A FEW YEARS BACK, THE WORLD OF PHILOSOPHY WAS TAKEN
BY STORM WHEN A NUMBER OF ENTHUSIASTIC AND ENTER-
PRISING PHILOSOPHIC MODERNISTS IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA
USHERED IN PRAGMATISM WITH A GREAT THRUSH OF TRUMPETS.
IN AN AGE WHICH PRIDES ITSELF ON BEING PROGRESSIVE, WHEN
WE ARE EVER EAGER TO HEAR SOME NEW THING, NOVELTIES IS THE
SURE PATH TO SUCCESS, AND PRAGMATISM, WHICH CONSIDERS
SUCCESS TO BE THE ONLY VIRTUE, ANNOUNCED ITSELF AS A NEW
METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY WHICH WILL SOLVE ALL PROBLEMS IN
HEAVEN AND EARTH, EVEN THOSE WHICH WERE NOT DREAMT
OF BY ANY PREVIOUS PHILOSOPHY. ANXIOUS TO WIN IN THE
PHILOSOPHICAL POLLING-BOOTH, IT ADOPTED THE TACTICS OF AN
ELECTIONEERING CAMPAIGN. A CLEVERLY ATTEMPT WAS MADE
TO DRILL AND HORRIFY, BOWILDER AND ASTORISH. PROCEEDING
ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT WE ARE NEVER WISE IF WE DO NOT CALL
OUR FATHERS FOOLS, THE SUPPORTERS OF THE THEORY ATTACKED
CLASSICAL IDEALISM, AND TRIED NOT TO ARGUE BUT TO LAUGH
IT OUT OF EXISTENCE. THOUGH SATIRE IS A SURE BUT A
SLOW SOLVENT AND ABUSE A DEADLY BUT UNREMARKABLE WEAPON,
THEY MISSED THEIR AIM, AS THEY WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY
EITHER LIFE OR Logic. IN THE THUNDERING CRITICISMS POURED
BY PRAGMATISM ON OTHER SYSTEMS, WE HEAR THE SOUND OF THE
GUNS AND SEE THE BRILLIANT DISPLAY OF FIREWORKS, BUT DO
NOT CATCH ANY Glimpses OF THE FLAG FOR WHICH THE BATTLE IS
FOUGHT; WE FEEL THE POTENTIAL WEAL AND THE PROPAGANDIST
PRAQTAMISM

servous, but do not perceive the ideals underlying the
new system as loudly and widely advertised. We are
told that pragmatism will hirvorous philosophy and
render it once again "a subject gentlemen can read
with pleasure, dehomin barbarism of both temper and
style, sight with the Dragon of Scholasticism, which
deters men from approaching the golden apples that
cluster on the tree of knowledge in the garden of the
Hesperides" (Humanism, Schiller, p. xxii). As yet, we
must say that the entrance of pragmatism into the philo-
sophic arena has resulted rather in a disturbance of the
usual calm and an exhibition of bad taste and temper.
Dr. Schiller heralds the coming of pragmatism as the
renaissance of philosophy. It will be "a great tonic
to reinvigorate a previously depressed humanity" (ibid.,
p. 39). William James, one of the greatest men of our
age, sings the praise of pragmatism so exquisitely that
many are charmed into an unconscious support of it.
When one views the glorious virtues which are the peculiar
possessions of the pragmatists according to William
James, and contrasts them with the infamous ones which
characterize the absolutists, the chances are that any one
careful of good name and dignity would choose the side
on which the pragmatist angels are. But if, without
being led away by the false glamour of vain advertise-
ment and moral monopolies, we try with self-posse-
sion and restraint to study the message of this New
Dispensation and find out where exactly it differs from
classical absolutism, we shall see that it is not after all
so radical and revolutionary in its tendencies as we are
led to believe by its protagonists, and that where it
differs from speculative idealism, it does so at its peril.

At the outset we must refer to the pragmatist's claim
that pragmatism is not so much a metaphysic as a method.
It tries to affect the philosophic outlook not so much by
directly supporting set conclusions as by insisting on a
new method of approach to the problems of philosophy.
It announces itself as a reform in the method of philo-
sophy. It emphasises a particular way of looking at things, a definite attitude towards the questions of life. It proclaims to a wondering world that truth is practical, and the meaning of an assertion depends on its application. The general charge against philosophy is its unpredicability, or, as Dr. Schiller likes to put it, 'Nephelococecygia.' Systems of philosophy which are developed in the Academy or the Posh do not appeal to the plain man of the market-place. They even protest against any attempt to introduce fresh air and light into their closed chambers. Pragmatism makes philosophy practical with a vengeance. It tries to interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences. What difference would it practically make to anyone, if this notion rather than that notion were true? If no practical difference whatever can be traced, then the alternatives mean practically the same thing and all dispute is idle” (James, Pragmatism, p. 45). Pragmatism is thus “an attitude of orientation, the attitude of looking away from first things, principles, categories, supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, facts, consequences, facts” (ibid., p. 35). It is the new method of pragmatism is put in this manner: we have no reason for complaint. Experience or life is ultimately the touchstone of truth. No theory has any meaning apart from its application to life. We are glad that pragmatism, without committing itself to any results in metaphysics, merely insists on an application of the teleological method. In the image of the Italian pragmatist Papini, pragmatism is like a corridor in a hotel which opens into innumerable chambers. In one we may find a free-thinker worrying himself about the defence of atheism, in another an agnostic thinking out his apology, in a third a devotee on his knees praying to God for faith and strength in his despair, and in a fourth a synthetic philosopher trying to reconcile philosophy, religion and science. Each of them may adopt the method of pragmatism (see James, Pragmatism, pp. 33-54). But this method is not a new one in philo-
Pragmatism

