CHAPTER XII

PERSONAL IDEALISM

Though we have considered the chief representatives of the pluralistic reaction, there are others no less important for our purposes, though it is not possible for us to review them at great length or refer to them all. The humanist emphasis on personality and its values comes out in the views of Dr. F. C. S. Schiller of Oxford, Professor Howison of America, Dr. Rashdall, and the Right Hon. A. J. Balfour. These views may be fitly grouped together under the title of "Personal Idealism," and may be noticed briefly in this chapter.

I

Schiller's contributions are not so much to philosophy as to logic. But man cannot but philosophize, and Schiller's vision of the universe, which shows great daring and dialectical skill, is exemplified in his Riddles of the Sphinx, and parts of his other works. He gives us a metaphysical system, though he admits that the system

1 Schiller in chapter xvi. of his Studies on Humanism discusses the relation of humanist metaphysics to idealism and realism. From an analysis of dream experience, he concludes that both realism, if it is "taken to mean a denial that experience and reality belong together," and idealism, if it "asserts existence to be merely mental," are false. Humanism does justice to both the subjective and the objective elements. It is "like the true Idealism and the true Realism, and has conceived the true Ideal, in which experience has become divine without ceasing to be human, because it has wholly humanized itself and achieved a perfect and eternal union with a Perfect Reality" (p. 456).
of philosophy can lay claim to absolute truth and certainty. For, he says in his preface, "a system of metaphysics, with whatever pretensions to pure thought and absolute rationality it may start, is always in the end one man's personal vision about the universe . . . the idea that it is to hold true literally for all, and for all time, is ludicrous" (pp. vii-viii). This modest estimate of the value of metaphysics is due to the influence of "humanism." Though we are told that pragmatism is not committed to any scheme of metaphysics, Schiller thinks that it is inclined to a pluralistic construction of experience of the type suggested by him. "Pragmatism may be taken to point to the ultimate reality of human activity and freedom, to the plasticity and incompleteness of reality, to the reality of the world process in time and so forth. . . . Humanism in addition may point to the personality of whatever cosmic principle we can postulate as ultimate and to its kinship and sympathy with man" (Studies in Humanism, p. 10). Schiller starts with a protest against the abstract metaphysical method of Plato and the other absolutists, and the pseudo-metaphysical method of the scientific naturalists. He proposes to adopt the concrete method, which is consistently and consciously anthropomorphic, which explains everything from individual existences viewed after the analogy of the human selves. For illustration of the use of the concrete method, Schiller refers us to Berkeley's spirits, Leibniz's monads, and Aristotle's concrete individuals. Modern science and the theory of evolution are quite in accord with this true method and its results, provided they are confined to their spheres, and we do not admit their claims to furnish us with metaphysical doctrines. But if we start with scientific metaphysics, we steadily get from bad to worse. The positivistic rejection of metaphysics takes us to philosophical agnosticism with its doctrine of the unknowable. From this it is but a step to absolute scepticism, which destroys scientific as well as philosophical certitude. Pessimism, with a post-
script that all knowledge is both theoretically and practically invalid, seems to be the inevitable outcome. But we cannot live in the world with the chilling belief that the ground of things is wholly perverse and irrational. The false method of scientific naturalism we have to abandon. The abstract metaphysical method which leads to pantheistic materialism has also to be rejected. Its central defect is the assertion of a real infinite. In any admissible sense of the term, the infinite is only a potentiality. An infinite whole is intellectually unmeaning and morally dangerous. The absolutistic conceptions of Pure Being, the Idea, etc., are nothing but pitiful abstractions from experience, mutilated shreds of human nature whose real value for the understanding of life is easily outweighed by the living experience of an honest man" (Humanism, p. xviii). We have, therefore, to adopt the concrete metaphysical method, which, in Schiller, means a passive surrender to the claims of life as it appears to us. This method leads us to pluralism which alone can answer pessimism. The satisfactory life to which the method leads is its only justification. After all, what other justification can we ask for or have, in a world where theory and life, thought and action are inseparably related as light and heat? Schiller holds that self is an ultimate reality. No philosophy can dissolve it away. We see in the world process an actual development of selves in society or individuals in association. Ultimate plurality of real existences is the conviction forced upon us by the world process. We may not be able to prove it, but proof is unnecessary. "Indeed it is a mistake to suppose that all things require to be proved" (Riddles, p. 234). These existences are spiritual in their nature. Before time and the world process they existed as a chaos of absolutely isolated and independent beings. One fine morning the Divine Spirit determined to make a harmonious cosmos out of this chaos. The objective world arises out of the interaction between God and the other individual beings.
From this consciousness results. The form it takes in man is consciousness of the world on one side and of the self on the other. "Our actual selves and the world in which we live, are correlated results of an interaction between the Deity and ultimate spiritual beings or Egos, of whom we form the conscious part." (Riddles, p. 354.) With the world process time begins. With time becoming and evil are conjoined. The world process is quite a real one with a beginning and an end, a development of actuality from potentiality. The later stages of the process contain more actuality and being than the earlier. A naturalistic evolution will not work, as in the true process of the world we have a progress from lower to higher. The process of evolution through all its stages consists in the perfecting of individual existences by their grouping into more and more perfect societies. After molecules have been formed from atoms and organs from cells, the process is continued in the formation of animal and human societies properly so called. This process goes on till the end of evolution, viz., the formation of perfect individuals in a perfect society, is reached. Thus, the world process works from its beginning of a precosmic stage where there is no order to a postcosmic stage with perfect order and adaptations of individuals to society. Here time passes into eternity and becoming into being.

"But just as the development of ourselves reveals more and more our full nature, so it must be supposed that the development of the world will reveal more and more fully the nature of God, so that in the course of evolution, our conception of the interaction between us and the Deity would become more and more adequate to the reality, until at the completion of the process the last thin veil would be rent asunder, and the perfected spirit would behold the undimmed splendour of truth in the light of the counterface of God." (Riddles, p. 279.) There, the ideals of goodness, truth, and beauty are realised in a unity which fuses them all and transcends them. The final state, according to Schiller, is the
eternal and perfect activity of perfected individuals. The eternal state is not one of inaction and stagnation; for such a condition has the tendency to lapse into perfect nothingness, a changeless state of equipoise (see Esseanissae, ch. xii.). Perfection is not rest but activity. It is consciousness, though it may not be self-consciousness. The highest which is the pneumatic and the lowest which is the pneumatic are both limiting conceptions, the presuppositions of the world process.

What is the place of matter in this scheme of the world? Since it is as much as spirit a manifestation of divine purpose, it has an end to serve in the world. To the highest spirits, it is useful as labour-saving machinery; to the lower, it is useful as offering resistance to the free exercise of their evil tendencies. "Matter is connected with evil in its double aspect, both as the engine of progress and the mechanism of the divine education of spirits, and also as the check upon consciousness. For, if evil, i.e. inharmonious spirits were permitted the full realisation of their conscious powers, they would be able to thwart and to delay, if not to prevent the attainment of the divine purpose of the world process. But if they are permitted intelligence only when they are ready to recognise the cosmic order and in proportion as they are ready to do so, the aptness of the contrivance of Matter becomes manifest. The lower existences, i.e. the less harmonised, have their consciousnesses limited and repressed by material organisation in order that their power for evil may be practically neutralised, and that in the impotence of their stupidity they may have little influence on the course of events. On the other hand, the higher existences, who have learnt the necessity of social order and harmony, are thereby enabled to acquire that knowledge which gives them power over matter" (Riddles, p. 206-7).

Turning to the problem of freedom, Schiller admits the reality of choice and tells us that "philosophy ought not presumptuously to commit itself to a static view of
Reality, and that it is not an inescapable necessity of thought, but a metaphysical prejudice, to believe that Reality is complete and rigid and unimprovable and that real change is, therefore, impossible” (Studies in Humanism, p. 427).

