CHAPTER VI
BERGSON AND ABSOLUTE IDEALISM (continued)

I

While the absolutist holds to a teleological conception of the universe, rejecting mechanism, Bergson rejects both. But to make his system consistent and satisfactory, Bergson is obliged to admit teleology. For Bergson, reality is creative evolution. It is spontaneous creative process. Time is the very substance of reality. Mechanism and teleology both reduce time to an empty appearance, and rob the universe of everything in it which is unique and novel. The universe is determined by a first cause, according to mechanism, by a final cause according to teleology. Mechanism regards "the future and the past as calculable functions of the present," and claims that all is given (C. E. p. 34). The world of nature becomes a mechanism in which there is no room for the novel, the unique and the individual. If we cannot grasp the whole universe in one comprehensive vision, it is due to our mental insufficiency. Nor do we fare better with teleology, which conceives the world as the realization of an absolute purpose. If the world is the working out of a prearranged plan, the cosmic process is non-creative. The world is committed to an externally imposed programme. Real time and duration become futile. The end is inevitable. There is no risk, no failure, no uncertainty. But for Bergson nothing is inevitable. Everything is in the making. "There is
radical contingency in progress, incommensurability between what goes before and what follows, in short, duration" (C. E. p. 30). Time is supremely significant and real. Both mechanism and teleology go against the central conceptions of Bergson's philosophy. In both everything is given ready-made from the first. Only teleology substitutes the pull of the future for the push of the past. It is inverted mechanism. Whether the individual is the result of the interaction of atoms or only a passing thought of God there is no place for the individual with his freedom and individuality.

But is Bergson's account of the nature of creative evolution correct? Is it an incessant flow without any plan or purpose? Does it not reveal a tendency or a fulfillment of end or purpose? Are we to think that this process of eternal change follows no end and pursues no purpose? In his anti-teleologist bias he regards the absolute as an eternal immutability making all agitation and disquiet illusory. And so Bergson starts with his conception of reality as becoming, but this leaves so room for rest and stability. Perpetual flux is the real. Bergson's cosmic principle seems to be the mirror of the twentieth-century soul which lives in an atmosphere of constant hustle and excitement in a perennial mainstream of events. The world becomes unintelligible caprice since the creative principle is looked upon as obeying no laws, and fulfilling no ends. In short, absolute chaos would prevail, in which nothing rational could be undertaken. Unbridled force or mere change without a controlling element would mean death or confusion. Chaos is God. In a world of such absolute caprice, man will have to shut his shop and descend into dust at the earliest opportunity. It is impossible that Bergson should mean all that he says when he is emphasizing the absence of teleology. It
cannot be that he is satisfied with a world without rhyme or reason.

If the world is only a bundle of disconnected states, if it is only a series of falsehoods, we cannot be sure that the world is progressing at all. How can we be sure that the changes are all in the right direction? Unless we have a whole which is present throughout the universe, we cannot have any guarantee of progress. In its absence the world would be mere caprice, purposeless growth. What appears to us would be the ultimate reality. If the world with its horror and imperfection were the sole reality, if there were not in it a stable spiritual purpose which is working for the values and ideals of spirit, then we should be compelled to view the universe as a great tragedy indeed. If faith in the whole, faith in the possibility of harmony in the world is absent, what is there to inspire effort? Bergson cannot hold to any such conception of an irrational durée which throws no light on the heaps of happenings we call the world; for "an absolutely irrational durée might suddenly stop creating, explode, go into nothing and refuse to come back; its creation might be like the frenzies of a madman, or the ravings of genius run mad."1 Bergson is sure enough to shrink from any such conception. As much as any absolutist he holds to a conception of an identity in difference, a whole in the world. Even with him all is given. Nothing comes into existence that was not there before. Bergson’s creative principle does not create out of nothing. If the new existences were to be sudden and abrupt, having no relation to the past, they would have to be put down as mechanical additions from without. But Bergson, with idealists, thinks that they are developments from within. The life impulse contains an infinite number of possibilities. It is an "immensity of potentiality." (C. E., p. 372?) Bergson is wrong in thinking that nothing is given. The creative principle, like the Leibnizian monad, is self-sufficient and has all the