James himself calls pragmatism a new name for old ways of thinking. "Being nothing essentially raw, it harmonises with many ancient philosophic tendencies. It agrees with nominalism for instance, in always appealing to particulars; with utilitarianism in emphasising practical aspects; with positivism in its disdain for verbal solutions, useless questionings and metaphysical abstractions." (p. 3, p. 53, 54). It is only different from absolutism. Dr. Schiller argues that the philosophic method which pragmatism attempts to displace requires us to "expunge from our thinking every trace of feeling, interest, desire and emotion, as the most pernicious sources of error." (Humanism, p. x). Schiller is here adopting the old device of calling a dog mad to kill it. Philosophy does not revel in abstract forms; it has its own interests and passions. While to classical absolutism intellectual pursuit is itself a passion, it does not want to be bewildered and distracted by other passions and prejudices. It is quite possible for us to have a disinterested love of knowledge, and when Schiller condems this attitude as a pernicious perversion of the cognitive instinct (see Axioms as Postulates, footnote r, p. 58), his passion gets the better of his pragmatism, for an appeal to facts would have convinced him of the force and value of a dispassionate search for truth. The excellence of pure disinterestedness, of seeing for the sake of seeing, and knowing for the sake of knowing, emphasised by even Bergson, is strange to the pragmatists.

To criticise pragmatism is like flogging a dead horse. But our discussion of pragmatism will have a pragmatist justification, since we wish to show how pragmatism, so far as it is true and valuable, defends and develops absolutism, and so far as it is not, it is a philosophy fit for the philistines of the present age with their sickly sentimentalism and sordid commercialism. We shall trace the different tendencies that converged in the pragmatist emphasis on the teleological character of truth, state briefly the central
positions of pragmatism, and compare and contrast it with absolutism.

II

Of the many influences that led to the genesis of the pragmatic philosophy, the first to be noted is that of Immanuel Kant. He is not only the father of speculative idealism in Germany, but also a pioneer of the pragmatic theories of the present day. He was the first to emphasize the indispensable part played by human activity in the construction of experience. Knowledge, according to Kant, is not the copying or the contemplating of reality, but is the making of reality according to our purposes. Reality is not what we find but what we make. In the words of Dr. Bosanquet, it lies ahead of us and not behind us. Our understanding puts questions to nature and determines the lines in which we construct reality. The successors of Kant have dropped out, and quite rightly too, the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon, experience and reality. Kant's theory when stripped of its inconsistencies, seems to reduce itself to the pragmatic doctrine that reality is largely constructed by human activity. It is mainly of our making. But more consistently than most pragmatists, Kant points out that there are certain given aspects or objective elements to which we have to adapt ourselves. While Kant rightly insists on the subjective nature of the so-called axiomatic truths, while he elaborates the resources of the mind and makes out that in a sense our understanding makes nature, still he is equally emphatic in declaring that reality is not wholly of subjective manufacture. There are in knowledge objective elements which we are compelled to note. But this distinction of subjective and objective is no doubt one of critical analysis, and not felt by the experiencing individual. Kant saves us from subjective Idealism by the adoption of this distinction of subjective and objective. But when pragmatism states that the purposive activity of mind is
all that is necessary for the construction of the world, we are straight-handed in solipsism. Kant tells us that our experience is an interaction between the two factors of knowledge, the subjective and the objective. The mutual implication of self and the world on which later objective idealism is built, is first suggested by the philosophy of Kant. In our human experience the interpenetration of the self and the world is not complete. So long as we have things given to us, things to which we are opposed, which we have to manipulate, it is a sign that the ideal is yet remote. Human experience is trying progressively to realise this ideal. It is this reference to a common ideal that saves empiricist systems from the weakness of subjectivism.

By his insistence on the supremacy of the practical reason over the pure, Kant may be looked upon as the forerunner of pragmatism. It is Kant's belief, that though such central necessities of life as faith in God, freedom and immortality are theoretically inadmissible, though we cannot adduce any logical evidence in support of them, may, though it may appear that they contradict all conditions of objectivity in knowledge, still we have to believe in them for our moral purposes. As pure reason has a constitutional defect by which it comes into irreconcilable conflict with the practical necessities of life, it has to be supplemented by practical reason. If we want to vote for such sacred possessions of life as freedom, etc. we have also to vote for the inadequacy of intellect. The scientific understanding bound down to a world of mechanism has to be supplemented by the higher reason appreciative of values. Moral life ensures the reality of the human soul, God and freedom which the universal determination of science threatens to destroy. For the revelations of moral life are quite as genuine as the products of logical investigation. Kant is a thorough-going empiricist, whatever the critics might say about the 'high priestly road,' for it is Kant's fidelity to experience in all its aspects that compels him to supplement pure by
practical reason, a world of nature by a world of ends. But we should remember that even Kant does not break up the unity of mind. His pure and practical reason are both expressions of reason. In some cases reason is satisfied with mechanism, in some others it demands teleology.

