own, a Platonic world of timeless and changeless ideas. Thoughts and feelings, minds and physical objects exist. But universals do not exist in this sense; we shall say that they subsist or have being, whereas being is opposed to existence as being timeless. The world of universals... may also be described as the world of being. The world of being is unchangeable, rigid, exact, delightful to the mathematician, logician, the builder of metaphysical systems, and all who love perfection more than life.
Universals are as real and as independent of consciousness as any of the objects in space and time. These universals are indispensable for reasoning. We have to assume as many universals as there are propositions for the sake of reasoning. Simple enumeration cannot give rise to them. The general propositions of logic transcend the bounds of sensible knowledge which is limited to particular facts. From particulars we cannot derive principles of universal validity. We would be arguing in a circle if inductive principles are only derived from experience. Laws of experience possess a historical and not a logical value. Empiricism which holds that the universals are the products of experience, and idealism which reduces them to subjective forms of mind are equally false, since in either case we cannot employ them in reasoning. It follows that we must have a world of universals possessing a reality of its own, external both to the mind of man and the world of space and time. Unless we assume these universals our house of knowledge would crumble to pieces. They exist in a spaceless and timeless world as objects of perception exist in a world of time and space. We have concepts as universals for every thing, quality or relation. The world of universals is as infinite as the world of space and time. The universals do not function in our experience, but are still objects of conceptual contemplation. While particulars are private to individuals, the universals are public possessions. If to every percept there is a corresponding concept, if in the world material things perish after a time, then their corresponding essences are to be regarded as alive. The world of space and time changes; that of universals is unchangeable. No wonder we prefer to think of the world of universals as reality and that of particulars as appearance. Russell holds that we can have direct acquaintance with universals as with sensible data, though of material objects in space and time, which are independent of our subjective perception, we have only indirect knowledge by description (see Problems of Philosophy, pp. 81 and 102).
Do we not have here the old difficulty about Plato’s ideal types? Russell’s doctrine of universals is based upon Meinong’s theory of objects. While empirical sciences deal with existing reality, the theory of objects deals with rational essences which can be developed a priori. Mathematics deals with the ideal and not with the real, with what subsists and not with what exists. Do not all objects of the universe, good, bad and indifferent, share in an immortality since they all are rooted in unseen reality or essences? Is not this immanent or immortal unseen reality the ground of the existence of the objects of the world of space and time? If these objects share in an immortal reality, we must look upon them as lasting for all time and therefore as real. The realists guard against any such high claims for the objects of the world, since they hold that universals and particulars have nothing to do with each other. There is no question in realism about the participation of the particular in the universal. But we need universals to account for particulars. The function of the universals is that, otherwise, the world will be broken up into a number of dead particulars on the one side and abstract universals on the other. To bring the two together, to develop the given into an organic completeness, the two must be bound together. Then law is rooted in fact. If once we grant the immannence of the universals, then the two worlds become interdependent, and the highest and the most ultimate universal as the keystone of the arch would become the absolute idea. But such a hypothesis becomes incompatible with strict pluralism, and so the realist shrinks from it. But if a barrier is set up between particulars and universals, sensible cognition and rational knowledge, the familiar difficulties raised by Aristotle against Plato’s scheme of ideas come up. How are we to conceive the union of the idea and the real as necessary for the cognitive act? Unless the universals are immanent in the particular, they cannot help us in the reasoning process; but if they are immanent, pluralism disappears.
The realists think that the universals are not thought constructions. We find but do not make them. Any and every universal we want we seem to be lucky enough to find. All the universals necessary for sustaining the world of sense perception are thus easily slipped in. The abstractions of logic are given a reality. This policy may justify the positing of the Absolute if only we find a need for it. Logic brings about its own revenge, and a system of philosophy which prides itself on being the absolute antithesis of pragmatism unconsciously finds its home in the neighbourhood of pragmatism. This tendency to postulate universals whenever we feel a need for them has very dangerous consequences. We seem to have as many universals as there are objects conceivable and real. Very likely, we may become aware of universals corresponding in five and brimsome, paradise and purgatory, dust and deity.

Relations according to Russell's logic are external. They are not grounded in the nature of the terms. They cannot be deduced from the essence of related things. Every relation is independent of the relations as well as the related. It follows that the relations are not the work of thought. "The relation, like the term it relates, is not dependent on thought, but belongs to the independent world which thought apprehends but does not create." (Problems of Philosophy, p. 155). Russell objects to internal relations on the ground that if relations are rooted in the nature of the terms, there can be no diversity in things (see Philosophical Essays, p. 163). We can say that A is different from B, only if the two have different predicates. But on the hypothesis of internal relations there is only one thing. We can have no judgment at all if "the one final and complete truth must consist of a proposition with one subject, viz. the whole and one predicate. But as this involves distinguishing S and P, as if they could be diverse, even this is not quite true." (Ibid. p. 164). The fundamental defect of idealism according to Russell is that it over-
looks the distinction between quality and relation. There is a difference between relating a thing and qualifying it, between saying that a thing has this or that quality and that it stands in this or that relation to something else. A thing's relations are not the qualities of the thing. Changes in relations do not alter the nature of the objects, while changes in qualities do. After the colour of the stone, it becomes different. After its relations to other objects, its nature is not changed. Idealism makes a mistake in reducing relations to qualities. To the idealist logician relations are internal. The characteristics of a thing, whatever we may call them, constitute a unity. The bond of cohesion among these characteristics is necessary and logical. He conceives the whole universe to be a single whole. Every particular thing in a manner reflects the whole nature of the universe. Every logician finds that a fragment or a part involves the nature of the whole. To the realist the meeting of two entities is contingent and accidental. A causes B not because it is the nature of A to cause B, but because they happen together. There is no necessity in the nature of things to make two objects bind themselves together. We cannot ask why two terms get related. They are together and that is all. If the relation between S and P is not grounded in their nature, the relation cannot be permanent, but we do have certain permanent relations which the realist cannot account for. If the relations are not internal, we cannot anticipate and say what will come next. Every change will be an absolute shock or surprise. There is no reason why one change rather than another should occur.