1 Frank Thilly in the Philosophical Review, xxiii. 277.
potencies in it. The "organised world is a harmonious whole" (p. 53). The whole is an organic development where every stage is the sum of its preceding stages. There is enough of law and regularity in the working of the creative principle. The items of the creative evolution obey order and are not irrational. The clash vital battles with matter and overcomes it. Though Bergson does not admit the conception of a fixed goal towards which the process of evolution is tending, he still holds to the reality of a conscious tendency. Bergson does not say that the flux of the world is the whole. He postulates a God who is "the source whence issue successively, by an effect of his freedom, the currents or impulses each of which will make the world." He does not think that "what has always existed is the world itself" (Bergson's letter quoted in pp. 42-43 of Henri Bergson, the Life and Philosophy, Robe and Paul). Henri Bergson clearly tells us that the world of change is not the all, but there is a God who is the source of it. There is unity of direction which ensures that there is no ambiguity, at least, no chance in the ultimate. Thus Bergson is obliged to admit that while reality is a flux in one sense, in another it has a static aspect. Viewed from within, the cosmic process appears to be a plurality of individuals; from within, it appears a unity of energy. Bergson is not a monist if monism is wrongly interpreted so as to exclude plurality. But in the true sense of the word, he is a monist, as the plurality is the outcome of the original unity.

But when Bergson recognises the reality of a whole in which changes occur he cannot say that time is the ultimate reality. So if progress is to be assured, there must be a whole, and if there is a whole then time is not the absolute reality. As Bradley puts it, "If there is to be no supreme spiritual power which is above chance and change, our own spiritual interests are not safeguarded. But with any such power it seems to me no nonsense to talk of the absolute reality of time" (Truth and Reality, foot-note to p. 250).
Bergson frequently reminds us that the nature of reality resembles our psychical life. The only teleology of which we are conscious is the teleology of human life. Every other teleology is an inference. How does our human life proceed? Man aims at and pursues ends. We cannot say that his purposive willing and deliberate adaptation of means to ends freely chosen are all delusions. The presence of purposes freely chosen does not deprive man of his freedom. He is not in the grip of a law of progress imposed from without; for his ideals are set for him not by events, not by law, but by himself. There is novelty also since the course of moral life is the process through which an abstract ideal acquires flesh and blood, colour and perfume. Moral progress depends on new and varied expressions of creative spontaneity and freedom. The ideal is not yet realised, and the process of realisation will be something novel. We have there the novelty of becoming. Teleology operates in human life without depriving it of its freedom and initiative, novelty and occasion. When Bergson admits that the acts though they cannot be foreseen can be accounted for by us when once they occur, he admits that they are embodiments of reason and purpose. Were they really contingent, we could not account for them. "M. Bergson hold that events, which, because they are contingent, even infinite powers of calculation could not foresee, may yet be accounted for even by our very modest powers of thought after they have occurred. I own this somewhat surprises me." (Balfour, Hibbert Journal, x. 13). This would be no surprise if it be admitted that they are not contingent even though they cannot be foreseen. R. L. Stevenson says: "I, as a personal artist, can begin a character with only a name in my head"; but how is I have to translate the base into words before I begin? I can find language for every mood; but how could I
tell anyone beforehand what this effect was to be, which it would take every art I possessed and hours and hours of deliberate selection and rejection to produce?" 1 Ever in such arts of genius, though we cannot foretell, it is still clear that the original inspiration controls the whole process. There is the purpose of the artist present throughout, though it may undergo modifications in the very act of realisation. We do not say that simply because a purpose is present therefore moral life is a mere mechanical adjustment to a purpose imposed from without. Ethical life is a free, spontaneous, creative expression of the total active self of man. We have in it not merely the changing process but also the stable purpose. We do not have a dualism between the process and the purpose, for the process is only the expression of the purpose. If we make the purpose external to the process then the process becomes something externally determined. The two are aspects of the one whole. The process and the purpose evolve together; they are the twin expressions of the concrete life. The end is not predetermined but grows along with the activity of its realization. If then the moral life of man is the free pursuit of self-chosen ideals, cannot the cosmic life be conceived on its analogy? For, after all, the ideas of freedom and novelty are derived from human life. "Dynamism starts from the idea of voluntary activity given by consciousness." The cosmic process may be the free pursuit of ever-growing cosmic ends. As human conduct is free activity and consists in the creative expression of the entire past experience in free acts, even so the world may be viewed as a free spontaneous creativity. Random business without end or aim may result in abortions and misdeeds, but not in genuine creativity. Bergson's creative evolution is a regular continuum; evolution fulfilling plans and purposes. The rich world with its wonderful variety and colour is more