James's defence of the will to believe takes its rise from this doctrine of Kant, though it owes much to the views of Pascal and the theory of value judgments of Lotze and Ritschl. As Kant is believed to put practical reason above pure reason, James puts will above intellect. When we have to act and to choose between alternatives, which are logically indifferent, we are asked to choose that which is aesthetically satisfying or morally edifying. If to the scientific understanding the world appears morally colourless, i.e., if it looks indifferent, grinding out both good and evil impartially, and religion requires us to believe in the ultimate goodness of the world, James asks us to try the several alternatives. Believe in the ultimate goodness of the world and see how life will be affected; believe in the colourlessness of the world and see how it would look; believe in its rottenness and find out its results. If we conduct these ideal experiments to ascertain the possible bearings of the several theories on life, then, according to James, we will have to accept that course which is morally most satisfying. "The whole function of philosophy ought to be to find out what definite difference it will make to you and me at definite instants of our life if this world formula or that world formula be the one which is true" (Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results). James when he is more careful tells us that we cannot believe whatever we want to believe. When we have different alternatives without sufficient evidence for intellectual conviction, James defends our right to believe that one of them which would aid us in life, and see if the practical results justify our ventures in belief. Ethical beliefs are practical attitudes where we have to find out by experimental verification which are desirable and which not. James's doctrine of the
will to believe is quite a limited one. It holds that in ethics and religion science is not truth and we live by faith. It
asks us to believe where proof cannot be had. "Our
passional nature not only lawfully may, but must decide
an opinion between propositions whenever it is a genuine
opinion that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual
grounds; for to say, under such circumstances, 'do not
decide but leave the question open' is itself a passional
decision, just like deciding yes or no, and is attended with
the same risk of losing the truth." (Will to Believe, p. 11).
The wise man says, "In doubt, refrain from action." Whatever be
the value of this advice in law-courts, in
life we must not when in doubt refrain from action. Where
intellect neither helps nor hinders, the claims of morals
should decide the issue. Kant says very nearly the
same thing. If supersensible realties cannot be proved,
they have to be postulated if they are indispensable to
life. Though they are inaccessible to pure reason, from
the practical point of view, there is "valid ground to
justify us in acting as if we knew that these objects were
real" (Kant quoted in Journal of Philosophy, Psychology,
and Scientific Methods, 1913, p. 106). There are cases
of forced options where we are compelled to assume
because we do not know. But this does not mean that
they are true or that we believe in them.1 Even in the
realm of morals and religion, if the consequences do not
fit in with the facts, the beliefs should be abandoned.
There is no question about the validity of this contention.
When we seek for an explanation of moral conduct, the sole
test of the validity of the explanation is its adequacy to
account for moral life. And if moral life contradicts the
proffered explanation, the explanation must fail to the
ground. The only criterion of truth is working, not
evilical or emotional, but logical.

1 W. K. Clifford in the Ethics of Belief contends that it is a sin to
believe unproved statements simply because they satisfy the believer.
"It is wrong always, everywhere and for every one, to believe any-
thing upon insufficient evidence."
Philosophers, when they cannot prove logically everything they wish to, fall back on some extralogical principle. Locke looked to intuition. Descartes rested on faith in God. Kant asserted the supremacy of practical reason, and James defends the will to believe. On closer analysis we find that the difficulty of Kant and James is due to a false view of the nature of intellect. The defect is not in reason as such, but in the faulty method of Kant, James, and the positivists. When intellect is employed in natural sciences it leads to certain concepts; but the same intellect in moral consciousness leads to certain others. Science and ethics find a reconciliation in a higher synthesis. Mechanism and teleology are only different modes in which our intellect works in different spheres of reality. Kant admits it when he says: "We should explain all products and occurrences in nature, even the most purposive, by mechanism as far as is in our power. But at the same time we are not to lose sight of the fact that these things which we cannot state for investigation except under the concept of a purpose are real. In conformity with the essential constitution of our Reason, and notwithstanding these mechanical causes, he subordinated by us finally to causality in accordance with purposes." (Critique of Judgment, Bernhard's translation, p. 323). We admit the proposition that our "whole man . . . is at work when we form our philosophical opinions." (Wise to Believe, p. 192). We admit we cannot, in morals and religion, wait for scientific evidence of the type we come across in natural sciences. "Where faith in a fact can help create the fact, that would be an insane logic which should say that faith running ahead of scientific evidence is the lowest kind of immoralities into which a thinking being can fall." (Ibid., p. 25). Kant's insistence on practical reason as the clue to reality, and James's defense of the will to believe are both traceable to an inadequate conception of scientific truth and understanding. When once we admit that it is understanding and not a different faculty which works in the moral and
religious field, that everywhere it proceeds by the method of ideal experiment, and that beliefs are always tested by their adequacy to account for the facts, sensible and ideal, which provoked them, there will be no need to insist on a special faculty of faith. It is a complete dissociation of understanding as it operates in natural sciences from the kindred method illegitimately called faith, which works in morals and religion, that Dr. James to believe that the two were different and both were needed. In morals we would reality to suit our ideals; in thought we mould our ideals to suit reality, and this difference is all-important. When in regard to morals and religion James admits that faith in a fact helps to create the fact, he is quite right. But when he extends it to all knowledge and upholds the hypothesis that everywhere truths are man-made, he is wrong. When he makes out the quite unobjectionable proposition that in cases left open by intellect moral ideals may be employed to decide the struggle, he is right. But when he rushes to the conclusion that will and feeling play an important role in truth-making everywhere, he is illegitimately extending a theory which derives its plausibility from a falsification of the nature of intellect.