In religion, Schiller admits only a finite God. We require a God since there is no other ‘reasonable’ way of accounting for the world (ibid., p. 357). We find signs of intelligence in the world which are not due to any known mind. In the struggle with evil, good prevails, and this cannot be put to the credit of the constitution of things, since the actual world is quite compatible with evil and disorder as with good and order. We cannot consider God to be infinite, as that would make the problem of evil insoluble. The old difficulty is restated by Schiller when he says: “If God is all powerful everything must be exactly what it should be, from God’s point of view, else he would instantly alter it. If then evil things exist, it must be because God wills to have it so, i.e., God is from our point of view evil” (ibid., p. 307). Infinicity conflicts with all the rest of his attributes. “The attribute of Infinicity contradicts and neutralises all the other attributes of God, and makes it impossible to ascribe to the Deity either personality, or consciousness, or power, or intelligence, or wisdom, or goodness, or purpose, or object in creating the world; an infinite deity does not effect a single one of the functions which the religious consciousness demands of its God” (Ibid., p. 306). God is force, and force everywhere implies resistance. God to enforce his will against the world, requires a world which limits him. God is not all, though he is a factor in all things. We can only infer a finite God from the nature of the world and the work expected of him.

According to Schiller’s philosophy, the egos are unrestricted and uncaused, while our phenomenal selves, which are only the manifestations of the ultimate egos, pass from life to death. There are according to Schiller degrees of immortality. The lower forms of
spiritual existence do not have any content which would enrich a memory, and without it there is no meaning in immortality. Immortality is graduated according to the degree of consciousness attained by the self during its past. Memory of the monads persists, but it can do so in a personal form only when a sufficient concentration of consciousness is attained. Schiller believes in pre-existence and succession of lives. Individuals may perfect themselves through a plurality of lives. When the body gets worn out with age, death occurs to give place to a fresh phase of life. Schiller believes in the ethical argument for immortality, and sympathises with the work of the Psychical Research Society since it offers empirical proofs of future life.

II

Schiller develops his position as other pluralists do through a criticism of the monistic view. It is from the practical or the ethical point of view that he attacks. Absolutism means the 'death' of morality (Humanism, p. 2). In support of this view, the greatest of the living absolutists, Bradley, is quoted: "Make the moral point of view absolute and then realise your position. You have become not merely immortal, but you have also broken with any considerable religion" (ibid., p. 2). But Schiller forgets that the moral struggle cannot be the end of things. It must be swallowed up in religion. Were it the ultimate reality, morality would lose its significance. Schiller asks: "What would our attitude have to be towards a world in which the ultimate significance of our ideals was denied, i.e., a world which had no world, a world in which nothing really meant anything, nothing was really good or beautiful or true, and in which the hope of happiness was nothing but illusion? . . . For in a world which had really renounced its allegiance to the ideals, all action would be paralysed by the conviction that nothing we desired could ever be attained because
the existent was irreconcilably alienated from the desirable. . . . We should be plunged in that unfathomable abyss where skepticism matures with pessimism, and they hug their miseries in chaos undisguised" (Humanity, pp. 267-268). If the chapter of life is not to be closed by death, we feel the need for an Absolute which guarantees us the victory of the moral ideal. The Absolute, instead of being the death of morals, is the very life of morality. If the moral ideal is only a dream of desire, if struggle is the end of things, morality will lose its value. But if the ideal is admitted to be real, then the truth of absolutism is also admitted.

The whole conception of the interaction of the egos is wrapped up in obscurity. Without this interaction, there will be no world. But we do not know how the interaction takes place. Why and how does God interact with other egos? Is there any common impulse which necessitates the common behaviour of interaction? Is there any psychical ground in which the egos are rooted? If there is, pluralism is compromised. If pluralism is kept intact, we cannot understand how interaction sets in and why God comes out of his isolation to interact with the egos.

Without a common inspiration and aspiration, Schiller's view will be subjectivistic. The world exists fragmentarily or incoherently in the egos. No ego, not even God, can hold the world in a complete form. The egos help to produce nature. We cannot say that there is a common nature. What is the objective world of space and time due to?

Again, if the end of evolution is once reached, we will have to imagine a cycle of evolutions somehow brought into being by God. When once becoming reaches being, what happens next? Mr. Fawcett, the author of The World as Imagination, holds that the experiment will be repeated by God. We will have the days and nights of Brahman, becoming and being following in quick succession. But any such possibility will conflict with the
teleological view of the conservation of all values. Schiller rightly contends that the end of becoming would never be reached, though he gives us no reasons for this belief. The deeper view that there cannot be any becoming without being, finite without infinite, is foreign to him.

Again, Schiller’s ‘potentinality’ is a word and a word only. He cannot admit potentinality and real becoming together. We cannot have creative synthesis and a development of potentinality unless it be in the absolutist sense. If the end of things is a monistic unity, it means that this unity must have been a potentinality from the beginning in the world. This, Schiller admits when he says, “Pluralism is in a way based upon a monism; the Many presuppose the One. But not in any sense which can affect the substantiality of the Many. The One which is presupposed by pluralism is the most meaningless of all things; it is a mere possibility of the interaction or co-existence of the Many; it is a mere potentinality which has no actual existence except as an ideal factor in a real plurality” (Riddles, p. 444). But that which is the ideal of our activity, that which we are slowly trying to realise by transcending the actual cannot be ‘meaningless.’ The ideal goal of the world process is not an empty conception. “The Many who at present interact discordantly may come not only in contact but also to act together; and their perfect and harmonious interaction would realise the ideal of a true union, of a real uniedness as far superior to the imperfect union of our present cosmos, as the latter is to the abstract unity of the underlying One” (ibid., p. 345). If this means that the goal is a concrete unity we have no quarrel with it. But only the monism which was once the most meaningless of all things now becomes the “Alpha and Omega; as the basis of the many, it is the lowest and least of things; as their perfection and final harmony, it is the highest and last of things” (Riddles, p. 346).

We may here notice the question, whether the end of
evolution is a self or a society of selves. Schiller holds to the latter view. But since we can have distinctions only with phenomenal selves, when once we reach perfection we do not know how to distinguish between the several perfect selves. "The phenomenal self is but a portion of the Transcendental Ego which is at any time actual consciously experienced. It forms but a feeble and partial excerpt of the Ego, but the self is as yet alone real, though as in the progress of its development it unfolds all its hidden powers, it approximates more and more to the Ego, until at last the actual and the potential would become co-extensive, the self and the Ego would coincide, and in the attainment of perfection we should be, all we are capable of being" (Kiddles, pp. 276-7). From this it is not clear what the nature of the end of evolution would be. In discussing the nature of sexual love, Schiller admits that "possibly this emotional impulse foreshadows the formation of coalesced existences of a higher order than our present partial and imperfect selves" (ibid. p. 407). But as Schiller admits that the end of evolution will never be reached, the world process will always continue to exist, and it will be not a single self but a society of selves. In the world of becoming, we have only selves, and not egos (see Kiddles, p. 410).

The whole account of the relation of becoming to being, time to eternity, is conceived after the analogy of the absolutist theory. "Time is a corruption of Eternity, just as Becoming is a corruption of Being" (Kiddles, p. 257). Before the world was produced, Being was equable and unchanging. It later lapsed into change and becoming. Why did it lapse from its perfection to imperfection? is a question more often asked than answered. "Time is but the measure of the impermanence of the imperfect, and the reason why we fail to attain to the ideal of eternity, is that we fail equally to attain to the cognate ideals of Being and Adaption. The question resolves itself into the old difficulty of why the Real is not
yet adequate to the perfection of our ideals. But, if it
would be, is it not evident that there would be an end
of Time, as of change and of evil, and would not Time pass
into Eternity?" (Riddles, pp. 257-8). The end of evolution
is never to be attained, as the becoming or the
struggle of finite existence will vanish. The time process
is real as an integral part of the world structure. There
is change within the whole, evolution in reality.