1 I owe this illustration to E. Hering's book on Sweden and Switzerland, p. 164.
the expression of artistic genius than of aimless dilettantism. So a teleology of the highest kind prevails in cosmic evolution. Such is the logical conclusion from Bergson’s frequent insistence on the kinship of the cosmic process to human life. This principle that Reality is of the nature of self-consciousness or spirit is not the discovery of Bergson, even if we confine our attention to Europe. It had been vaguely suggested by philosophers before Kant, half understood by him, taken up by Fichte and Schelling, and completely developed by Hegel. As reality is of the nature of mind, it is a concrete universal or the perfect individual.

IV

It is urged that the absolutist theory which makes the process of the world a mere revelation of the nature of the whole deprives man of his freedom. The work of the universe becomes a twofold task. It adds nothing to the original unity. Reality exists ideally in the Absolute, and the Absolute is experience as it develops in time. This theory takes all as giver, and makes freedom an appearance. It cannot be reconciled with a real time process. If the end is already achieved, then the moral struggle is useless. Reality becomes perfection eternally complete, something to which we can add nothing. But absolutism believes that the principle of wholeness works through man. There is a progressive realisation of the absolute in the world. The analogy of logical inference suggests how it is possible for the whole to be realised in a real process without making the process lose its sense and significance. We speak about the paradox of inference, that the conclusion must be contained in the premises and must also be something new. Both sides of this are true. Even though the conclusion is contained in the premises, it still requires the exercise of the logical intellect to draw it out. In the same manner, even though the essence of the world process is contained in the absolute, still the
effort of man and the process of the world are needed to draw out this essence and make it concrete. We do not say that the movement of thought is either unreal or unnecessary. It is a real activity that creates. Why should we say that the work of the world is either unreal or unnecessary?

V

Bergson may fear that if there be granted an ultimate purpose, then when that purpose is gained the process of the evolution of the universe must come to a full stop. If life were nothing more than the realization of a plan, then when the goal is reached there must be cessation of activity; but for Bergson there is no finality since there is unwending creation. "It is a creation that goes on forever in virtue of an initial movement" (C. F., p. 109). It is so even for the absolutists, since it is impossible for the end to be reached in the time process. The universe can never become the complete expression of reality. For reality is like the complete integer trying to express itself in the terms $\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{4}$. This can go on extending without end but will never reach the limit. The whole remains an ideal only, however much the ideal is realized in the distinctions of the world. It is impossible for us to realize the whole in the finite world. We cannot empty the sea with a shell. We see that Bergson holds to an immanent evolutionary teleology which has the support of the absolutists also.

VI

Bergson believes that intellect is inadequate to the grasp of reality. We need intuition for it. There are some absolutists who are of the same opinion, who hold that intellect gives us the highest knowledge while intuition gives reality. It is only by a rough usage that we can call intuition also a kind of knowledge. For the
intuitive knowledge of these absolutists is really the
intellectual love where the distinctions of intellect cease
to have any applicability. In intuition the soul and the
soul become one. This ineffable unity, they consider,
cannot be described. It is an experience beyond utter-
ance. The individual is lost in the divine eternal essence,
and intellect cannot do justice in the fullness and force
of that experience. But absolutists generally take care
to establish intellectually the reality of that experience.
Were it unreal, art, science and morality would lose their
significance. This all-comprehensive reality is the pre-
sumption of all our existence. In one sense or other
this intuitive experience is admitted by the absolutists,
from the thinkers of the Vedanta downwards. Plato,
Plotinus, Dante, Spinoza, Hegel, Bradley and Bouquet
adopt it in different ways.