Modern methods of science have also come to the help of the new philosophy. The hypothetical method of induction and the 'a priori' method of scientific theories are taken up by the pragmatist view. Every truth is a hypothesis and every axiom a postulate. Our axiomatic truths are really postulates which have had to be confirmed by ages of experience before they were accepted as axioms. Our mathematical truths are human constructions, demands we make on reality to convert it into a cosmos on which we can depend. The postulatory character of axioms is admitted by all logicians. For example, Dr. Russell, speaking about the laws of thought observes: "As reflective conceptions they are postulates, i.e. principles which we use because we need them;... they cannot therefore be taken in a
definite form as hypotheses or axioms antecedent to experience. Experience may be said to begin with the certainty that 'there is somewhat,' and the postulates of knowledge do but express in abstract form the progressive definition of this somewhat (Logic, ii. 206). The idealist would have no objection to the pragmatist theory of the postulatory character of axioms. When we do not know the world completely, we assume that it is knowable. We say the world should be a harmony though it is not yet one. We cannot but assume it for our intellectual life is impossible without the assumption. This only means that the work of reason presupposes some sort of faith. The famous principle of Mr. Bradley, that 'what may be and must be, that certainly is,' confirms the hypothetical origin of all knowledge. We frame a hypothesis, a possibility, a mere 'may be'; we test and verify the hypothesis and see if we are constrained to think it, if it is a 'must be'; if so, we say it is. Schiller insists upon not only the postulatory character of axioms but also their verification. He does not want us to admit beliefs simply because they are convenient. Beliefs ought to await confirmation by life and logic. Any faith will not do. The pragmatist is in sympathy with Newton’s “hypotheses non fingo.” “The spurious faith which too often is all theologians take courage to inspire is merely the smoothing over of an unshod scepticism, or at best a pallid fungus that, lurking in the dark corners of the mind, must shun the light of truth and warmth of action. In contrast with it a genuine faith is an ingredient in the growth of knowledge. It is over realizing itself in the knowledge that it needs and seeks to help it on to further conquests” (Humanism, p. xv). Intuitions cannot be accepted without criticism. Schiller puts the whole point in a manner quite agreeable to the absolute idealist. “Humanism... has the utmost respect for intuitions of all sorts. It regards them as psychological facts of the greatest interest, importance and significance. It would not attempt to do without them either in ethics
or in logic. It would define them as immediate judgements of value. But it would respect without valuing. It could not refrain from examining claims before admitting them as infallible guides to validity. It would regard it as uncritical to treat them as anything else than psychological. In the first instance at any rate, it would treat the claims of intuition as something which might require confirmation by experience. In this respect truth claims and intuitive moral judgements are fundamentally alike. Both are made constantly and freely and spontaneously, and are chronologically prior to the sciences which criticize them. Hence they form the data from which a prudent theory of logical and ethical values will set out. But the mere fact that truth claims are made does not prove that they are infallible; they may still require confirmation, and God knows they mostly need it!” (Mind, 1909, xviii. 126). We are glad that Schiller so clearly and sharply distinguishes psychological certainty from objective validity. Much that once appeared self-evident has later turned out false. The hypothetical method of induction is accepted by idealist logic. For the central proposition of the idealist theory of truth that there is a coherent and comprehensive system of experience is only a hypothesis.

Inductive science regards laws to be approximate accommodations to reality. They are conceptual shorthand, a labor-saving machinery, possessing only an economic value. When they cease to serve their purpose they are abandoned. Ptolemaic astronomy, Euclidean geometry and Aristotelian logic are examples of theories which were adopted for the sake of their utility for some time, but later considerably modified, if not rejected. The so-called laws of nature do not represent the immutable foundations of reality but only their tendencies. They are man-made formulas for housing events, calculating their past and predicting their future. The absolutist admits that the categories of science are limited in their value. He knows that if these limited
concepts relative to narrow purposes are extended in the whole sphere of reality, they lead to contradictions. Determinism and freedom come into conflict though each principle is true, in its own field, in relation to the purpose for which it is assumed. As a matter of fact, the absolutist contends that all truths except the whole truth are relative. The only necessity of which we are aware is a mediate or hypothetical necessity. Even the mathematical truths are relative to our ideas of space. We have no objection to the view that much that claims to be knowledge is provisional in its nature in the sense that we are content with relative truth, since the idea of absolute truth is yet remote. It is not provisional in the sense that it satisfies some false, subjective and temporary interests. It is also said that the absolutist theory has no room for growth and evolution. "The essential contrast is that for rationalism, reality is ready-made and complete from all eternity, while for pragmatism it is still in the making and awaits parts of its completion from the future" (Pragmatism, p. 237). The absolutist admits the growth and progressiveness of human truth. Truth grows and develops, it outlives stages which are recognised as erroneous. While the absolute truth, which is the ideal, may be looked upon as fixed and immutable in its perfection, human truth is bound to grow till it becomes identical with the absolute. It follows that truth so long as it is human grows, a proposition which is declared to be the distinguishing feature of the pragmatist theory.

On the pragmatist view the question remains unanswered as to why the world lends itself in this process of economising by concepts, why it allows itself to be reduced to systems. If our reasoning attains its ends, it is a proof of the relationship between human intelligence and the nature of things in general. This oneness of things is the pivotal principle of absolutism, and Schiller admits it in discussing the methodological character of eternal truth. "It is evident that unless
the nature of the world had lent itself to a very considerable extent to such interpretation, the assumption of eternal laws would have served our purposes as little as those of astrology, necromancy, chiromancy and calomelancy" (Humanism, p. 104).

Pragmatism can also be traced to the Darwinian hypothesis of evolution. According to this doctrine, consciousness is, like any other organic function, but a means of adaptation in the struggle for existence. The cognitive function is a means for the preservation of the organism. Thought is a product of vital adjustment. Intellect is the organ of will, a form which the will to live must work to meet the new experiences. It has no intrinsic value by itself. Just as the forms of evolution are not immutable and eternal, even so forms of thought are unstable and relative. They grow by adaptations to new conditions. Truth has its history as anything else in this world of evolution. If evolution tells us anything it is that the world is an unceasing flow. There is nothing stable and unchanging in it, and forms of thought are not an exception to this rule. Truths are only guides to reality, and when they fail of their purpose they may be abandoned. Truth is born into the world as any organic form, and perishes when it cannot stand the shock of new demands. The history of truth can be understood not as an attempt to progressively realise an absolute rational order imminent in things, but as the attempt of human intellect to meet the needs of life and action. Mr. Dewey of Chicago contends that thought is a function like other functions originating in determinate needs. Its occasion is a situation of conflict or tension, and thought intervenes to re-establish the equilibrium of the system and thus preserve the integrity of experience. The whole function of thought lies in this work of restoration or re-integration. The validity of thought lies in effecting the transition from a conflicting situation to an integrated experience. But this whole account rests on a confusion between the
psychological and the epistemological. Truth may be due to needs of life, but our question is, what is its nature. The theory of evolution declares that the origin of intellect is due to the vital necessities, in which case we cannot subscribe to the divine right of reason to be inviolable. There are certain laws in accordance with which we act in our search for truth. These laws form the basis of all our knowledge. The objects presented to the mind, the problems set, in other words, the empirical contents of consciousness change and vary, but not so the principles of truth. The relativity of truth to the needs of man requires explanation. Ideas would not help us long in the struggle for existence if they did not conform to objective reality. Suppose the world were completely irrational, what could human intelligence do in such a case? The concept is useless because nature is not a flux. There is a harmony between human intelligence and the structure of reality. If the two were essentially different we would have to give up the attempt of knowledge. They are a manifestation of a higher reality which reveals itself in both. We may say that reality attains its full stature in truth and thought.¹