Evil springs from the resistance of the selves to the
harmonious evolution of the cosmos. God represses by
means of matter the power for evil which lower exist-
ces have. As these beings cannot be destroyed, the
nearest course is to reduce their powers. When they
are reduced to a torpid condition, they unconsciously bend
to the purposes of God. But this assumes that
we will be able to get rid of evil by striking intellect
dumb and overwhelming the world with matter. But
is not stupidity a great source of evil? Again, if God
created matter for the purpose of reducing the possibility
of evil in the world, does he not take upon himself the
responsibility for physical evil? Dr. Schiller roundly asks
us to dispense with the omnipotence of God and assume a
finite God. Then to account for evil, we want an Evil
One or many Evil Ones. Though God is not powerful
even to overcome evil completely, he is not so weak as
to yield to it without a struggle. Strictly speaking,
Schiller’s system is neither a monism nor a pluralism, but
a dualism, and therefore a pessimism. If evil is opposed
to God, and if he cannot overcome it, then despair stirs
us in the face as evil may engulf the good. But if he
overcomes it, then Evil will vanish, there will be nothing
thwarting God, and so he will have no work to do. “Omnipotence becomes impotence in the absence of resistance.”
(Riddles, p. 355). These difficulties are incident to all
views which conceive of God in the image of man. Evil,
though it is real in the sense that in life and practice we
have to fight it, is not ultimately real. Though the dis-
tinction of good and evil is a vital one in life, though it
is true that the distinction "can be explained away only at the cost of dissolving the world into a baseless dream.
" (Ibid. p. 348), still it is not ultimate. "If ultimate, then
an Olympian dualism would be the lot of the world.
Schiller holds that the development of matter and
spirit proceeds along converging lines. When we reach
the highest, we will see how a single reality is seen to
embrace the manifestations of both. "The universe is
one; Body and Soul, Matter and Spirit are but different
aspects, the outside and the inside of the same fact; the
material is but the outward and visible sign of the inward
and spiritual state. No other theory of their relations can
possibly be drawn from our premises; for, if the pheno-
menal world is a stress between the Deity and the
Ego, the soul is but the reaction of the Ego upon the
divine action which unites it as the body. " (Riddles, p.
232). The whole world is a manifestation of one force.
Atoms, crystals, animals and men are but the "successive
manifestations of the process towards individuality." (Ibid.
p. 234).

But God in Dr. Schiller's scheme is only an ego among
egos, one among many and not one underlying the
many. He is a finite being limited by the existence of
other individuals. If he is only an ego among egos, why
should we call him God at all? What gives him the
right to rule? Why is he looked upon as the highest
in the scale of being? How can we be sure that he will
always preserve his superiority? Has he not an amount
of perfection yet to acquire? Can it not be that in egos
to come and in the worlds beyond a more powerful being
may come into existence? Dr. Schiller believes that
unless God is finite, he cannot well influence the minds
of other egos. "By becoming finite, God becomes once
more a real principle in the understanding of the world,
a real motive in the conduct of life, a real factor in the
existence of things, a factor not the less real for being
unseen and inferred." (Riddles, p. 348). But in believing
that God, to be of use, should be finite, Dr. Schiller is
obviously wrong. If God is viewed as the outcome of inference from the facts of nature, life and history, it is not a designing God of limited capacity that we are logically forced to admit. The world shows, if anything, not the signs of rational design but, as Mr. Fawcett has it, the adventure of imagination. The world is extremely irregular and imperfect; we have in it not only growth and aggrandisement but also decline and decadence. It suggests a chance experiment and not the working out of a set plan. It may be the product of an imperfect blundering deity but not of a rational God. A right view of the situation sometimes suggests to Schiller that God should be conceived of not as an ego among egos, but as an indwelling presence. God is then both immanent and transcendent. "God is immaterial in all things; a constant, all-inspiring, ever-active Fource. And yet God is not dissolved in the All, which was the heavy price paid by pantheism for the immanence of its God, but has also a real Personality, a truer and transcendent existence for himself" (Riddle, p. 355). God is not only the non-phenomenal cause of the world process, but also the sustainer of the world. We are willing to accord personality to God if by personality is not meant something limited and finite. If it can be reconciled with the immanence of God, we may call God a person, as personality expresses the highest we ordinary mortals know. We agree with Schiller when he says: "There is no objection to the use of terms like suprapersonal or intrapersonal, if we mean by them something including and transcending, rather than excluding personality. For, doubtless, the personality of God would transcend that of man as that of the highest man transcends that of the atom" (Riddles, footnote to p. 303).

No philosophy which is not mechanical disputes the relative freedom of man and holds that man is completely swept along the tide of fate. Even Schiller can grant us only relative freedom as he admits the inevitability of the end to which the whole creation moves. And this
is not an improvement on the kind of freedom we are offered in the absolutist systems.

Taking up next the problem of immortality, we find that Schiller is of opinion that the only immortality which has any significance for us is personal immortality. Monism, by making the permanent existence of the many impossible, abolishes all prospects of personal immortality. "The belief in the ultimate self-existence of spirits, uncreated, uncaused, that are and ever have been and can never cease to be, seems to be the only adequate ground for asserting the immortality of the individual" (Riddle, pp. 387-8). We may be led into the belief that personal immortality is safeguarded in Schiller's metaphysics as he views ultimate existences to be many and eternal. But that this is not so, will be obvious from the following statement: "As the whole world process was taken to be a process occurring in the interaction between the Ego and the Deity, the various stages of material evolution must correspond to different phases of that spiritual interaction. Parallel, therefore to the physical evolution, there would run a spiritual evolution related to it as meaning and motive to outward and visible manifestation. And there would be, however, no reason why this process should not be the development, not of Spirit in general, but of particular spirits; nor why a single Ego should not pass through the succession of organisms and developments of consciousness, from the amoeba to man and from man to perfection. This gives, as it were, the spiritual interpretation of the descent of man from the beasts, and at the same time assures him of his due and proportionate share in the immortality of the ultimate spirit" (ibid. p. 386). There is no use in telling us that the transcendental egos are immortal, as we are now concerned with phenomenal selves. What is a gain to the transcendental egos is a loss to the phenomenal selves. Persons are phenomenal selves, shadows of the real egos, or, to be accurate, "parts of the Ego" (p. 395), and as such they have no chance of
separate survival. The phenomenal phases of the spirit's development persist and continue only "as factors in the development." (Riddles, p. 399). The individual impressions of a single life persist only so far as they have coincided with the course of spiritual development. All this is very agreeable to the absolutist. The only question is whether the real self is one or many. Schiller inclines to the latter alternative, and as no reasons are forthcoming, we have to put it down for a matter of taste or opinion. Now and then we find Dr. Schiller paying unconscious homage to the absolutist theory. "Though monism would be an excellent theory when the world process was ended, it is for this very reason quite inapplicable and extremely mischievous while it is still going on" (Riddles, p. 340). We admit the validity of this contention. The world is still diverse and discordant though it is aiming at unity and harmony. But when Dr. Schiller admits monism to be ultimately true, it follows that the real self of the world apart from the phenomenal manifestation is one.

In Professor Howison's Limits of Evolution, we have a new variety of pluralism where time is not a very essential factor. He also joins in the general protest against idealistic monism and emphasizes the reality of selves, freedom of action and the existence of a personal God. He advocates "an eternal or metaphysical world of many minds, all alike possessing personal initiative, real self-direction, instead of an all-predetermining single Mind that alone has real free agency" (Limits of Evolution, p. 3). He resolves the universe into a number of self-subsistent individuals. Since freedom is an essential fact of life which cannot be explained away, and since it is incompatible with the createdness of beings, Howison holds that the selves are uncreated. "No being that arises out of efficient causation can possibly be free.... Not
even Divine Agency can give rise to another self-active intelligence by any productive act." Howison discards the old efficient causal notion of God and his function. Since the self is not the result of any action from without, it is its own creation. We cannot get behind the ego. The knowing self is as eternal as the universe. Freedom means essentially pluralism and vice versa. The temporal series requires for its ground and explanation an eternal principle, but Howison thinks that it is not one Eternal Mind but Many Eternal Minds. The world is a real multiplicity of spirits. "The members of this Eternal Republic have no origin but their purely logical one of reference to each other. . . . They simply are and together constitute the eternal order." (1868, p. 357).