Dr. Roseauq writes: "In a large proportion of cases the relevancy of the relations to the properties of the related terms involves a community of kind. You cannot have a spatial relation between terms which are members of a mental world. Why is it absurd to ask for the distance from the London bridge to one o'clock? Because the one term is in space and the other in time." (Logic, ii. 277-75). The London passenger's question
about the distance between Piccadilly and Thursday will be quite justified on the realist's hypothesis. The 'external relations' theory seems to be supported by abstract mathematics where the relations are completely external and do not alter the nature of the terms related. But what is true of a world of abstractions is not true of the world of reality. In the latter, things are changed by the action of other things on them. If relations are external we cannot have inference. Implication is meaningless without system, and system means internal relations. From the world of sense perception, which is the starting-point of knowledge, we develop through insight into its implications the world of science. Without internal relations and logical implication we do not know how it will be possible for us to discriminate fact from fancy, truth from error, and imagination from reality. We quite recognise that there are relations which are not essential to the nature of realities. But we cannot therefore say that relations in general form no part of and are external to the essential nature of all realities. The nature of relations external or internal has to be empirically determined.

Russell, fifteen years ago, held the view that truth is a quality, an immediate characteristic feature of independent entities which are what they are in and for themselves without relations to mind (see Mind, N.S., No. 52). But for many years now, he has advocated the view that truth is a quality of propositions as opposed to facts and is dependent for its existence upon mind though it is external fact that decides whether a given belief or proposition is true or false (see Problems of Philosophy, pp. 188 and 202). What makes a belief true is a fact which is independent of mind. Truth consists in correspondence between beliefs and facts. The property of truth or falsehood which propositions possess is wholly dependent on the relation of the beliefs to outside things. It is supposed that experiencing makes no difference to the facts. In sensation we
have two simple factors and a relation. (1) The quality apprehended—a simple independent real; (2) the act of apprehension which is mental or physical; and (3) a relation between these which cannot be further defined as it is unique. The relation between subject and object in experience holds the related facts together, but leaves them untouched and unaffected by their union. A proposition is either true or false according to the nature of the relation between the terms. This character is only to be immediately recognised. It cannot be further defined. Some propositions are true and others false as some substances are sweet and others sour. Mr. Joachim criticises this theory of truth in his book on the Nature of Truth from the idealist standpoint. Even though facts are independent of the experiencing of this or that individual subject, they cannot be said to be independent of experiencing as such. We cannot have experience of something independent of experiencing. Realism asserts that objects experienced are not dependent on our experiencing of them. Idealists grant that the real is not a mere mental state, but that which we are forced to think about it in sheer consistency. The real is not the point which lies behind perception, i.e., it is not what exists when our perception is removed, but what we have to make of it. In the words of Dr. Berquemart, "Reality lies ahead and not behind" (Logic, ii, 302). Truth and falsehood according to this theory become matters of immediate intuition.¹ Knowledge is the direct relation between the knower and the known. We seem to be reduced to the correspondence theory. If idea and object are independent and extraneous, we cannot say whether the idea corresponds with the object or not. If the object is outside the idea, there is no meaning in saying that the idea should correspond to or represent the object. There is no security that knowledge represents things as they really are. Subjectivism, phenomenalism and agnosticism.

¹ For, "Derivation Knowledge is what is validly deduced from perceiving known intuitively" (Principles of Philosophy, p. 292).
are the logical corollaries. We have the thing in itself on one side as it exists apart from its being known, a subjective modification on the other, which is a state of man's mental being. We know only the mode in which our consciousness is affected, but we do not know by what it is affected. We have an idea about anything on which our experience depends. As Dr Stirling has it: "The world only knows itself; it knows nothing of the thorn." "Text-Book in Kant, p. 353." So long as we have mediation which is looked upon as external to the terms meditated, we cannot have knowledge. The relation between the knower and the thing known must be an organic one and not contingent and accidental, for there is neither object nor subject apart from reality, which includes them both. The subject is an abstraction apart from the system with which it is in relation and which gives it its mental filling. An object again is not what it is in itself, but what it is known as. The late Professor Laurie put the whole thing neatly in the following passage: "For the real is truly to be found in the final presentation to a subject; it is in that crisis that the thing gathers up all its casual conditions and prior processes (ethical, dynamic or what not) and offers itself to us in all the richness of its phenomenal individuality. It is at this point that the heavy skeleton of abstract mathematico-physical explanation is clothed with flesh and blood and lives; it is this that conveys the emotions of the human breast, and gives birth in poetry and the other arts to the highest utterances of genius regarding our complex experiences" (Synthesis, i. 84-85). Except in a conscious subject the object cannot fulfill itself. The process of mediation is absolutely essential, and it is not a defect if the mediation expresses the organic aspects of reality. If, however, we put the subject entirely outside the world it seeks to know, then mediation becomes mutilation and our knowledge a distortion of actual reality. Even if, for the sake of argument, we hold it possible to reduplicate the world in terms of
consciousness, what is the good of it? After all, what right have we to say that the relation of the knower to known is contingent? Is it possible to find them in any other relationship? Can we catch the subject apart from the object or vice versa? If they are never separate in experience, their relation cannot be accidental. Knowledge, when adequately conceived, reveals the organic relation of the two. Mind envelops the world not as a thing alongside other things of the world but as the whole.