But no absolutist identifies it with the immediate data
of sense. His intuition is not crude perception. It is the
exercise of consciousness as a whole; it is mind penetrat-
ed by the heart, knowledge suffused by feeling, intellect
transformed by emotion. Intuitive experiences are the
moments of deepest wisdom which give us glimpses into
the ultimate essence, or the whole which is the true and
the real. Intuition is always viewed as the perfection of
rational experience, since the demand of reason becomes
a fulfilment in it. Intellectual stages will give us only
arguments about it: but they will be unilluminated. In
intuition, on the other hand, the soul meets the real
about which it hears and argues through intellect. In
the light of this fullness of experience which is the
goal of logic, our intellectual knowledge looks relative
and partial but not false. Intuitional experience alone
is whole and absolute, where we feel the essential
identity between the knower and the known. In a sense
this cannot be called knowledge, as the latter depends
upon the existence of the duality between the two. But
the duality is also a unity, and this unitary aspect is
emphasised in intuition. If there is anything that baffles
intellectual apprehension, it is the whole and nothing else. Intuition is a kind of knowledge and a kind of life. Bergson makes it both, but in him it is more a kind of life. For in intuition the knower plunges into the flux of reality and knows that reality from within by being one with it. It is knowledge that swims within the stream of life. Here truth is completely identified with reality. And this consciousness is not knowledge. As Bradley argues, truth when it becomes existential nullifies the distinction between the knower and the known on the basis of which knowledge develops. "Truth, while it is truth, differs from reality, and if it ceased to be different, would cease to be true" (Truth and Reality). Whatever opinion we may have about the soundness of Bradley's doctrine, this much can be safely asserted, that in the intuition of the absolutists the knower no longer regards himself as a particular, though he is that as an existing knower in dealing with others, but as the whole including himself. The point is that intuition with absolutists does not mean a break with our ordinary thought or an inversion of our rational procedure, but is only an expansion or completion of the labour of intellect, a grasp or comprehension which sees things as a whole. It is, in the expression of Wordsworth, reason in its most exalted mood. It is knowledge of the whole or integral experience. As Kant says, the ultimate principles are only ideals to pure reason, while in practical reason they are realities. Matters of faith are also ideas of necessary thought. Intuitive beliefs are to be logically necessitated by intellectual proofs. Intuition pure and simple is likely to land us in difficulties. No intuitive experience can be the basis of a philosophical truth unless intellect endorses it. Without the aid of intellect intuition is not distinct from mystical gazing, and that is no substitute for philosophy. When Bergson makes intuition a kind of life, it becomes impossible of practice. We have true knowledge, he says, when we become one with the real, when the knower and the thing
known become one. "By intuition," Bergson means "that kind of intellectual sympathy by which one sets oneself in the interior of an object in order to coincide with the very reality of that object, with its uniqueness, with that in it, consequently, which cannot be expressed" (Introduction to Mat.). To know reality we must become reality. Intuition is an effort to dissolve into the whole, but how is this possible? How can we know anything else than our own consciousness? How can we become one with, or assimilate the duration of the plant and the insect or a fellow-man or the world? How can we place ourselves in the moving currents of other objects? To know reality, the individuality or the concrete duration of reality must interpenetrate the being of the knower, but the possibility is that when it comes to consciousness it may get fused with his own duration in one blended whole. And when we say that we know the object, we are either drawing upon our imagination or relying on intellect. If we are doing the former, we would be opening the flood-gates to every form of mysticism, emotionalism and sentimentalism. The only chance of agreement among different intuitions seems to be chance. If two people have the same vision they may agree, but their experience will not be authoritative for others. We need somehow to bring Bergson's intuition nearer intellect. It is not life but our knowing consciousness keeping in step with the rhythm of the duration of the object intuited. It is only if we make intuition intellectual that there is any chance of communicating our intuitions to others. Were it not intellectual, how can an individual who has felt the duration of his own life assume that other people have the same experience? What is it that compels him to think that the essence of the world is of the same nature as his own consciousness? Intuition reveals to us only our inner life. How can we get from it a conception that shall embrace life as a whole? It has been the tendency of philosophers to make a part express the nature of the
whole, and Bergson finds the nature of consciousness a perpetual unfolding or creation, and so it is brought to hold that what is true of the most intimate depths of our inner life furnishes the model according to which we may represent all other reality. But that the whole reality is of the same nature as the self, Bergson cannot assume. No intuition can give rise to this view. It is due to thought. Even if we assume for argument's sake that intuition can give us the truth of our inner life, it is thinking that enables us to grasp the true nature of everything else than our consciousness. Bergson admits this when he says that "dialectic is necessary to put intuition to the proof, necessary also in order that intuition should break itself into concepts and so be propagated to other men" (C. E. p. 257). Intuition has to be supported and supplemented by reason. Intuition when unguided by reason becomes instinct, and when supported by it it becomes divine and creative intuition. Intuition of the right sort will give us truths satisfactory to reason. Reason must sit in judgement over the findings of intuition and evaluate them. Absolute idealism has faith in the hidden harmonies of the universe, because they are to it matters of logical demonstration. The faith of absolute idealism is rational faith.