Free agents subsist by defining or positing themselves "in terms of their own immeasurable and inexpressible particularity and of the supplemental individualities of a whole world of others" (1868, p. 354). They place themselves in a series "that must run through every real difference from the lowest increment over non-existence to the absolute realisation of the ideal type" (1868, p. 354). Thus Howison establishes the independence of the action of each human self, its cut-off character and personal responsibility.

Since it is assumed that the total society of selves must contain all possible grades of being from the lowest to the highest, we get a supreme self which differs from all the others in that it has no temporal side or taint of imperfection. This supratemporal supreme self is God, the pure Eternal. Creation is only the moral recognition of the world of spirits by God. This recognition is an eternal fact since it is the expression of God's own nature as a perfect moral being. The perfection of God "lies in his giving complete recognition to all other spirits, as the complement in terms of which alone his own self-definition is to himself completely thinkable" (1868, p. 355; see also pp. xiii-xvii).

For Howison self-consciousness is the principle of
separation and exclusion. The mutual recognition involved in the self-defining act by which each individual subsists applies also to God. God is not the Absolute, since a solitary God would be lacking in personality, besides crushing out all autonomy in the beings he creates. Personality is essentially social, involving relation to other beings. If man is not co-eternal with God, there will be neither God nor man. God as personal is a member of the series; as supreme, he is the central or the dominant member. Though God is limited by other beings he is not finite, for all minds are infinite in the qualitative sense (p. 422).

God and souls, the one and the many, "are different, unchangeably different; they are even different in species." There is in every finite soul a "derivative" life absolutely foreign to God. Every finite self has thus two aspects. While it is essentially eternal and perfect in one aspect, still it defines itself as different from other equally eternal selves by virtue of its association with a unique, individualized life in time, which just because it is in time involves some measure of imperfection. The perfection of God is the ideal implicitly operating in the life of the individual. The basis of the distinction of selves is the differentiation of self from others. In empirical existence we have the conjunction of the eternal with the temporal.

What is the origin and place of nature in this world of spirits? Man and other finite intelligences are "nature-begetting" minds. We are "ourselves the causal sources of the perceived world and its cosmic order." "Not God only but also the entire world of free minds other than God must condition Nature." In fact, the finite minds are alone "directly and productively causal of it, while God's conditioning of it can only be indirect and remote; namely, by the constant reference in him which these nature-begetting minds spontaneously have" (pp. 325-6). "All existence is either (1) the existence of minds, or (2) the existence of the items and order of their
experience. All the existences known as material, consisting in certain of these experiences with an order organised by the self-active forms of consciousness that in their unity constitute the substantial being of a mind, in distinction from its phenomenal life" (pp. xii-xiii).

IV

But what exactly is the relation between the items of mind and the facts of the world? How does the one explain the other? How, again, can the common world, due to so many individual minds, have any unity and stability? Howison speaks of the "dignity consciousness of the whole society of minds" (p. 270). But is this concourse due to chance, or does it indicate that the plurality is based on a deeper unity? How can a number of free individuals bring about order and unity in the universe such as to allow for the reality of all and provide for the individual differences? We seem to require a hypothesis of the type of Leibniz's pre-established harmony. Howison assumes that there is an identical content of system of reason, common to all self-active intelligences. It is a "universal rational society" or an "association of beings limited by a common rational intelligence." There is community of nature regarding intellectual, aesthetic and ethical ideals. It is the common reference to ideals that "raises Nature out of being a mere private show for each mind into a universal experience, with an aspect common to all minds alike" (p. xxii). The distinctions are due to the limitations which they are striving to overcome, and when the ideal is reached, the distinctions would be swallowed up in unity. The frequent reference to a common ground and centre of the pluralistic entities is a proof of the weakness of mere pluralism, and the insistence on social logic, etc., points to the strength of altruism.

The whole account of the relation between mind and
matter is in congruence with the idealist tradition. He holds that the common sense contrast between mind and matter "is not intelligibly interpretable except as the distinction between two aspects of one and the same total nature in the beings that possess it—the distinction, namely, between the whole and its dependent part; between the primitive or unconditioned, or more accurately the self-defining, and the derivative or the conditioned which is defined and determined by the first (p. xlii).

Hovison is right in contending that a self-conscious being ought not to act from pressure from without. He is a self-legislative agent whose conduct is determined by his personal will. Efficient causality of the type which prevails in the world of things is rightly ruled out. But simply because the self is a genuine source of activity, it need not be looked upon as self-subsistent and eternal. If each individual has his fixed place in an absolutely continuous series, where is the room for freedom? If each individual has a definite nature assigned to him, then there is no meaning in saying that he is free because not God but he himself is the author of his nature. But over this self-authorship is not consistently carried out. Creation is self-contradictory if the creator should be free agents and not machines. We must give up either the freedom of the creator or the creation by God. "...Creationism must logically exclude the possibility of freedom. For the Creator cannot of course create except by exactly and precisely conceiving; otherwise his product would not differ from nonentity. The created nature must therefore inevitably register the will and the plan of the creator" (p. 397). But still we require a God to settle the places of the individuals in the series. This dependence of the individual on God, Hovison admits. "Real creation means such an external dependence of other souls upon God that the non-existence of God would involve the non-existence of all souls, while his existence is the essential supplementing Reality that raises them to
reality; without him, they would be but void names and bare possibilities" (p. xvii). Most modern systems mean by creation only this. It is not an event which took place at a certain point of time, nor is it the transient activity of a so-called first cause. It is only the eternal dependence of the created on the creator. That God is the one ground of the world, and that the individuals are free because God the creator is free, is brought out in many passages, e.g. "The self-existent perfection of the deity itself freely demands for its own fulfillment the possession of a world that is in God's own image, and such a control of it as is alone consistent with its being so; a divine creation must completely reflect the divine nature, and must therefore be a world of moral freedom" (p. 74). In the accepted sense of the term, creation is a condition of freedom.

But the chief problem of how imperfection in which the eternal selves are entangled and which reduces them to the finite level arises is not solved. The facts of experience compel Howison to posit an element of imperfection. He is not clear about the nature of this element. It is sometimes defined as "a degree of imperfection self-posted in the very being of each self defined" (p. 362). With some absolutists, who view nonbeing as sometimes positive and sometimes negative, Howison regards imperfection as a more negative absence of reality and also an "actual antagonizing check" (p. 364). Each individual has two aspects. It is primarily and essentially eternal, and viewed in this aspect it is perfect, but this does not explain the aspect of plurality, which is the main thesis of Howison. So he holds that each self defines itself as different from other equally eternal selves by virtue of its association with a unique individuated life by time, which just because it is in time involves some measure of imperfection. But if God can be both self-defining and perfect, cannot man be the same? There is no reason assigned for treating man differently from God. But if God as self-defining is imperfect, then
imperfection is in the very heart of creation. In God is
the source of evil; in perfection, of imperfection.

We do not find any adequate reason as to why there
should be a soul corresponding to every possible degree of
divergence from the perfect ideal (see footnote to p. 162).
If the world is merely an assemblage of all conceivable
degrees of perfection from zero to infinity, there is no
room for any progress at all. One step up and one step
down would be the way to Howison's Heaven. The
actual world will be unimprovable.

What is the place of God in Howison's scheme? "The idea
of every self and the idea of God are in
separably connected, so that if any self exists, then God
also must exist; but any and every self demonstrably
exists, for the very doubt of its existence implies its
existence, and therefore God really exists" (p. 359).
But can we not have the idea of self without the idea of
God? Is a nontheistic pluralism impossible? If God
is the necessary premise and presupposition of every self,
if he is the supreme ideal and the defining standard,
part from which no self can apprehend itself, if he is
the cause of all evolution, natural and moral, then God
cannot be an individual among a number of self-subs
sistent individuals but must be the Absolute. As one
among many, God cannot be the "fulfilled type of every
mind and the living Bond of their union" (p. xiii).