On this theory of dualism, cognitive relation becomes inexplicable. If thought and being, presentation and reality are completely independent of each other, we cannot understand how one can be related to the other as in the cognitive act. Again, we cannot say that in cognition the nature of the subject is not in any way altered. It must undergo a change in the process of apprehending facts of experience. The theory of external relations requires us to assume that consciousness does not undergo any change when it cognizes reality. But it can never be the same subject as that to whose consciousness the experience was not present before. In other words, all cognition alters the nature of the subject, i.e., subject and object do not remain always external to each other. Russell has no right to assume that consciousness with its faculties simply mirrors the finished world opposed to it. There are philosophers who think that the mental apparatus comes between the mind and the object. Then knowledge will get vitiated by subjective peculiarities. The realist has no right to assume that there is no falsification of facts. He rightly emphasizes the uniqueness of the knowledge relation and points out how we have both subjective and objective factors in it, but knowledge is not representation. The known is everywhere in direct relation to the object known. We cannot identify the object with our sensations and images, and we must recognize the underlying reality of the object as we know it. This is the absolutist view as much as the realist.
If pluralistic realism is the fact, what becomes of our attempt to reduce the world to order and system? The institution of connecting links would break down the isolation of simple entities. To retain the pluralism the relation is looked upon as an accidental link which is itself a third term. A plurality of absolutely simple reals cannot constitute a unity in any intelligible sense. But on this hypothesis we cannot account for the wonderful harmony of the working of the many infinites. The world remains a mystery and skepticism seems to be the only safety. A genuine organic unity is possible only if the constituent elements are interdependent features of one whole.

If sense-data, etc. are repellent units, how and why do they collate themselves in the act of perception? What exactly is the difference between their co-presence apart from perception, and presence to perception? Have we any means of knowing how or what they would be without relation to conscious subject? To Russell, terms as well as relations are given and there is no work for consciousness to do. But how can we say that all existences, original sense-data, memory images, dreams, fictions and hallucinations are independent realities of different orders? It is reasonable to say that memory images are different from sense-data but they also resemble them. They are seen to be spatial and real, extended and coloured. How are we to account for their likeness? Can we consider dreams to have an extramental reality? While we dream, the dream world seems independent of us, but can we have so many different worlds, one of waking life, one of fiction, one of dreams, etc.? How, again, can realism account for illusions and hallucinations? Perceptions as well as hallucinations seem to be equally real. How can we know in any given case whether we are genuinely in touch with reality or only apparently so? If hallucinations are locked upon as the products of a mental medium which sometimes distorts facts, we cannot call knowledge an
immediate relation as a medium intervene. If, according to a strict interpretation of realism, we view what appears to be the reality, then the distinction between hallucinations and perceptions vanishes. If it is argued that the object appears differently to different organisms, then this conflicts with the theory of external relations, for the content seems to change with relations. To the naive realist there can be no illusion of any kind in cognition. He will have to deny the central assumption of all logic and philosophy, that things are not always what they seem. Russell's solution of these problems is given in (pp. 173 ff.) his *Mysticism and Logic*, "Concerning the immediate objects in illusions, hallucinations and dreams, it is meaningless to ask whether they 'exist' or are 'real.' There they are and that ends the matter. But we may legitimately inquire as to the existence or reality of 'things' or other 'sensabilia' inferred from such objects. It is the unreality of these 'things' or other 'sensabilia,' together with a failure to notice that they are not data, which has led to the view that the objects of dreams are unreal." (p. 176). Because the dream states are not continuous with the dreamer's past, because they cannot be combined according to the laws of physics with the things inferred from the sense-data of waking life, because they cannot be correlated with other private worlds, we call them dreams. The sense-data we have in dreams have exactly the same status as any others; only they are lacking in the usual correlations and connections. This feature is "always physically or physiologically explicable." Russell classifies sensabilia in two ways. We may group together all those which have direct temporal relations to each other. Such groups are called 'perpectives' or 'biographies.' All the sense-data cognised by a single mind constitute a biography. We may group together sensabilia which are related by the bonds of continuity and similarity. These groups are what we call things and their members are states of things. Dream states
are to be regarded as the sensibilia which, while being members of a biography, are yet not members of a thing. All normal particulars are susceptible of this double classification. All the same, the difference between the normal particulars of waking life and the abnormal states of dreams, hallucinations and illusions is one of inference and not of fact. This means that mind has an important function to perform in the construction of the world of reality. In short, the world is a mental construction.