Bergson concedes to the co-operation between faith and reason, intuition and intellect: "It is impossible to have an intuition of reality, i.e. an intellectual sympathy with its innermost nature, unless its confidence has been won by long familiarity with its external manifestations." Again, "it is reality itself in the profoundest meaning of the word that we reach by the combined and progressive development of science and philosophy" (C. E. p. 199). In these passages Bergson recognises that intuition need not throw overboard the results of intellect, but should only caution the work begun by intellect. "It is from intelligence that has come the push that has made it rise to the point it has reached" (p. 187). Here Bergson has not identified his
intuition with uncriticised experience or untested feeling, but has clearly advocated a middle ground between the two, science and philosophy. "Notwithstanding his high valuation of intuition, he thought it should always be tested by verification, regarding intuition as a valuable guide-board, but one that, like other guide-boards, might point wrong." (Miller's Bergson and Religion, p. 79). We clearly see that Bergson's intuition is not emotional mysticism, but comes very near Spinoza's intellectual love, or Kant's practical reason, or Schelling's intellectual intuition. But still we cannot class Bergson with the absolutists, as a different view of the relation between the two, intellect and intuition, runs throughout his writings. His distrust of intellect is so great that it is enough to make us pause before we venture to rank him as an absolute idealist in his view of this problem.

Though Bergson comes very near the absolutists when he asserts that intellect gives us partial accounts of reality, still he breaks away from them when he holds that it does not touch reality at all. We have not much to choose between Bergson and the absolutists if he asserts that while both intellect and intuition give us knowledge of reality, one does it fully and perfectly, while the other does it partially and imperfectly. St. Paul says, "We know in part" (1 Cor. xiii. 9). Bergson sometimes, and the absolutist always, holds to this doctrine. This is the only view that can make Bergson's philosophy logical and consistent. But the other view that intellect distorts and mutilates reality is the more prominent doctrine in Bergson and gives uniqueness to his system. He wants us to grasp reality without the intervention of intellectual formulas. Our mind should become one with the central stream of life, and should not allow itself to be diverted from it by the fixed forms of intellect towards matter which owes its existence to the necessities of action. We must take reality by storm, seize it by a direct effort of intuition. We must catch reality on the wing without allowing reflection to settle on it to
reduce it to a series of states. Intellect cannot grasp reality as it is. It can only arrest it, break it up, schematize it. Bergson agrees with the pragmatists in thinking that intellect is an instrument of action. It is valuable in the world of inert matter where mechanism reigns, where there is nothing living, no individuality, no inwardsness. It can well describe the things at rest. When intellect tries to construct a picture of the universe it gives us a skeleton of skin and bone, and not a body of flesh and blood. Intellect misses the meaning of the whole and gives us relative symbolic pictures. It gives us snapshots of life while intuition seizes its movement. Intellect scratches only the surface of reality while intuition is needed to grasp its meaning. This view is due to an inadequate appreciation of the nature of reality as well as of intellectual activity.

Reality is looked upon by Bergson as a flow, a duration. Intellect cannot grasp duration but only that which endures. It makes of reality, which is a ceaseless flow in pure duration, a static motionless appearance. If intellect attempts to deal with the real it ends by spatializing it. It mechanizes mind. The flow of duration slips between its fingers and in the place of the flow we have a series of juxtaposed concepts. We get for the perpetual flow a set of immobile pictures. Reality, as it is, is beyond the province of intellect. The phenomena of this cannot be squeezed into the rutricies of reason. Life eludes logic. Philosophy must be intuitive while science may be intellectual. "If science is to extend action on things, and if we can act only with inert matter for instrument, science can and must continue to treat the living as it has treated the inert. But in doing so it must be understood that the further it penetrates the depths of life, the more symbolic, the more relative to the contingencies of action the knowledge it supplies to us becomes" (C. E. pp. 298-299). Science treats of the immobile and the lifeless, but what is, is fluid and living. Philosophy dispenses with the symbols and
knows the real. Science, according to the idealist, is viewed as giving us partial and imperfect knowledge of reality, but, according to Bergson, has no ontological significance at all. It is a product of fancy and imagination. "The philosopher must go further than the scientist. Making a clean sweep of everything that is only an imaginative symbol, he will see the material world melt back into a simple flux, a continuity of flowing, a becoming, and he will thus be prepared to discover real duration there where it is still more useful to find it, in the realm of life and consciousness" (C. E. p. 109). There is an absolute distinction between intuition and intelligence, philosophy and science. On this view the absolutist theory that intellect leads to intuition, science in philosophy, becomes a meaningless absurdity.