The relation of God to finite selves is not on a par with
the relation of the finite spirits to one another: "Each
of them has its own ideal of its own being, namely, its
own way of fulfilling the character of God . . . God is
the final cause of the whole existing self" (pp. 339-40).
The unique meanings of God, the complex sides of his
nature are substantiated into separate selves. While the
meanings are different from one another, still they are
meanings of one whole and as such are bound down to a
unity. The individuals are the manifold embodiments
of God, who as the whole is to be viewed as the Absolute.

God is the final and not the efficient cause of the
temporal striving of all selves. Each developing consciousness or finite self has for its ideal the timeless self-sufficiency and purity from sin and struggle which are realised in God. The ideal must be capable of being realised, otherwise it cannot be an ideal. The individual self inspired by the ideal should be able to realise the perfection of God. If by any amount of striving the individual self can never realise the ideal, if it is fated that he should always be in time and never above it, then pluralism is secured, but God cannot be the final cause. If he exists at all, he can only be a finite God or a magnified man. If Howison's system wishes to escape from absolutism, it must end in either a number of selves without God or a finite God.

There is running throughout in Howison's system a confusion between God and the Absolute. We are told sometimes that the only ground of the world is "a principle of connection between all minds, God included." It is supposed that the principle is not ontological but only logical, not metaphysical, but only teleological. But occasionally Howison identifies this principle with God. "As final cause, God is at once (1) the logical ground apart from which, as defining standard, no consciousness can define itself as I, nor consequently can exist at all; (2) the ideal Goal toward which each consciousness in its external freedom moves" (p. 391). God is here the ideal goal as well as the logical ground. How can pluralism be sustained with the positing of such a God? "The theistic ideal of God immanent in the world by its activity of his image in the mind of man" is "the only Divine immanence compatible with the moral freedom of the soul" (Preface, p. xxx). As Professor Pringle-Pattle observes: "The relations between the Divine and the human indicated by such phrases as a common essence and an immanent ideal are of a character so intimate and so unique as to make the metaphor of a republic—the whole idea of an association of independent individuals—totally inapplicable to the facts."
Howison's God is just the Absolute of the idealists and is rightly viewed as the root as well as the fruit of the universe.

In a paper on "Personal Reality, Human and Divine," which the Rev. H. Rashdall contributed to the Oxford Essays on Personal Idealism, and in his Theory of God and Evil, he supports the current conception of God as infinite and personal. He makes a distinction between God and the Absolute. God is a person since he possesses the characteristics essential to personality. A "person" should distinguish himself not merely from objects we class as things but also from other subjects. This carries with it the further implication that a person can exist only as a one among many. God is a supreme self to which the world of persons and things is an object. In proving the existence of God, Rashdall adopts the traditional argument of idealism. The world as we know it exists in our experience. Apart from us there is no world for us to know, but the world any human individual knows is part of a much vaster world, which is independent of the individual, which existed ages before he was born, and will continue to exist for ages after he is dead. There must be an experiencing self indefinitely greater than the finite individual, as the world is greater than his world. In exactly the same way, Rashdall attempts to infer 'God' from the moral consciousness. The Absolute Moral Ideal exists. 'To exist' means 'to be in some mind.' Obviously, it does not exist in any individual mind. Therefore, there must be a Divine Mind in which its existence is to be located. Thus Rashdall establishes the reality of a spiritual self who is the subject of the world. In a sense the world is not outside God. But simply because the world of the finite individual is a part of the world of God, we cannot conclude that the finite individual is a part of the supreme spirit in the absolutistic sense. For
this would be to make a confusion between content and the consciousness which knows the content. Because the content of knowledge which exists in fragmentary in "finite centres" must be supposed to exist entire and distinct. In the "perfect experience," we cannot assume that "the finite centres which have these fragmentary experiences exist in an and form part of the Being, which has the 'perfect experience'" (Mises, July 1918, p. 265). Identity of content does not prove identity of existence. The supreme consciousness may have identity of content with finite selves, but the experiences of the finite selves as unique and particular fall outside the consciousness of God existentially. The supreme spirit is not the whole since it is limited by other finite selves. The Absolute is the whole, which is God and the finite spirits. Reality is not a single self-consciousness but a community of selves. "The Absolute cannot be identified with God, so long as is thought of as a self-conscious being. The Absolute must include God and all other consciousnesses, not as isolated and unrelated beings but as intimately related (in whatever way) to him and to one another, and as forming with him a system or unity. . . . God and the spirits are the Absolute—not God alone. Together they form a unity, but that unity is not the unity of self-consciousness" (Good and Evil, pp. 339-40).

He further emphasizes the unity of God and the finite selves by saying that "the ultimate Being is a single Power, if we like we may even say a single Being, who is manifested in a plurality of consciousnesses, one consciousness which is omniscient and eternal and many consciousnesses which are of limited knowledge, which have a beginning, and some of which, it is possible or probable, have an end" (ibid. ii. 241). God is thus one of the echoes, a separate appearance of the Absolute. He has all the limitations of personality. He is finite and limited by other selves, but this limitation is not an arbitrary one from outside but a necessary one springing from his very nature. The limitation of God by finite
spirits, who are knowing subjects will their own individualities, is a self-imposed one. Of course, Rashdall does not mean that God once was, in the popular sense, 'A mighty and then limited himself by an act of will. He means only that other spiritual beings derive their being from him and are willed to exist in order to bring about the greatest attainable good. There is only one mind which gave rise to the many that through their mutual interaction a supreme blessing otherwise inconceivable may be attained. Rashdall holds that all finite selves are created but still they are regarded as self-existent and mutually independent units. To satisfy popular prejudice, Rashdall makes the individuals free and independent, and provides space in his schema for evil and imperfection. Instead of saying that the supreme power is working under limits imposed upon it by an intractable environment, under conditions which he cannot or does not wholly control, he holds that God limited himself by his own act of will. Rashdall contends that God made the human will free with the idea of realising a higher purpose, which it would have been impossible to realise apart from human freedom. God created the best world that could be had.

VI

Passing by the difficulties incidental to the existence of imperfection and evil in this world we may ask how can we distinguish God from the Absolute when once divine creation of the world, including finite selves, is postulated. God becomes an appearance of the Absolute and the finite selves the appearances of God. If the whole world is the object of God, if it is his creation due to his self limitation, then surely God is all and we cannot draw any distinction between God and the Absolute. God is viewed as one among many, simply because the many are asserted to be independent of God, but Rashdall's theory of creation suggests that the finite selves have
only a derivative and dependent being. God, as the cause of them, may be said to include them all. In this case there is nothing independent of God outside of him. This means that God is the whole. Even in Rashdall's view God alone is real, and the reality of God includes the reality of all beings derived from God. If we separate God from the finite selves, we will be compelled to substantiate the universe apart from the particulars, an illogical procedure—and end in undisguised abstract monism or pluralism.

But Rashdall is interested in attributing personality to God. He can do so provided he allows that it is not of the kind we are acquainted with in our experience. After all, even though the perception of selfhood or personality arises by way of contrast with another, we need not assume that the feeling of contrast is of the essence of selfhood. The way of knowing truth is not truth itself. But it is fidelity to the religious beliefs he entertains that induces Rashdall to distinguish God from the Absolute and makes of him a supreme personality. He observes, "The alternative to a crude ultra-anthropomorphic conception of God is not a depersonalized idea of the Deity such as M. Loisy tends to share. The religious consciousness requires us to believe in a God who consciously wills moral ends"; and if we frankly admit that his power is, in a sense, limited, and at the same time that he is revealed "not merely in some imperfect and partially conflicting consciences, but in some supreme manner by one conscience," i.e. the Christ, we are entitled to claim that a "full-blooded Christian theism with (as it were) a background of confessed agnosticism is a far more philosophical attitude than a pantheism which professes to know and to explain everything, but does so only by the use of language which on closer examination turns out to be self-contradictory or meaningless" (The Modern Churchman, November-December 1916, "Theism or Pantheism").
VII