IV

In his Lowell lectures, Russell tries an account for our knowledge of the external world. Though he has not much love for Kant, it is remarkable that the problem which Russell tackles is stated more or less after Kant. We start with the immediate data of sense, " certain objects of colour, tastes, sounds, smells, etc., with certain spatio-temporal relations." How is this starting-point to be transformed into the world of common sense belief and scientific knowledge? The contents of the world are different from sense-data with which we start. The contrast between science and primitive knowledge is thus brought out: "We have still in physics as we had in Newton's time a set of indestructible entities which may be called particles, moving relatively to each other in a single space and a single time. The world of the immediate data is quite different from this. Nothing is permanent; even the things that we think are fairly permanent, such as mountains, only become data when we see them and are not immediately given as existing at other moments. So far from one all-embracing space being given, there are several spaces for each person according to the different senses which give relations that may be called spatial" (Our Knowledge of the External World, p. 194). Russell does not admit the reality of permanent things with laws of their own that cause the sense-data. Before we can get to the things of common
sense or matter of physics, we have to perform a long journey from sensibility. Similarly with the problem of self. With Hume, Russell agrees that when we wish to think of self we stumble on a particular mental state. "The question whether we are also acquainted with our bare selves as opposed to particular thoughts and feelings is a very difficult one upon which it would be rash to speak positively. When we try to look into ourselves we always seem to come upon some particular thought or feeling and not upon the 'I' which has a thought or feeling. Nevertheless there are some reasons for thinking that we are acquainted with the 'I' though the acquaintance is hard to disentangle from other things." (Problems of Philosophy, p. 78). What makes this knowledge of world and self possible is the question which Russell, in the manner of Kant, proposes to himself. There is one difference between the two in that in Russell sense-data include certain spatio-temporal relations. But he does not give any reason for this opinion. According to him, we have direct acquaintance with sense-data, universals and perhaps selves, but our knowledge of the external world and of other persons is of the descriptive kind. This indirect knowledge is not perfect. Perfect knowledge is the immediate intuition of the eternal relations constituting in their ideal combination the system of mathematical logic.

In attempting a solution of the problem, Russell does not want to adopt the easy method of inferring the existence of things from the data of sense by the employment of a priori principles. If our philosophy is to be made scientific, if our beliefs should rest on observations and experiments, this method must be avoided (see the article in Scientia, July 1914). The objects of science are not sense-data. We cannot infer them legitimately as the causes of sense-data. How then are we to justify science and common sense? Here Russell turns to his method of logical construction. Instead of inferring
things and atoms, time and space, we have to construct them. "Wherever possible logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities." This 'construction' is supposed to characterise the new method of philosophy. What exactly is construction? We are told it is not mechanical putting together as when we build a house or make a chair, but a logical, intellectual or hypothetical construction (see Our Knowledge, pp. 87, 93). We build a hypothesis or frame an explanation. Space, world, point, matter, etc. are such constructions or explanations. It is hard to see how this logical construction is different from inferential explanation. To illustrate his point we may give the following passage:

"The space of geometry and physics consists of an infinite number of points, but no one has ever seen or touched a point. If there are points in a sensible space, they must be an inference. It is not easy to see any way in which as independent entities they could be validly inferred from the data; thus here again we shall have, if possible, to find some logical construction, some complex assemblage of immediately given objects which will have the geometrical properties required of points" (Our Knowledge, p. 113). Thus space, time, matter, etc., are defined as logical functions of sense-data. They are not given in sense nor can they be inferred in the traditional manner from realities given in sense, yet they must be (see Mysticism and Logic, p. 128). Thus all things are constructions and not realities.