What is Bergson's distrust of intellect due to? Is he right in thinking that intellect can deal only with the static and the dead, the logical and the mathematical? No. Kant started with a similar view, but in the course of his work got over it. He begins by making intellect logical and mathematical in nature, so that it cannot account for vital and psychical processes. Since reality is looked upon by Bergson as vital and psychical in its nature, intellect which is, according to Bergson, logical and mathematical, becomes abstract and subjective. Intellect becomes limited to the world of inert matter. Mechanical categories will not give the essence of life. Intelect becomes incapable of grasping reality as it is. If we assume that science is identical with mechanism, then this conclusion is inevitable. Science requires supplementation by philosophy. For Bergson, intellect and science are mechanical. "Intuition and intellect represent two opposite directions of the work of consciousness; intuition goes in the very direction of life, intellect goes in the inverse direction" (C. E. p. 267). But Kant revised his starting-point. His work taken as a whole shows that intellect is not purely mechanical. In the Critique of
Practical Reason, and in the Critique of Judgment, ethical and aesthetic categories are also employed. In his Logic Hegel codifies them all. There is no doubt that Kant’s later view, which is practically the same as Hegel’s, is a more rational one than his earlier view. If, following that view, we regard thought as including not only the Kantian categories of understanding but also those of ethical and aesthetic apprehension, Bergson would find that reason is adequate to interpret the whole of experience. Thought would then become an explication of the real. The attitude of doubt and distrust, which ought to have been confined to the pretensions of naturalistic science to interpret the infinite riches of mind and nature, is unlawfully extended to reason as a whole.

Besides the Kantian theory of understanding, the other fact that leads Bergson to think that intellect is mechanical is the consideration that the intellectual man is preeminently a tool-making animal. As the animal consciousness has no control over matter, and cannot make mechanical appliances, and as the intellectual man can do these things easily, it is thought that intellect has been evolved to enable him to control matter and harness it to man’s needs. Bergson admits that man is not only a tool-applying but also a tool-making animal. . . . Intelligence is “the faculty of manufacturing artificial objects, especially tools to make tools.” It is capable of “indefinitely varying the manufacture” (C. E. p. 146).

This means adaptation, or creative construction. Though the application of tools, symbols and concepts may be mechanical, still the first making of them cannot be that. Even Mr. Lindsay thinks that this account does not do justice to the nature of intellect. “The use of the machine may be mechanical but not its invention, for that requires the insight of genius” (Philosophy of Bergson). Knowledge of the universal is an act of spirit, while its application may be a matter of routine. It is an act of spirit or intelligence higher than that of mechanical understanding. So when Bergson grants that by intellect man makes tools,
he also grants that intellect is not mechanical. It then follows that for understanding life and its secrets we do not require a process opposed to intellect.

By the cleavage his metaphysics makes between the world of matter and the world of life and mind, Bergson is led to distinguish between intellect and intuition. Life movement in nature is due to the living pushing itself through matter. Matter is dead while life and consciousness are living. To live is to create and invent. Bergson believes that because intellect mechanises life it has to be overthrown, and we have to take for our pilot intuition or faith. But surely protests against the mechanisation of life do not amount to protests against the use of intellect; for rationalist thinkers since the time of Plato have protested against the mechanisation of life and mind. Rationalism is not bound to treat the universe in such a dead and wooden way. Besides, we have seen how Bergson is wrong in thinking that life and matter are absolutely opposed, as they are only the lower and higher manifestations of spirit. In that case the opposition of thought to life breaks down. Continuity between life and matter means continuity between intuition and intellect. Thought becomes only a progressive interpretation of experience. The logic of Bergson's argument requires us to postulate a continuity of spirit throughout reality, as matter, life, consciousness are only the slowly-developing stages of the one spiritual aspect. Thought becomes adequate to its grasp. Intuition and mechanical understanding become the higher and lower aspects of a process, essentially the same throughout its stages. The philosophical or the intuitive view is that of absolute knowledge, and constitutes the highest kind of intellectual experience, while the mechanical view is the lowest.