The theistic humanism of Mr. A. J. Balfour is developed in his Gifford Lectures on Theism and Humanism, though anticipations of the later view are to be met with in his earlier works on Philosophic Doubt and Foundations of Belief. Considerations of religion weigh much with Balfour, and from the beginning he has adopted an attitude of protest against the employment of reason in general and absolute idealism in particular in the interests of the Christian Religion. Balfour the Christian is the father of Balfour the sceptic of the Defence of Philosophic Doubt, the believer of The Foundations of Belief, the philosopher of Theism and Humanism. In the first book, Balfour develops an attitude of scepticism not because it is the right philosophical attitude but because he wished to take the win out of the sails of the scientific thinkers who attack religion in the name of science. Its subtitle, An Essay on the Foundations of Belief, indicates the spirit of the volume. Philosophic Doubt is directed against the foundations of scientific knowledge. The second volume on the Foundations of Belief is more positive in its aim, and its subtitle, Notes Introductory to the Study of Theology, indicates the religious motive that prompts the investigation. Its main interest is a reconstruction of the foundations of belief in general, and religious belief in particular by a demonstration of the defects of scientific reason and the dangers of rationalising theology. It pulls down the pretensions of science and idealism that it may reinstate Christian theology and all its views about man, God and the universe. It inquires into the relation of reason to authority to conclude that science is no substitute for metaphysics, and religion cannot be made a department of science. Thus Balfour makes logic and philosophy a means to critique and religion. The spirit comes out more plainly in his latest volume. Philosophy should aim at the fulfilment of the ethical and religious needs of man. Since these vary with indi-
viduals. Balfour takes the needs of the plain Anglican layman to be the standard and sets to work out a philosophy which would satisfy him. We should seek in philosophy not so much truth as ethical and religious satisfaction. "Task him (the trained man of speculation)," says Balfour, "to consider whether his system provides an honourable place for the actual belief by which his waking life is ruled" (T. and B. p. 271). Belief becomes the test of truth and religion of philosophy. Balfour's thought reveals the complete supremacy of religion in philosophy, for the avowed intention of all his work is the vindication of certain beliefs about the course of the world and man's place in it.

The unsettlement in men's conceptions of life due to the advance of scientific evolution and German idealism, as Balfour interprets it, caused his wrath. He felt himself called upon to undertake a defense of religion and persuade men to pursue the path of righteousness and turn a deaf ear to the attacks of science and metaphysics. Anxious about the human hopes and aspirations, which are doomed to disappointment if the rationalistic systems of naturalism and transcendental idealism are to have the last word on them, he assailed with these types of scientific reason. In his first book, Philosophic Doubts, he asks if nothing is certain in this world, and everything is only probable, why should we care much for the attacks of science, which is, after all, only probable, against religion which is equally so? In his second book, on The Foundations of Belief, he goes a step further, and builds that the certainties we have are those which satisfy our needs and values. In his Philosophic Doubts he advocates scepticism, pure and simple, and challenges the validity of scientific principles. It is a piece of negative criticism directed against the foundation of scientific knowledge. Balfour takes extreme delight in proving that all schools of science and philosophy, both ancient and modern, are useless. If reason by itself cannot establish the theories of science and philosophy, if they are also matters of
habit, faith and speculation, why should we insist on different standards for morality and religion? If the scientist in his conceit denies metaphysical systems as fantastic fairy-tales, Balfour retorts by flinging the charge in the face of the scientists that their fundamental hypotheses are no better. "Religion is at any rate no worse off than science in the matter of proof" (Philosophic Doubt, p. 379). Both religion and science are "incapable of any rational defence." Our beliefs in these regions are only matters of psychological habit and association, and not of logical necessity. Our claims "are not rational grounds of conviction... It would be more proper to describe them as a kind of inward inclination or impulse, falling far short of" or I should perhaps rather say, altogether differing in kind from—philosophic certainty, leaving the reason, therefore, unsatisfied but announcing, nevertheless, to a practical cause of belief, from the effects of which we do not even desire to be released." (Ibid. p. 117). But it was not then Balfour's intention to identify claims and reasons. It was his interest only to show that science is no better than religion in the matter of its authority. We cannot prove either science or religion though we have need of both. Both have claims on us though the claims are not reasons. Balfour did not then declare that the "existence of an ultimate impulse to believe a creed" was a sufficient justification for considering it to be true. In his Defence of Philosophic Doubt he supported a universal scepticism and rescued religion from the attacks of science. He did not pause to consider how far this all-dissolving doubt is a gain to religion and a loss to science. But we need not pick a quarrel with him on this point.

When we come to the Foundations of Belief, we find Balfour bridging the gulf between need and belief. Here scepticism is made a means to the vindication of religions faith and authority. He assails the two types of philosophy which employ scientific reason. He asks us to ascertain the grounds of naturalism and science
before we take sides with science, which is a bar to religion, and naturalism, which is the enemy of theism. He finds that all our beliefs can be traced to "custom, education, public opinion, the contagious convictions of countrymen, family, party or church." They are due to authority and not reason. "If we are to judge with equity between these rival claimants, we must not forget that it is Authority rather than Reason to which, in the main, we owe, not religion only, but ethics and politics; that it is Authority which supplies us with essential elements in the premises of science; that it is Authority rather than Reason which cements its superstructure" (Foundations of Belief, p. 229). Our beliefs are due not so much to logical grounds as to the psychological causes which bring them about. Of course he carefully distinguishes need from belief, and also urges that it is not any need or desire that can justify belief but only the true and valuable needs. This method of establishing beliefs may be different from the strictly scientific method of logic, but it is not to be confused with the pseudo-pragmatist method of desire and its fulfillment. "If the relation described is, on the one side, something different from that between a premise and its conclusion, on the other it is intended to be equally remote from that between a desire and its fulfillment." Balfour is right in his contention that pure reason does not afford a basis for life, if it is interpreted in a narrow and abstract sense, as always working from 'premises to conclusion.' Such an abstract reason can only be "permitted to have a hand in the simplest jobs" (ibid. p. 73). Such scholastic rationalism which regards as its function the deductive development from dogmas is not to be confused with the living intelligence of man. By reason is not meant mechanical syllogising but all human powers of insight. Even if with Balfour we hold our beliefs to be the products of custom, education and public opinion, and the other factors grouped together by him under the head of 'Authority,' deeper insight tells us that this Authority
is, after all, the embodiment of reason. The distinction between 'Reason' and 'Authority' as Balfour views them is not a distinction between the presence of reason and unreason respectively. Authority is the embodiment of universal reason, and does not, therefore, connote "sensational causes" (ibid. p. 219). It is impossible for man to discuss all propositions, but he takes certain things approved of for granted, and proposes to proceed on their basis a step further. All those propositions which the individual takes on trust as already proved, without debating them, are grouped by Balfour under Authority.

From the argument of the Foundations of Belief, he insensibly takes us to the modern pragmatist theory, which in some of its forms substitutes belief for logic and need for truth. The ordinary beliefs about the scientific world are not based on reason, but are determined by the practical needs of life. "In accepting science, as we all do, we are moved by 'values,' not by logic. ... If we examine fearlessly the grounds on which judgments about the material world are founded, we shall find that they rest on postulates about which it is equally impossible to say that we can theoretically regard them as self-evident, or practically treat them as doubtful. We can neither prove them nor give them up. ... Values refuse to be ignored." (Bibl. Sco. J., x. 1, pp. 4-6). Philosophies are to be judged by their capacity to satisfy the values of spirit. Problems of philosophy are to be solved by reference to human values. Freedom is a fact simply because we are "not prepared to give it up" on ethical grounds (ibid.). There is no need to argue the question; we have only to admit it. Those systems of philosophy which are more inclined to reason out beliefs are warned that an unreasonable pursuit of reason will lead them to the devil or the deep sea. Absolute idealists have an implicit faith in reason, with the result that they "are not religious" (ibid. footnote to p. 22). M. Bergson is a great philosopher, if not for any-
thing else, at least for the reason that he declares his dissatisfaction with "the all-inclusive unification of the idealist systems" (ibid. p. 23). He gives us a super-consciousness which takes sides and wars against evil. Balfour believes that the Absolute of the idealists is absolutely useless. It seems to kill all the values we find and enjoy in the world. No man will be moved to do anything for it, not even humanly intellectually. That is why Balfour could not bring himself to understand what the Absolute is and what it stands for.