Pragmatism represents a revolt against the abstract and vicious intellectualism which ignores the other sides of human nature. The rise of the new psychology, with its emphasis on will and purpose, resulted in an exhibition of the weakness of abstract intellectualism, which seeks satisfaction of the mind in the scholastic logico-chopping gymnastics. The extravagances of pragmatism may also be traced to this revolt against the ‘inhuman’ philosophies of naturalism and absolutism. In both these theories everything is logically necessary. All are on the same level, and there is no distinction of values. If an idealist like Kant opens the back door to them, it is very curious that Bergson, who contends that intellect is relative to its material, should, to suit his convenience, forget this truth and urge that intellect is always dead and mechanical, and is therefore to be condemned.

¹ It is very curious that Bergson, who contends that intellect is relative to its material, should, to suit his convenience, forget this truth and urge that intellect is always dead and mechanical, and is therefore to be condemned.
critics are ready to put them down as subjective aspirations which have no logical standing place in the hall of truth. They do not belong to the world of reality but are dreams floating in the chasms of fancy. Philosophical and religious skepticism seems to be the outcome, and we have to erect moral and religious faith on it. In the reaction against absolutism, while romanticists affirm the necessity of faith or intuition as a substitute for knowledge or reason, the pragmatists assert that knowledge itself is faith and reason is intuition.

It is said that absolutism criticizes human experience not from the standpoint of human experience, but from the visionary and impracticable standpoint of an absolute experience. It has no intelligible doctrine of error, while, as we shall see, pragmatism propounds a philosophy of error which is famous for its simplicity if for nothing else. Truth claims which do not work are errors, while those which do are truths. We have purposes, and if they are furthered by beliefs we have truths, and if thwarted by them we have errors. This is a simple view and will be true if we substitute for purposes the expression, the supreme purpose of the harmonious adjustment of the elements of reality.

The constructive activity of the subject in the elaboration of knowledge and the supremacy of will over intellect are due to the philosophy of Kant and recent advances in psychology. The postulatory character of knowledge and the experimental nature of truth-making are traceable to the modern inductive or scientific method. The evolutionary hypothesis gets the credit for the practical nature of intellect and the relativity of truths to human ends. The inspiration for absorbing these different elements into a new creed of philosophy finds its source in the emotional revolt against the rigors of the logical intellect and the barrenness of the absolute. In passing, we have referred to the extent to which these several sources might be rightly utilized. In the next section we shall further pursue this topic.
What is the pragmatist theory of truth? James answers this question by saying: "Truth is one species of good, and not, as is usually supposed, a category distinct from good and co-ordinate with it. The truth is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite assignable reasons. Surely you must admit this, that if there were no good for life in true ideas, or if the knowledge of them were positively disadvantageous, and false ideas the only useful ones, then the current notion that truth is divine and precious, and its pursuit a duty, would never have grown up or become a dogma. In a world like that our duty would be to shun truth rather" (Pragmatism, p. 75). We need not dispute the proposition that truth is a species of good if it only means that it is a form of value, something intrinsically valuable. Truth is one form of value as moral good is another. This cannot mean that the true is the same as the good; but it seems to be James's meaning. For he says: "The possession of truth, so far from being here an end in itself, is only a preliminary means towards other vital satisfactions" (ibid., p. 203). Schiller writes: "Nothing more is required of a truth than that it should be relevant to a specific situation, valuable for a purpose, and the most satisfactory answer to a question" (Riddles of the Sphinx, p. 133). The purpose may be ethical or aesthetic. Beliefs may be practically valuable, as so many fictions have been, and they have to be regarded as true. The 'true' thus becomes confused with other values. Against this contention we defend the independence and the intrinsic worth of truth. It is not a subordinate species of the ethical good. The true is not to be confused with the good or the beautiful, though all the three are to be found in the ultimate reality. They are 'distinct' which we must carefully discriminate, while we should beware of any suggestion of their final incon-
purity. It is the ambiguity of the word 'good' that causes confusion here. Truth is a good, a form of value. It is logical value, in the words of Schiller. But the logical 'good' is distinct from the moral 'good,' though both are species of 'good' in general. Truth is a primary value quite as fundamental and ultimate as any other kind of value. It is what satisfies the logical purpose. Schiller admits this view when he urges, "in all actual knowing, the question whether an assertion is true or false is decided uniformly and very simply. It is decided, that is, by its consequences." (Studies in Humanism, p. 154). We need not debate this proposition if by consequences we meant theoretical consequences, effects on the system of knowledge. Speaking of the validation of truth claims, Dr. Schiller admits that "the validation of such claims proceeds by the pragmatic test, that is, by experience of their effect upon the bodies of established truth which they affect" (Ibid., pp. 157-158). Again, "The true is what forwards, and the false is that which thwarts a human purpose (primarily logical), or, in other words, true and false are the forms of logical value" (Ibid., No. 59, p. 359). Schiller here recognizes that true and false are logical values and not ethical. Truth is a purposive effort, but the purpose is not any temporarily superficial private one, but a deeplying logical or cognitive purpose of understanding reality. Reality is not here looked upon as a means to the satisfaction of social or practical ends, but as that in which the will to know can find its fulfillment. The one supreme logical interest is the unifying of all experience, and the harmonizing of all contradictions. But there is also to be seen a tendency to confuse logical with ethical values. Schiller writes: "There is no reason to set up a peculiar process of verification for the satisfying of a purely intellectual interest, different in kind from the rest, superior in dignity, and autocratic in authority. For there is no pure intellect." (Studies in Humanism, p. 7). While it is true that all
intellectual interests have their own mental contexts, this does not justify us in repudiating the reality of purely cognitive interests. Intellectual interests are always found in union with emotions and desires, but it does not follow that there are no intellectual interests at all. Schiller asks, "Real means real for what purpose, to what end, to what use?" (Kantsches, p. 71). He makes much of the different purposes which inspire different sciences, but this does not touch the point at issue. To say that different sciences put different questions and get different answers does not support the pragmatist theory. The wealth of experience requires that it should be studied in all its aspects. The limitations of man compel him to abstract from some and concentrate on others. Dr. Schiller quotes from the Niemeyer's Ethics of Aristotle the statement that "in the case of intelligence, which is theoretical, and neither practical nor productive, its good and bad is truth and falsehood" (Studies in Humanism, p. 153). We agree with this view, and hold that truth is a form of value, and it satisfies our purpose. We only say that this purpose is one of theory. Truth is practical in the sense that it fulfills one side of our nature, the will to know. It has its own right, which is quite as fundamental as that of the will to do or the will to enjoy. Life is not only worth living as morality says, or worth living as art declares, but is also worth knowing as science and philosophy announce. Knowledge is not always sought after as a means to conduct, but is also pursued for its own sake, for the theoretical satisfaction it brings. Logic fulfills a part of our being. In any other sense it is wrong to reduce the cognitive attitude to the practical, however much they may be related.