From this it follows that our logical constructions derived from sense-data must be private to ourselves. "A complete application of the method which substitutes construction for inference would exhibit matter wholly in terms of sense-data, and even, we may add, of the sense-data of a single person, since the sense-data of others cannot be known without some sort of inference" (Science, July 1914, p. 10). Let us should feel that all this is subjectivistic. we are told that sense-data exist independently of being given in sense to an indi-
individual. Smells, sounds and colours have an independent existence of their own though they do not depend on any substratum in the external world. But how can subjectivism be avoided so long as the sensibilia cannot be common data? "So far as can be discovered, no sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once. The things seen by two different people are often closely similar . . . but in spite of this similarity it would seem that some difference always arises from difference in the point of view." Each man's data of sense form a world private to him. We do not know what right Russell has to assume this except it be the empirical fact that when two men look at the same object they do so from two different points of view. How can we say that the two are slightly different appearances of the same unless we presuppose identical substances behind the appearances? Again, Russell distinguishes the act of awareness from that of which there is awareness, and calls the former sensation and the latter sense-datum. The sense-datum has to be distinguished on the one hand from the act of apprehension and on the other from the real object. Sense-data are appearances of the object which is a permanent possibility of sensations. Appearances are sometimes regarded as the way in which reality is apprehended by a finite mind. They have a reality independent of the object of which they are the appearances. Is the thing different from the appearances, or does the reality live in the appearances, is a question to which Russell gives no clear answer. In the former case we live in a dream-world, and to Russell there is no logical impossibility in the supposition "that the whole of life is a dream in which we ourselves create all the objects that come before us." (Problems of Philosophy, p. 35) (see Mysticism and Logic, pp. 129-30, and Mind, p. 185, 1915). Realities to which our ordinary statements refer do not exist. The independent real is a matter of inference. This conclusion of subjectivism cannot be avoided, so long as we start with
the presupposition that knowledge is a construction out of sensations. Associationist psychology made sensations the ultimate irreducible entities and by reason of that mistake failed to give a satisfactory explanation of knowledge. Sensations instead of being the direct data of experience are the results of complex processes of analysis and abstraction. The notion of a thing precedes that of a pure sensation. James and Bergson are right in urging that our consciousness is a stream of abstractions from which we abstract sensations. Conscious life, instead of being a number of discrete sense-data plus an external principle of union, is a concrete whole, simple and individual. There is no passage from discrete sense-data to the world of knowledge. If we dismiss these things behind sense-data and also keep clear of subjectivism, be true to modern psychology, we seem to come very near Hegelian Idealism. The world is an ideal construction and is therefore nothing apart from the categories of thought, though the acts of thought are to be distinguished from the objects thought about. As we have already urged, if universals are thought of as existing in an extramental world, then physical reality becomes confused with psychological presentations and we cannot escape from subjectivism. So long as the law and the fact, the universal idea and the immediate experience remain outside each other, subjectivism is our only goal. But in the world of reality we do not find them apart, but get them as aspects of a single unity.

V

Though Russell does not adhere to the representative theory of knowledge, he retains the ultimate distinctness of subject and object. Consciousness is viewed by him as a sui generis relation called experience or awareness between subject and object (see The Analysis, 1914, p. 438), but we cannot know anything about the
subject term of the relation. Unity of experience and recognition of remembered experiences require Russell to postulate the existence of a self which is not merely a referent. Otherwise what is the difference between A's experience and B's? Consciousness is not merely a passive spectator of existence. While there are many things which it sees, there are also some which it makes. Aesthetic and moral feelings and values have no reality outside consciousness. It is hard to see how creative works of art are merely subjective. Imagination deals with universals which are in the non-spatial world, and so works of imagination dealing as they do with eternal values are the least subjective. But still Russell holds that consciousness is an unnecessary spectator of external events adopting the passive role in perception, etc., and an active role in creation. But if relations, terms, etc., are all out there, there is nothing which remains to be done by consciousness. Russell recognises the difficulty of defining self. Mr. Moore reduces self to a mere empty conception. Mr. Alexander assumes its existence as the presupposition of feeling and choice. When every possible thing is looked upon as objective there is nothing which is the characteristic of the self. The self, if anything, is but a collection of experiences. Out of the total mass of reality a few are experienced, and these few crowd together into a mind. The self is therefore not the subject apprehending objects but the objects self or experienced grouped together. There is no single self which is conscious of the multiplicity of changes. Each state is an absolute reality. There is no conscious spectator in the realist's universe. Thus the self is resolved into a series of mental states which get themselves collected, God knows how.

VI

It is the function of philosophy not merely to show how the world is made out of hypothetical simple entities,
but also to help us to appreciate and comprehend the concrete world of life and experience. The realist method which Russell adopts does not authorize him to assume that the world is good or that there is a God. We cannot worship the world as it is, nor can we say that there is a God. God is not the fact but is only the ideal of our hearts, a creature of our imagination. The free man will fall down and worship only a non-existent God. "In this lies man's true freedom; in determination to worship only the God created by our own love of the good, to respect only the heaven which inspires the insight of our own best moments." As realists with a new sense for facts which are not to be confused with our desires they deny the existence of God. Logic has no room for God or immortality. Intellectual argument does not strengthen man's instinctive beliefs. Russell, of course, has no sympathy with the pragmatist's advice to act as if there were a God and as if we were immortal. He does not want us to play with such fancies. Let us add to the tragedy of our being the sin of self-deception. Theology is a fraud and religion a mockery. The world is a magic show, a pantomime in which God has neither part nor lot. We are the greater fools if we count on the defeat of vice and the victory of virtue. The universe is rotten to the core. Let us know it and accept it in calm resignation. Let us not live in a fool's paradise. Since die we must, let us do so in the open daylight, realizing that the whole thing is a farse and all is vanity. In short, let us totally disbelieve in God. "The life of man is a long march through the night, surrounded by invisible foes, tortured by weariness and pain, towards a goal that a few can hope to reach and where none may terrify long" (Philosophical Essays, p. 67). Man is helpless against the invisible powers of darkness thickening their coils round him. He tries to live in security and comfort by mastering natural forces, but sooner or later the pitiless powers close upon him and he collapses like a
wrecked balloon. The natural phenomena of earthquakes and volcanoes do not wait to consider their moral effects before they operate. An insidious machine created man in sport and would kill him in the same spirit. As in the vision of Mirza he slips from the rest of human existence and disappears even though his hands are lifted up to heaven. In such an unredeemed and unredeemable world how can man live? Since brute strength is all in all, there is no use of our kicking against it. Why shake our fists impotently at God, why defy the will of the earth, why strive against the fate that sweeps the globe? Justice, pity, loyalty, power, etc., are nothing to it. Out of the despair born of the awful encounter of the soul with the outer world arise renunciation and wisdom, hope and charity. Since our aspirations are dashed to pieces in the world of reality, we can only seek consolation in the world of art and imagination. "In thought, in aspiration, we are free, free from our fellow-men, free from the petty planet on which our bodies impotently crawl, free even while we live from the tyranny of death" (Philosophical Essays, p. 63). Without marking time on earth, let the spirit of man fly from the actual to the ideal, which is the land of heart's desire. Thus Russell proposes a Copernican revolution. Since we can only grow desperate if we subject our mind to things, let us cheer up by subjecting things to our mind. Without submitting to conditions we do not like, let us lose ourselves in contemplating a world where the unrest of life is stilled. Since the actual world is full of pain and misery, let us seek delight and happiness by re-creating the world. Let us sing of the paradise to come, and not speak of the men, women and children caught in the mechanism of a dead and wooden civilization. This is why Russell adores abstract mathematics. For we there get into the shadowland of poetic values and fancy pictures. "Remote from human passions, remote from the pitiful facts of nature, the generations have gradually created an ordered cosmos, where pure thought:
can dwell as in its natural home, and where one at least of our noble impulses can escape from the dreary exile of the actual world” (Mysticism and Logic). Life is so hideous that we have only to avoid it. The best way is to live in art and contemplation. Instead of playing the fool and singing the glories of destruction, let us play the sage avoiding all dangerous illusions. The whole essay on the love Man’s Worship is one long outcry of a spirit in sorrow, which has a tragic fascination for the human mind in some of its moods.