Every system of philosophy should have in view the claims of the ordinary man, and secure an 'honourable place' for his beliefs in an independent world of persons and things, in universal causation, in the rationality of things, their goodness and beauty. While we agree with Balfour in the view that the highest values of spirit should be conserved, we are not prepared to say that the doctrines are true simply because Tom, Dick or Harry believes in them. We should think out the relations of the highest values of man to reality in existence as a whole. Everything we want to believe cannot be real. Balfour admits that most of our beliefs about the universe are "moulded by formative forces, which vary from irresistible coercion to faint and doubtful inclination" (I. and II. p. 278). If the beliefs which he admits "are to be regarded rather as the results of tendencies than as the conclusions of logic," are confused with valid truths, we would be reducing logical reasons to psychological causes and rational necessity to non-rational coercion. Then there will be no function for the rational part of our nature. Our philosophy would be a glorification of the animal mind and its way of working; for we do not propose to distinguish between coincidences and coherences, psychological associations and logical connections. Balfour believes that in this procedure we have the authority of Kant and his transcendental method. But Kant does not set to himself the task of understanding the subjective
experiences of men, their hopes, and fears, their joys and regrets and satisfying them. He asks about the conditions of experience, scientific, ethical and aesthetic. The centre of his philosophy is experience in general and not the needs of the plain Anglican layman of the twentieth century. Balfour knew the weakness of his theory and the merit of Kant's undertaking. "The correspondence postulated is not between the fleeting fancies of the individual and the immutable verities of an unseen world, but between these characteristics of our nature which we recognize as that in us, which, though not necessarily the strongest, is the highest; which, though not always the most universal, is, nevertheless, the best" (F. of B. pp. 247-8). All that the transcendent method says is that philosophy is not a deductive development of conclusions from set dogmas, but the explication of the presuppositions of experience. Experience, if it is not to be dismissed as an illusion, demands explanation. There are certain things which we should assume, if we are not to de-rationalize the scheme of things. Such conditions which are necessary for rendering experience possible may be taken to be truths according to the transcendent method of Kant. But, as we shall see immediately, Balfour is not adopting this true method of Kant and the absolute idealists, but the subjectivist and pragmatist method, when he declares that without a theistic conception of the Deity, as distinct from the absolutistic humanist values cannot be conserved.

Balfour inclines to the God of religion as against the Absolute of philosophy. The distinction between religious and non-religious systems of philosophy is that "God, or whatever in the system corresponds to God, does in the former the same role in the one system, while, with more consistency, and for less truth, he is, in the non-religious system, represented as indifferently related to all the multiplicity of which he constitutes the unity" (Iliffere Journal, x. 1, p. 22). To Balfour, God is a "spirit among spirits" (T. and R. p. 20), an ethical
personality with whom personal relations of love and worship are possible. Absolutism, which regards its highest as "logical glue," which binds together multiplicity to make it intelligible, he cannot suffer easily. "When I speak of God, I mean something other than an identity wherein all differences vanish, or a unity which includes but does not transcend the differences, which it somehow holds in solution. I mean a God whom men can love, a God to whom men can pray, who takes sides, who has purposes and preferences, whose attributes, however conceived, leave unimpaired the possibility of a personal relation between Himself and those whom He has created" (Pl. L, p. 22). Let us consider Balfour's proofs for the existence of such a God. The first argument is, "that all we think best in human culture whether associated with beauty, goodness or knowledge requires God for its support, that Humanism without Theism loses more than half its value" (p. 248). "The root principle, which by its constant recurrence in slightly different forms binds together like an apoplectic lesion the most diverse material, is that if we would maintain the value of our highest beliefs and emotions, we must find for them a congruous origin. Beauty must be more than an accident. The source of morality must be moral. The source of knowledge must be rational. If this be granted, you rule out Mechanism, you rule out Naturalism, you rule out Agnosticianism, and a lofty form of Theism becomes, as I think, inevitable" (ibid. p. 230). This argument that God is implied in science, art and morality appeared already in Foundations of Belief. "We bring to the study of the world the presupposition that it is the work of a rational Being, who made it intelligible and at the same time made us, in however feeble a fashion, able to understand it" (P. of B. p. 183). God must be rational, science demands it; he must be moral, morality demands it. We are thus led to a conception of God as a single personal Being at the head of the Cosmos, the Creator of the world. Balfour allows that God may
be superpersonal. But if the source of personality can be superpersonal, the source of morality can be supermoral, and the source of rationality super-rational. Let us next ask whether a theistic conception of God is the necessary implication of logic, ethics and aesthetics. The assumption of logic which growing experience verifies is that the world is a cosmos where the outer and the inner cohere. There is no necessity which compels us to a personal God. The same is the case with ethics and aesthetics. The humanist values of knowledge, beauty and goodness demand a spiritual unity self-dependent and self-explanatory. As Balfour himself suggests in a passage of his *Foundations of Belief*, “When once we have realised the scientific truth that at the root of every rational process lies an irrational one; that reason from a scientific point of view is itself a natural product; and that the whole material on which it works is due to causes physical, physiological and social, which it neither creates nor controls, we shall be driven in mere self-defence to hold that behind these non-rational forces and above them, guiding them by slow degrees, and, as it were, with difficulty, to a rational issue, stands that Supreme Reason, in whom we must thus believe, if we are to believe in anything” (*Foundations of Belief*, p. 343). Balfour makes much of the argument from design as supporting a personal conception of God. He emphasises how the universe is so shaped as to permit the production of spiritual beings. Beauty in art implies an artist; beauty in nature requires God as its artist. But art implies only a spiritual reality and not a personal God. Balfour argues incidentally that great artists are theists, which is a mistake of fact. They consider every object a spirit or a manifestation of spirit. They are either polytheists or pantheists. But the argument from design is not conclusive since there is much error and imperfection in the world. If this argument proves anything, it is that naturalism is inadequate. But to refute naturalism is not to prove theism. The other considera-
tion Balfour puts forward, that there are certain forms of beauty and goodness which have intrinsic worth and not merely survival value, does not help theism. It only overthrows naturalism. There are philosophers of different persuasions who hold to intrinsic values. These values do not stand or fall with theism (see Moore, Principia Ethica). Balfour knows that his theism is not logically demonstrated. But he tells us that since logical proofs cannot be had even for scientific truths, we need not stickle for logic. In a world where everything is probable, theism cannot hope to be better. But if probability is the guide to life, absoluteism is quite as probable as theism, and, besides, has the strength of logic behind it. To surrender logic because it is not palatable and take in probability is foolhardy wisdom.