If there is one point more than another emphasized by modern psychology, it is the purposive character of mental life. Pragmatism rightly insists on this purposiveness of thought. All meaning depends on purpose. Truth inquiry is for the fulfilling of an intellectual interest. But the mistake of pragmatism lies in confusing the
deeper need or impulse of logic with the temporary interests and purposes in which it is wrapped up. It forgets the existence of the underlying dominating will to know, and considers the fleeting purposes and superficial phases to be the sole reality. There is the structural need of intellect to remove contradictions, and this is the impulse in logical thinking. Special needs, which set to us special problems, are the outward expressions of the underlying demand of intellect to clear up contradiction. Because the logical impulse is mixed up with temporary purposes, the pragmatist concludes that thought is sporadic, being occasioned by special needs and purposes. Absolutism maintains that all consciousness is judgement, one continuous affirmation, though we become conscious of this fact when the needs and purposes are deeply felt. The principle of rationality operates throughout our life: we become conscious of it when the striving to get rid of irrationality meets with obstacles and checks. "Just as we feel no particular pleasure when we breathe freely, but an intense feeling of distress, when the respiratory motions are prevented," even so, James says, "any perfectly fluent course of thought awakens but little feeling," but "when the thought meets with difficulties we experience distress" (The Science of Rationality). Even the Protagorean formula that man is the measure of all things is approved of by the idealists; they only contend that it is not the superficial individual selfish man that is the measure, but the true human being with his effort to know, to will, and to love. The world conforms to the true nature of man. We admit that these fundamental needs exist as elements in consciousness. But because thought is truly a part of concrete mental life, it does not follow that we should study in logic the psychological structure of the whole, of which thought is an integral element, for the validity of thought does not depend on the variable and contingent facts of conscious life. We can stand apart from personal idiosyncrasies, but still determine the
value of thought. "Because we can abstract from the personal peculiarities of this man or that," Dr. Schiller argues, "it does not follow that we can abstract from all men." (Studies in Humanism, p. 64). We agree. If we eliminate the personal prejudices and understand the common character, then it is the logical need to know operating in mental life, whatever its particular applications be, that strikes our attention.

When the pragmatist says that the true will be ultimately useful, we have no quarrel with him. Man's real nature is so far dependable that truth must satisfy his fundamental needs. Things have laws of their own which are not extraneous to the nature of intelligence. The whole world is an organism with basal affinities between its members. Again, it is said, if the truth were positively dangerous and disadvantageous, we would not pursue it. It has a relation to life. It has practical consequences worth discussing. If it makes no real difference which of two rival statements is true, then there is no real difference between the two. Dr. Peirce in his essay on "How to make our ideas clear," in the Popular Science Monthly of January 1878, points out that if our beliefs are really rules for action, and to develop a thought's meaning we have only to determine what conduct it is fitted to produce. It is the same principle that ideas influence our practice that Shadworth Hodgson emphasizes when he declares that reality is what it is known as. The truth which has no practical consequences is a meaningless one. If the lesson of all this is to tell us that thought has its application in conduct, theory in life, we have no objection. There is no question that the concrete meaning of life is enriched in different ways by theories.