Bergson thinks that intellect can deal only with abstract, repeating identities. As reality is concrete and ever creating differences, intellect must confess itself humbled in its presence. It can use words as tools or
symbols. The application of these depends on repetition. Intelllect can never grasp the individuality of the real, but can only reconstitute it "with given and consequently stable elements" (C. E. p. 173). Intelllect is here reduced to a bare apprehension of identity. Dr. Bosanquet has subjected this doctrine to a careful examination (see Logic, vol. ii., on "A Defective Formulation of the Inductive Law of Reasoning"). He considers it incorrect to say that intellect is inadequate to the grasping of mere identities. We can understand only an identity in difference. Bergson is wrong in thinking that intellect cannot deal with novelty. Psychology tells us that consciousness hampers when the same situation occurs again and again. Then the responding movement becomes automatic. It is only when a new situation arises, when the accustomed action is not adequate to it that consciousness appears on the scene. It is only then that intelligence has to devise a fresh action and react to it. Bergson admits all this when he says that the function of intellect is not merely to repeat a movement, but to reply to a new need. This is as good as granting that intellect has a capacity to deal with novelties and changed situations. It is quibbling to argue that though intellect deals with novelties, it does so by way of rearranging old elements or regrouping given parts. It is hard to conceive that when intellect is confronted by a new situation, what it does is to first break it up pieces, affiliate them all with old elements, and then apply set rules. Viewing varied and different situations in the light of universal principles is not a mechanical act in which we break the given to pieces and then apply the calculating machine. It is an act of intelligence which is much more than a mere mechanical repetition. It is the act of binding together a manifold by means of an identity. It is replying to a new situation. It is the adaptation of response to stimulus and not routine repetition. The truth contained in Bergson's view is that intellect cannot deal with mere difference, but only with sameness in difference. But
Bergson is wrong in thinking that it can deal only with absolute identities. Intellect will admit its insufficiency and confess its impotence in the presence of absolute difference as well as absolute sameness. But both these are unreal. What is, is an identity in difference. However much Bergson might protest against the description of reality or creative evolution as an identity in difference, our discussion of the relation of life to matter and mechanism and teleology has revealed that Bergson is compelled to consider the world as an identity in difference. Creative evolution is a concrete, universal binding together the different parts into a whole. If reality is a system, then, instead of the intellect being inadequate to its grasp, it is only to its grasp that it is inadequate. "So far from its being true that an organic unity is something that we cannot understand, it would be nearer the truth to say that we can understand nothing else" (CITED, The Philosophy of Kant, vol. ii, p. 330). "All the charges of narrowness, hardness, meaninglessness which are so often directed against thought from the quarters of feeling and immediate perception rest on the perversity assumption that thought acts only as a faculty of abstract identification" (Royal Encyclopaedia, Sec. 125, Wallace's translation). It is this abstract view of intellect that makes Bergson think that intellect dooms everything that comes within its paralyzing influence. The whole difficulty is due to a failure to appreciate the true nature of logical process and intellectual activity. Intellect is not merely repetitious but also constructive and creative. It can create novelties and understand novelties, for they are not only differences but also identities in difference. Creative genius in science, art and fiction is only the highest form of intellect. It is intellect viewed as constructive imagination which leads up to mind in its phase of integral knowing.