The very possibility of these ideals which we are asked to reflect on indicates that the not-self is not supreme. As Gutzlaff remarks: “There is no sure way of avoiding the world than by Art; and no surer way of uniting with it than by Art.” (Maxims and Reflections, translated by Bailey and Saunders). If we knew that the whole temple of man’s achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins, how can we begin building these idols in the immemorial shrine of the soul? But this is the only way of escape from bondage suggested by Russell. Science does not tell us that human life is the product of accidental combinations of atoms. Of course, finite man cannot play the providence in the world. He is limited by other forces and his limitations are necessary for developing the higher powers of intellect and heart. Man refuses to regard himself as a mere ephemeral being for, by persisting in his art, etc., he tries to compass eternity with his thought and imagination. If the story which Russell relates with such dreadful earnestness has any meaning and basis, then man would wish to yield to the forces of the world, be crushed by them, and feed the devil of the world with yet another mangled life, and yet another. Russell does not adopt the Schopenhauerian thesis that man should suppress the will to live. If the world is nothing more than a waste heap of moral energies, if it is a vast shadowy whole moving out to some unknown nowhere, then self-destruction seems to be the part of wisdom
which Russell does not encourage. Nature is the ally of man in the work of self-realisation.

The impulses of art are expressions of a real longing of the soul to transform life. Art is the impulse of life made sensuous. The soul longs to transform a world of evil into one of good, rebuild the world of time and see it in a different light. Russell’s worship of art means that he thinks it possible to make the world better than what it is. In other words, the unity of self and not-self is presupposed by it. Fidelity to facts requires Russell to admit the reality of a harmony between self and not-self.

Mr. Russell forgets that the mystic experience has for its object this unitive life which must be a reality. Experience includes the highest experience of all. The mystic experience which is admitted to be possible is the highest. Man can sometimes attain the infinite, breaking down the finite. “In many men the finite self remains always the gaoler of the universal soul; in others there is a rare and momentary escape; in a few the prison walls are demolished wholly, and the universal soul remains free through life” (Essays of Religion, p. 48). What is this life divine or mystic life? It is “a life free from struggle, a life in harmony with the whole, outside the prison walls built by the instinctive desires of the finite self” (ibid, p. 49). “The transition from the life of the finite self to the infinite life in the whole requires a moment of absolute self-surrender when all personal will seems to cease, and the soul feels itself in passive submission to the universe” (ibid, p. 49). If we should keep faith with the evidence of the mystics we will be delivered from the hard disgusting realities of science. Mysticism will displace pessimism by optimism. While sometimes Russell accepts the deliverances of the mystics, at other times he criticizes them down. To him they are not higher than the conclusions of logical reason. Intellect does not tell us that the race is moving towards any divine event. “A true image of the world
... is obtained by picturing things as entering into the stream of time from an eternal world outside, than from a view which regards time as the devouring tyrant of all that is" (Mysticism and Logic). But still the mystic vision is accepted by Russell as constituting the true essence of religion. The fact of mysticism itself is a refutation of the dualism which is the fountain-spring of all pessimistic thought.