But when James asserts that the true is the expedient in the way of our believing, as the good is the expedient in the way of our acting, then his view is open to question. Schiller supports James sometimes in a similar, sometimes in a bolder spirit. "As regards the objects
valued as true, truth is that manipulation of them which turns out on trial to be useful primarily for any human end, but ultimately for that perfect harmony of our whole life which forms our final aspiration” (Humanism, p. 67). The timidity of thought, which induces Schiller to admit perfect harmony of life to be the ultimate ideal, is abandoned when he says that truth will have to be decided by “its consequences, by its bearing on the interest which prompted the assertion, by its relation to the purpose which put the question” (Studies in Humanism, pp. 154–155). Our ideas are true if they answer to the needs which give them birth, if they fit the designs for which we have shaped them, if they lead to the desirable results. Truth is determined by utility; its test is satisfaction. This view justifies the relativity of truth, and in a sense vindicates the relative and national truths which this war has created. Truth is yoked to policy. It is adaptable to the purposes of the state. Pragmatism readily admits that what is true for one may be false for another. The same raw material may give rise to different versions of truth. We have the news now recalled to the Cabinet Ministers, the House of Commons, the citizens of the British Empire, the Allies, the neutrals and the enemies. The same fact is adapted to different ends, and so assumes different shapes. The worst superstitions of the world can be defended on this hypothesis. It is good to believe that there is a hangman’s whip in the other world, as it is likely to make people less wicked. “Now whatever its residual difficulties may be, experience shows that it certainly does work, and that the problem is . . . to determine it so that it will combine with all the working truths” (Pragmatism, p. 293). Apologists for various doctrines take shelter in the philosophy of pragmatism. It is suited to be the philosophy for the masses. It has nothing to do with the purely intellectual and objective pursuit of knowledge. It seems to support faith in the crude sense as the power of believing that which we other-
wise know to be untrue. Satisfaction of individual beliefs is its criterion. Only the solutions which pragmatism offers remain subjective and anarchical. Thought instead of removing the subjectivity and the fragmentariness of the individual mind rivets the chains and confines him to his prison, adding the legend that the prison is the house of truth. That truth has practical consequences, that it begins and grows in accord of human needs and interests, that truth is not a mere copy or reproduction of reality, and that reality is a construction are propositions quite agreeable to speculative idealism. But when pragmatism treats with contempt serious attempts to solve philosophical problems in a scientific spirit, and rests its dogmas on religious beliefs and instinctive needs, it gives up all pretensions to the claim of a philosophical method. The test of truth lies in its relation to the human will and purpose no doubt. But, as Dr. Schiller admits, there is the will to know, which is not different from the will to consistency, and no truth can really be useful and satisfactory unless it is consistent with itself and with the whole. James also insists on this aspect of truth, "After man's interest in breathing freely, the greatest of all his interests is his interest in consistency" (Meaning of Truth, p. 231). It is not therefore practical utility but intellectual utility that is the test. The true is the useful in the sense of co-ordinating our experiences into a consistent whole. It is not the convenient and the appetible, but the rational and the coherent.

So long as we believe in the rationality of the universe, truth includes something more than utility. If a theory allows us to play our part well in the world, if it works, it is because it is true. There is all the difference in the world between "It is useful because it is true" and "It is true because it is useful." The first statement is right and the second wrong. James is wrong in thinking that the two mean exactly the same thing. "True is the name for whatever idea starts the verification process, useful is the
name for its completed function in experience" (Pragmatism, p. 204). If an idea is verified, and if it is found to harmonize with the rest of experience, then it is no doubt useful as it satisfies the intellectual needs; only in this sense is the useful the same as the true, but it is not the pragmatic sense. There are degrees of usefulness, and any degree of usefulness is not truth. A theory is true when it is useful in the sense of reflecting the nature of the real, leading "us towards other moments of experience which it will be worth while to have been led to" (Pragmatism, p. 205). If 'use' is taken in a narrow sense of serviceability for particular ends or adaptations to external acts, we emphasize only a part of truth. Coherence not with this or that aspect but with the whole of experience is the essence of truth. Truth is a guide to reality and not to the satisfaction of our wishes. And this is the idealist notion of truth. Reality as it is felt is the actual; reality as the ideal is a harmonious experience, and absolutism contends that it this logical ideal has not also a metaphysical reality. Our logical enterprise becomes a large joke. While coherence with the whole is the real test, unaccountability to bits of experience is generally a sign of truth. Working is a symptom of truth, but not its nature. The pragmatist theory suffers from a confusion between truth and the recognition of truth.

As another illustration of the same confusion we may give the pragmatist's opinion that the true is the satisfying. No doubt satisfaction is a sign of truth, but it is not its essence. The true satisfies as the will to know is fulfilled. Fulfilled desire gives satisfaction. A belief satisfies because it is true, but we cannot say it is true because it satisfies. It is a fundamental tenet of idealism that the universe as rational will satisfy man's will to know, as an object of enjoyment, his aesthetic needs and as a field of service his ethical demands. A philosophical hypothesis satisfies when it is true, that is, when it furnishes us with a fruitful rendering of the world of experience. This James admits, when he says: "Truth in science is
what gives us the maximum possible sum of satisfactions, taste included, but consistency, both with previous truth and with novel fact, is always the most imperious claimant" (Pragmatism, p. 217). The contradictory is the unsatisfactory. The non-contradictory is the satisfactory. The struggle of thought is to avoid the contradictory. And this striving is a part of the great cosmic process (see Humanism, p. 188).

Schiller argues that "the practical value of scientific conceptions has accelerated and determined their acceptance" (Humanism, p. xiii). This does not prove that the practical value converts stimulating falsehoods into truths. The practical value selects truths, popularises them, but does not determine our acceptance of them as truths.

There cannot be truths which are unverified. Every truth must be tested with regard to its capacity to fit the relevant facts. In this sense the truth of an assertion depends on its application. Pragmatism rightly stresses the need for verification and experiment. The utility of useless unverifiable knowledge is evident to all. If in the process of verification we find any idea theoretically untenable, it is put down as false; if not, it is true. But pragmatism has its own theory of verification. An idea is verified if in the guidance of action it serves as a substitute for an immediate perception. That is, the idea must agree with the perception in the sense that the two prompt the same action (see Pragmatism, p. 215). It is the functional identity that the pragmatist requires. As immediate experience is looked upon as more real than the theoretical construction, the ultimate test according to pragmatism is whether an idea leads to the right perception or not. But this is not the only kind of verification. Even where complete perceptual verification is out of question, we may apply the criterion of coherence. The same confusion between truth and its recognizance reappears in the pragmatist contention that verification constitutes truth. Verification only helps us
to know the truth, but does not make truth. But still James says: "Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events." (Pragmatism, p. 201; see also Studies in Humanism, p. 179).