VIII

We are at one with William James in his view that "the difference between monism and pluralism is, perhaps, the most pregnant of all the differences in philosophy" (Will to Believe, p. viii). It is the supreme difference between first things and second things. Which shall we put first? Shall we put God first or man first? Shall we put subjectivism in knowledge, relativism in morals and polytheism in religion first or their opposites first? The views we have criticized in this book are inclined in favour of the pluralistic scheme, while the positive view in defence of which this study of contemporary philosophy is undertaken supports the monistic one. The pluralistic reactions which we have reviewed are the efforts of a disturbed age which does not know how to reconcile its "intense need of believing" with the "difficulty of beliefs." Men feel the need of religion for the hopes and consolations it offers; but philosophy and science ask, Have we any right to it? Can it not be that the God we believe in and require for the satisfaction of the heart is only a dream of our imagination, with no
mists in reality? Have our deepest aspirations any warrant in the constitution of things? Is the faith for which we sigh a rational faith? The advance of scientific and metaphysical knowledge in the nineteenth century disturbed peace and comfort of mind by exploding the traditional concepts, and exposing the values of human life to the searchlight of science and logic. Naturalistic philosophy and some forms of utilitarian looked upon religion as a web of illusions or a conscious fraud. To the scientific metaphysicians, the God of religion is as intolerable to thought as it is indispensable for the religion of the plain man. The need for God is intense; but the difficulty of the belief in God is equally acute. Faith seems to be tortured by reason. There is nothing to satisfy the need of those who want a reason for living. Matthew Arnold points to the unsettled condition of men's minds when he says, "There is not a creed which is not shaken, not an accredited dogma which is not shown to be questionable, not a received tradition which does not threaten to dissolve. Our religion has realized itself in the supposed fact, and now the fact is failing it." God the Creator and the Redeemer yields place to the Immutable Energy and the Unknowable Power. There is an inward struggle between what Hebraism calls "the sense of authority in what seems truth declared by science, and the sense of majesty in what is felt to be an ineffable good, which the apparent good seems to put in peril" (L. of E. p. 5). The old world is dead, the new is not yet born. The old spiritual basis is lost, a new spiritual foundation has yet to be supplied. Life views vacillate between faith and thought. We do not know what to do when faith loses sovereignty over men's minds, and reason gives us no hope of a world other than this. The contrast between the greatness of man, who feels that there is God without whom there is no true happiness, and the littleness of man, who cannot prove it satisfactorily, is very disquieting. The anarchy in men's minds and the vague disquiet which is blindly feeling its
way towards some soul-satisfying scheme are exploited by the systems of the day. Pluralism takes upon itself the task of overthrowing the contrast between faith and knowledge by interpreting life alike, and reconstructing the foundations of philosophy and religion. A sure instinct tells us that it cannot be that the world with its endless conflicts and aimless courses, random achievements and broken lights, the triumph of evil, and the defeat of good, is the be-all and the end-all of things. The most satisfactory feature of the present pluralistic reaction is its insistence on human values. Pluralism is not so much a mood as a frame of mind. With a new fuel for the realities of life, and a living interest in the world around, it approaches the philosophic problem. Discovering the great gulf between philosophic results and humanist ideals, it adopts a protestant attitude. The fountain spring of this reaction is the deep sense of dissatisfaction with the prevailing systems which tride with the values of spirit. So these pluralist systems have an irresistible charm for the man in the street, who cares as little for sound logic as the thinkers themselves, whose reason is at the mercy of their feelings. Men are eager to escape by any means from the chaos in which they had long been groping for a better state of things.

But, in our opinion, the greatest mistake of the new spirit is in its conception of the Absolute as Anti-Christ. The kind of absolutism which comes in for severe rebuke and condemnation at the hands of our pluralist critics is a fiction of their own imagination and not a theory held by any of its recognized exponents. The paramount question of philosophy whether concrete absolutism does not bridge the gulf between faith and thought is only raised to be dogmatically dismissed. To cast the career of philosophy on a negative answer to this question is to give up the philosophic endeavour. The "new" philosophy no doubt retains the monistic idealist of certain essential things which he in his passion for logic loses sight of, and has thus a negative value. It represents in this
sense a reaction of the individual who has become weary of monistic systems and stretched forth seeking hands towards a more reasonable and humane religious ideal.

But its value is limited because its faith in the values is so one-sided. While it emphasises the emotional and the practical, it ignores the logical values. Reflection is used by the pluralist writers not as a serious thought analysis but rather as a dialectical tour de force which must lead us to certain conclusions. A concerning hatred of thought, a complete faith in instinct and impatience of all reasoned solutions of the universe are, to a larger or smaller extent, the prominent features of the new mode of philosophising. The bearings of philosophic doctrines on human hopes have begun to reign in philosophy. Much of the chaos and unsettlement in the realm of philosophy can ultimately be traced to this sin against the scientific method of philosophy.

Pluralism is right in rebelling against the conception of a block universe. It points to the central defect of a shallow and static, narrow and abstract monism, which clings to a timeless absolute and reduces human effort to an illusion. Life is not a stage-play or a mimic show, but a hard battle where the individual has to risk and fight. Moral life depends on the autonomy of self. But in emphasising the moral aspect, the pluralist forgets the religious aspect where the individual feels a living dependence on God. As we have more than once said, without the religious belief in perfection, human effort loses its vitality and inspiration. The living ground of all individuals is God. The task of philosophy is to reconcile the claims of morality and religion. Pluralism, ignoring the data of religious consciousness, declares that the finite selves are the ultimate constituents of the universe. Indeterministic pluralism is offered to us as the way of escape from mechanical determinism. As we have seen, contingency and irrationalism are not the only alternatives to mechanism and necessity. The problem of freedom is not, as the pluralist imagines, one, between the
determination of conduct and the non-determination thereof, but between the different kinds of determination, the true idealistic and the false mechanical. Idealistic determination holds that the ever active dynamic self is the determining condition. Since the governing factor is the rational self, all human acts will be intelligible, though they cannot always be foreseen.

In our survey of the pluralist systems we have seen how the 'horrid Absolute' rears its head on the most inconvenient occasions. If we start with the parts and attempt to make a whole of them, we shall not succeed, unless we somehow put the whole into the parts. Pluralism without undertaking an analysis of experience assumes that the world consists of a plurality of distinct selves of different grades of development. Their only impulse of activity is the instinct of self-preservation. The starting-point is fictitious. No individual can be conscious of himself as a self unless he feels his oneness with a universal which transcends his little self. The self-consciousness of man is bound up with the consciousness of a universal life. The individual when he opens his eyes to the light of the world does not have any ideas of his separateness from other units, but feels himself to be a part of the whole. It is the presence of the universal in him that grade him on to activity, and ever urges him to transcend his individuality. The individual self is able to conserve its momentary experiences and develop them into a whole of knowledge, wisdom and strength, simply because it is not a mere individual. An isolated individual cannot have any commerce with reality. The universe is not merely an assemblage of separate individuals, but a rational whole. Sooner or later every system of pluralism feels the need for a deeper philosophy and comes to regard its pluralism as an aspect of a deeper monism.

The pluralists in their anxiety to liberalise religion and humanise philosophy have overhumanised God. If
the interests of true democracy are considered, we will not have a finite personal God, so dear to the heart of the pluralists, but an immanent infinite. If theology should follow politics, God the Father of the Bible or the King of Mr. Wells, would be displaced by God the life of the world, or the soul of the universe. God is the universal life force. He is not a personal God of limited power who shows his hand in human affairs.

Modern Science has no sympathy with a God who interferes with the course of nature. Were God all that the pluralists make him out to be, the challenges of the man in the street such as, Why does not God whisper into the ears of our princes and potentates words of wisdom? Why does he not send this great war? cannot be answered at all unless it be by saying that though he is abounding in goodwill, he is hopelessly destitute of power. The pluralists make God so finite and personal that he is absorbed in man and forfeits his nature. He becomes a growing God subject to time. In our evaluation of becoming, we subject God to the flux and succession of time. In such a philosophy time, instead of being viewed as only a part of truth, becomes the real God or Fate, holding in its grip the growing, struggling God. Such a conception is self-defeating. A personal God can only be an aspect of the Absolute, perhaps the executive authority of the Absolute.

Our conclusion is that the pluralistic movement has succeeded in giving a shake to the supremacy of absolutism in religion and philosophy, but has failed to overthrow it. False absolutism has come down while the true is considerably strengthened. Abstract monism, which destroys personal values and reduces individuality to illusion as much as radical pluralism, which means chaos, and relies on good luck and blind chance for the growing order and harmony of the world, is a defective attitude of life. While the false absolutist made too much of the reciprocal implications of things and the unity of the universe, the pluralist over-emphasises the sharpness and
distinctness of things, their uniqueness and individuality. What we want is a dynamic monism capable of account-
ing for a growing universe with its time and change. The Absolute should be a real living whole including both the finite and the infinite. Such an energising Absolute would lead to a solid conception of the world. Then it does not matter what we start with, whole or parts, for we know the whole to be a concrete one, and the parts to be parts only. Since it is impossible at the end of a book to deal constructively with the problems raised, we will, in the next chapter, give the outlines of a scheme, which to us, appears to satisfy the philosophic needs and impulses as well as the religious claims and aspirations.