For the kind of religion Russell advocates, we do not require any belief in dogma. If a religion is based on dogmas, it rests on shifting sands. Some time or other the traditional dogmas will reveal themselves to be hollow and beset with fancies and difficulties. In such cases we have either to give up the dogmas, when we will have to face the alternative of a morality without spirituality, or stick to dogmas which we know to be false. If we reject them, then Russell knows we will have bare morality, which "is very inadequate as a motive for those who hunger and thirst after the infinite" (ibid., p. 50). But if we cling to dogmas known to be false there will be a ring of insincerity in our religious life. We therefore require a religion which does not depend on dogmas. So he contends that the "religion which has no dogmas is greater and more religious than one which rests upon the belief that in the end our ideals are fulfilled in the outer world" (ibid., p. 51). We need not believe "in the existence of supreme goodness and power combined," but Russell himself realises the necessity for such a belief. This worship of an ideal good, though necessary for religious life, will not do completely since "it does not produce that sense of union with the actual world which compels us to descend from the world of contemplation and seek, with however little success, to realise what is possible of the good here on earth" (ibid., p. 53). "When this worship stands alone it produces a sense of exile in a world of shadows, of infinite solitude and alien forms" (ibid.). Love of the whole cannot be developed on this basis. So Russell asks us to
worship the whole and not merely the good in it. In true religion we must have both the worship of the ideal good and that of the whole. To Russell the ideal world is the world of universals, and we wish this ideal to become real. The whole we worship is actual but not good, and we wish it to be good. Russell thinks that pana-
thecism is wrong since it holds that the universe is good, and theism is also wrong since it contends that the ideal
good has a reality. "The two worships exist side by
side without any dogma; the one involving the goodness
but not the existence of its object, the other involving
the existence but not the goodness of its object." (Ibid.
p. 54). Religious activity is an endeavour to bridge the
gulf between these two objects of worship by making
more good exist and more of existence good. "Only in
the complete union of the two could the soul find per-
manent rest" (p. 54). But this possibility of making
more of existence good and vice versa is real only if we
reject the dualism between man and nature, self and not-
self, and acquire faith in the belief that good and exist-
ence are being slowly combined, and will finally dwell
together in harmony.

VII

Realism has done a great service to ethical thought
by scaring ethics from the fallacies of pragmatist util-
itarianism, evolutionary hedonism, etc. The doctrine of
universals is at the basis of realistic ethics (see Moore's
Principia Ethica and Russell's Philosophical Essays).
Goodness is an eternal reality, absolute and irreducible.
It cannot be identified with anything else. Good is not
the useful, the pleasant, or the expedient. While Moore,
Russell and Moore hold that beauty, goodness, etc., are
objective values, Mr. Alexander includes them among
subjective feelings which have no existence outside the
narrow border itself. In "The Free Man's Worship" Rus-
sell asks us to "preserve our respect for truth, for
beauty, for the ideal of perfection which life does not
permit us to attain, though none of these things meet with the approval of the unconscious universe." But in the preface to Mysticism and Logic, he tells us, "in theoretical ethics the position advocated in 'The Free Man's Worship' is not quite identical with that which I hold now. I feel less convinced than I did then of the objectivity of good and evil." Ethics is looked upon as "essentially a product of the gregarious instinct" (Mysticism and Logic, p. 108). On this hypothesis the low sordid ethics of materialist militarism becomes justifiable, while the lofty Stoicism of Russell remains unintelligible. Why should the individual seek the good? Is he under any obligation to adopt it? Goodness is a reality outside man. The sanction seems to be external to the individual. Besides evil also must be an eternal reality. If we can worship goodness, beauty, etc., what is there to prevent us from worshipping badness, ugliness, etc.? As Walt Whitman puts it, "What is called good is perfect, and what is called bad is just as perfect."

Russell thinks that we count for nothing in the constitution of the world. Reality is determinate and we cannot alter it. But ethics presupposes that it is only determinable and man's efforts count for something. Russell proceeds on sympathy with those who strive to rationalise the real and harmonise the discordant. He forgets that there is, besides the wish to understand why things are what they are, also the demand to make things as they should be. To Russell, life is bound in a network of fatal law. Impressed as he is with the inevitableness of the universe and the irrationality of human existence, he believes that the individual who wishes to realise his aspirations through his efforts is a victim of illusions. The most splendid heroism, the most magnificent sacrifice has no effect on a world which clumsily rolls on its path of space and time without pity, without shame, and without even an apology. It is no use thinking that the world is at fault and is to
blame for delaying man's hopes. It is all a dream, a lie. It is madness to oppose the course of the world, but if the universal nature is the wild deep in which the soul of man with all his aspirations and hopes of the future is to be engulfed, if the world of existence is a system of radical and immediate evil, not only religion but all life, ethical, political and social, becomes impossible. But this is too shocking a conclusion even for Russell. He quietly slips in an ethical ideal of stoic renunciation and moral turpitude generally associated with absolutist ethics. A life in the whole is looked upon as the goal of man. Man is finite-infinite. "The finite life which man shares with the brutes is tied to the body, and views the world from the standpoint of the here and now" ("Essence of Religion," Hidden Journal, October 24, 1911, p. 47). Every impulse that makes the individual man small and selfish, makes him struggle with others to gain his own ends, makes him believe that his interests can be gained at the expense of those of others, belongs in the lower finite self. The infinite self impels us to rise above the life of sense, and seek a common good. "It has a life without barriers embracing in its survey the whole universe of existence and essence; nothing in it is essentially private, but its thoughts and desires are such as all may share, since none depend upon exclusiveness of born and now and we" (p. 48). The finite self seeks self-preservation and domination over others; the infinite calls for the death of the finite and the rise of a life with the larger vision. "... through the bond of universal life the soul escapes from the separate loneliness in which it is born, and from which no permanent deliverance is possible while it remains within the walls of its prison" (p. 50). "It is the quality of infinity that makes religion, the selfless untrammeled life in the whole which frees man from the prison house of eager wishes, and little thoughts." (pp. 46-47). It is not possible for Russell to hold to a pluralism with this ideal of ethics. The infinite is the intrinsic character
of self. The particularity of the self is due to its context. The self is potty and small when it considers itself to be exclusive and impervious to others. The real self is the universal. It is not exclusive but inclusive of the whole. "Of the two natures in man, the particular or animal being lives in instinct and seeks the welfare of the body and its descendance, while the universal or divine being seeks union with the universe and desires freedom from all that impedes its seeking. ... In union with the world the soul finds its freedom ... union in thought, union in feeling, union in will." "The division into two hostile camps seems unreal; what is felt to be real is the oneness of the world in love." ("Essence of Religion," p. 55). In that highest experience where we see reality the deeper divisions of the soul and the fundamental contrasts of the world are overcome and harmonised. When the finite self reaches its destiny of the infinite, then the world as a whole becomes the content of the self, its life and experience. This is the reality which each self is to progressively attain. The finite is intelligible only through the infinite. Russell has to modify his doctrine of the relation of universals to particulars. Universals are not abstractions excluding individuals. This arbitrary view vitiates his whole account of the world of universals and existences. But in his account of the dual nature of the self and oneness of the world, he is constrained to submit that the universal is the pulsebeat of the individual. The true universal is the whole which pervades and comprehends all individuals.