IV

There is no question that if the pragmatist theory is interpreted in the way in which its supporters wish us to interpret it, it is entirely subjective. It becomes difficult for the pragmatist to account for the common world by reference to which we lead our life. Truth is not the private property of any one, but is possessed by all. Schiller admits that the individualities of interests, and purposes and points of view are negligible or relatively subordinate, when compared with the common ideals and universal impulses which inspire the progress of humanity. Schiller recognizes the danger of subjectivism to which pragmatism lies open, and tries to remedy it. He says: "Even in the individual there is a good deal of regulation of the individual's subjective valuations; there is a tendency to the consolidation and subordination of interests under the main purposes of his life. Hence many of his initial interests will be suppressed, and the valuations which ministered to them will tend to be withDrawn, to be judged useless, and ultimately false." (Humanism, p. 58). We cannot therefore say that anything which satisfies any interest is true. We have to find out the main interests of life, and whatever satisfies them is true. So Schiller says, that though truth is motived by desire and emotion, though thought is guided by interest, there is the security that the subjective valuations will disappear and the objectively true experiences will survive. There is the social factor to be taken into account, for man is not a Cruise with a desert island for the world. "Even though every truth may start in a minority of one, its hold upon existence is exceedingly precarious unless it can contrive to get itself more exten-
sively appreciated. Those unfortunate enough to have acquired and retained an exclusive view of truth are usually secluded in prisons or asylums" (Humanism, p. 58). This social recognition is sometimes made the result and sometimes the cause of truth (see Humanism, p. 59). But majority opinions and beliefs of the multitude are not necessarily true. The question of truth is not to be decided by feeling, whether individual or social. Our experiences as felt are neither true nor false. It is the interpretations we put upon them and their rationality that would help us in evaluating beliefs.

The subjectivism of pragmatism is due also to the idea that nature is entirely plastic and can be moulded to human desires. But the facts of life contradict the view that reality has nothing determinate about it. We cannot adapt nature to any and every wish and whim. We have to yield to nature, stoop to conquer in many cases. If nature is so entirely plastic and fluid, that we can determine it as we please, how is it that we meet so often with failure? When we do not bend to nature but try to bend it, we do so at our risk. Facts do not always say what we wish them to say. It shows that there is a resisting power in the environment. The evolutionary concepts of adaptation, natural selection, etc., presuppose that there is a nature independent of us which selects us only on condition that we adapt ourselves to it. There is no meaning in the phrase adaptation to environment, if the environment is only that which we wish it to be. For struggle, progress, etc., presuppose the persistence of nature and its resistance to man. Dr. Schiller adopts the Aristotelian theory of matter as the potentiality of whatever form we succeed in imposing upon it. Out of the raw material we can develop forms of life in which our spirit can find its satisfaction. Though we do not know the exact extent to which nature is plastic, still Schiller asks us to assume that it is wholly plastic, "to act as though we believed this." While the idea is highly invigorating and helps to increase
our sense of importance and responsibility in the world, it is not true. Reality is not all of our making. There are other forces at work. Again, the pragmatist's idea of shaping our reality to suit human ends requires that reality should have some fixity about it. If it is a mere mere of incoherency or caprice we cannot make either head or tail of it. What succeeds this moment may not succeed at the next. If reality should be of such a protean nature as to take different forms at different moments, then there is no question of true or false, successful or unsuccessful. Everything succeeds, and therefore everything is right and true.

As the theory of absolute plasticity conflicts with the plain man's belief and leads to deadlocks, the pragmatists hit upon compromises. Mr. Dewey allows that the organic situation which provokes thought has some determinations about it. James admits that sensations come to us and we have no control over their nature and order. There are relations which are thrust upon us and are not thought constructions. But when James asserts that truth is not a reproduction of a perfect reality but only a process of gradual completion through the activity of thinking beings, he seems to allow that sensations and their relations are not given. For if they are given to us and are only to be apprehended by us, where is the need for the spiritual activity of man? We cannot conceive reality to be independent of thought. For that commits us to a thing in itself behind experience. When James insists upon the activity of the subject he is logically bound to hold that there is no reality behind experience, and in experience we have a steady growth from an indeterminate flux into a rounded whole. James insists upon the givenness of sensations and relations only to intimate to us that the world which we accept as our starting-point is determinate in a real extent in that it is determinable only on certain lines. Absolute plasticity is therefore abandoned. As James clearly says: "Between the contents of the sensible order and
those of the ideal order, our mind is wedged tightly. Our ideas must agree with the realities, be such realities concrete or abstract, be they facts or be they principles, under penalty of endless inconsistency and frustration." Schiller in accounting for the objectivity of the world, points out how the individuals are constrained to think in a particular manner at the peril of their lives. He also admits the sensible core of reality. There are sensations and relations forced on us which we have to take account of. Pragmatism in the last analysis repudiates the suggestion that each individual makes his own truth according to his own needs and pleasure. There are other persons with their experiences and beliefs, and there are also lines determined for us and not by us along which alone reality can be constructed (see Mises, xiii. 403). Pragmatism therefore recognises the reality of an objective world. We cannot call this common world a mere abstraction from individual worlds. For a world with only the common features would be an unreality. It must be the whole including the individual and the universal, the whole which lives in the parts, the whole which though at no time completely embodied in any individual, is still the animating ideal of every individual's life.

V

Reality is an experience. In its fulness it is not an original datum. It has to be apprehended through a process of ideal construction. Truth grows by interaction between thought and reality. Pragmatic principles which are valuable in the upward progress cannot be looked upon as metaphysical realities. We only mean that there are certain features of our life, which it is useful to describe in terms of pragmatism. But the pragmatist logic, we have seen, commits us to the absolutist metaphysics. To escape from subjectivism, pragmatism is forced to admit that reality which in experience is not the experience of the individual subject,