How can we think that the ethical ideal is unattainable? If the real nature of existence is incompatible with its fulfillment, then those who try to attain the goal are weaving strings of sand. If the vision of the absolute triumph of good is only a dream: structure or a soap-bubble which can be pricked by the passing wind of the actual world, then we are striving after the impossible. But our attempts are real, and Russell feels that the ideal has also in some cases been attained. So it is
not a castle in the air or a huge self-deception. It only shows that the opposition between man and the world is apparent. Since the moral ideals are realizable, we cannot say that the universe is bad. Ultimately we have no quarrel with reality. It is not right to think that this world, which is the field for spiritual development, is set with knives and daggers, and is full of rocks and pitfalls. The world is not cruelty and mockery, littleness and misery. At first sight we may be struck by the immensity of nature and the insignificance of man, but appearances are misleading. If there is no deeper truth our soul will sink in despair. But our higher life tells us that the opposition of self and of not-self is overcome in the great vision of the self in the non-self. Man and world are made for each other. Man wields and nature yields. Man commands and nature yields. Man meditates and the world drops dead at his feet. If he stoops to nature for a time, it is only to conquer nature. Russell’s censure is merited against the doctrine that sees in the universe nothing alien to the self. The pessimistic doctrine of the indifference of the world to man’s hopes and aspirations is due to the atmosphere of gloom which Russell has created round himself. A truly scientific attitude tells us that nature is not blind and impotent, but can be used by man to further his own purposes. Both pleasing dreams and threatening nightmares about it are equally unjustified.

The great war has Russell to give more prominence in the place of impulse in human life. The keen dialectician with his faith in the might of mind and the power of reason now feels the strength of impulse. We cannot have even discovery of truth without the impulse to seek truth. “Impulse has more effect than conscious purpose in moulding men’s lives” (Social Reconstruction). What is impulse? “It is the mere instinctive part of our nature, a tendency to activity not prompted by any end or purpose,” "crude and anarchical not easily fitted into a well-regulated system," "blind in the sense
that it does not spring from any provision of consequences" (ibid., pp. 13-17). Reason is identified with calculation, and impulse with creative activity. When Russell supposes a life of instinct and impulse, we really do not know where we are. If impulse is blind and erratic, it belongs more to the animal mind, since it is only there that impulse works with no end or purpose. It is quite possible that in his determinist bias Russell may look upon mind as a complex of several entities, sensation, perception, imagination, thought, impulse, desire, will, etc., which retain their identities since they are only externally related in mind. But it is impossible for us to imagine that impulse retains unaltered in a self-conscious being the character it possessed in its original form. In the human mind impulses, though dependent on organic conditions, are still not blind. Simply because they do not contain representation of an end, we cannot call them blind. Most of our activities, automatic and habitual, do not configure an end, though they embody purposes of mind. It cannot be that Russell means all that he says since he makes certain impulses which he calls creative, responsible for science, art, etc. He holds that the best life is one where creative impulses occur. "I consider the best life that which is most built on creative impulses and the worst that which is most inspired by love of possession." In other words, the best life is that where the infinite side of man expresses itself, and the worst that where the finite is allowed free play.

About the belief in immortality realism adopts a negative attitude. Though Russell is not indifferent to the fate of man beyond the grave, still since his objective is truth, he is obliged to deny personal immortality. It may be a matter of deep regret that our lives become extinct at death, but it cannot be helped. The hereafter which theologians conjure up before us is a refuge of lies. But this gloomy conclusion about future life is bound up with his pessimistic outlook and disappears with the overthrow of pessimism.