Bergson tells us that conceptual knowledge will not give a knowledge of the whole though "we easily persuade ourselves that by setting concept by side of concept, we are reconstructing the whole of the object with its parts,
thus obtaining an in speech its intellectual equivalent. . . .”  
(Introduction to Met., pp. 15-16). Bergson argues that it conception should seize the component parts of the objects, then the pulling together of the concepts may perhaps result in the knowledge of the whole. But concepts give us only partial views, expressions or notations, and not real parts. If concepts could give us real parts we could fit them into objects and acquire the total vision, but what can we do with a mere notation or a scheme of symbols? Reality is movement or life, while concepts are timeless, immobile and dead. It is impossible for the dead inert concept to give us parts of living movement. As soon as intellect touches life, it solidifies and even the part becomes dead. Conceptual knowledge is symbolic only. It gives us dead symbols of live reality. “Intelligent substitutes for the interpretation of real terms: the juxtaposition of their symbols” (I, and F. W. p. 134). We cannot reproduce continuity by adding concepts to concepts. But this whole criticism is due to a confusion between the symbol and the object symbolised. Bergson argues that logic which deals with static concepts cannot give us knowledge of reality which is flow. There is a gap between reality, which is flow and duration, and concepts which are static and solid. But does Bergson really believe that in the material world these concepts give us the realities themselves? Do they not symbolise objects and things? Do they re-instate the experiences themselves? If in the world of life and duration they do not give us realities, even so do they not give us realities in the world of matter. They must be inadequate there also. But if they will suffice in the world of matter they must suffice in the vital world also. Intellect gives us interpretations, formulas and symbols, and not the experiences or the objects symbolised. It is the function of a sign to signify, but for this it need not resemble or reproduce the thing signified. Its function is only to symbolise and not to photograph. If this function of intellect is admitted, as Bergson admits it when he
considers the concepts to be valid in the world of matter, then it follows that intellect is good right through in logic and mathematics, in biology and psychology. But if we mistake its function then it becomes bad all through, notwithstanding Bergson. The whole fallacy is due to the confusion of the sign with the thing signified, a relation of symbols with a symbolised relation. We cannot say that he "who drives fat oxen should himself be fat."

Evolved by life, our intellect cannot understand life. Created by life, it cannot take hold of life. "Created by life, how can it embrace life, of which it is only an emanation or aspect?" Bergson argues that intellect can understand only dead matter and physical processes, and cannot represent reality as it truly exists in life, as intellect is created by evolution for the purposes of practice. But the origin of intellect is due not merely to life but to the interaction of life and matter. If it is the product of life it is as much the product of matter. Again, if intelligence cannot grasp life because it is evolved by it, the faculty which can grasp it must be something not evolved by it. But is Bergson prepared to say that intuition has not been evolved by life? Bergson does not give us any definite answer. According to him, every theory of knowledge has to take knowledge for granted. What we have to explain is the absence of intuition where it is absent, rather than its presence where it is present. In Matter and Memory he gives his explanation of the cases where we find only sense perception instead of intuition, and in Creative Evolution he gives his explanation of why insects stop short at instinct instead of reaching intuition, and why man usually stops short at intellect instead of reaching intuition more frequently. To get back to intuition, we have to adopt either the exclusive or the inclusive method. The former is not possible; the latter is suggested by Bergson himself. To comprehend life it would seem we should mix up intellect and instinct. But we ask if one part cannot comprehend life, and if the several products are to be combined, is it
not necessary that all the products should be combined? So to instinct and intellect we should add classes of automatism or torpor, and of these miscellaneous things which are all produced by life even though we do not have any knowledge of them. "If in evolving in the direction of the vertebrate in general, of man and intelligence in particular, life has had to abandon by the way many elements incompatible with this particular mode of organisation, and consign them, as we shall show, to other lines of development; it is the totality of these elements we must find again and rejoin to intellect proper in order to grasp the true nature of vital activity" (C. K. p. 52). So to intellect we should add not only instinct but also vegetative torpor, as that is also one of the developments of the primary impulse. "Vegetative torpor, instinct and intelligence, these three are the elements that coincided in the vital impulsion common to plants and animals, and which in the course of a development in which they were made manifest in the most unforeseen forms have been dissociated by the very fact of their growth" (p. 142). Bergson foces that this conclusion would be ridiculous, and so escapes from it by saying that vegetative life is only a retrogression. But he admits that the three are found in all though in different proportions. "There is no manifestation of life which does not contain, in a rudimentary shape, either latent or potential, the essential character of most other manifestations. The difference is in the proportion" (p. 112, see also p. 125). The only way of escape, which is not satisfactory, is to say that vegetative torpor cannot be mixed with instinct and intellect as it is not a phase of consciousness.

What, then, is the good of scientific knowledge which is unlike to reality? It is of practical utility. For practical purposes we conceptualise reality and spatialise spirit. So the world of our everyday life is only an appearance and not reality. We cannot agree with Bergson in thinking that intellectual knowledge is knowledge of an unreality. Granting that intellect can only...
grasp matter, is not matter real? It is the inverse movement of life, and even though life is not grasped by intellect, its inverse is apprehended by it. All that Bergson's intuition comes to is this: While reality in its fulness cannot be grasped by intellect, still parts of reality can be known by it. Intellectual knowledge has ontological value; only the whole of reality baffles it. Intellect does not deal with wholes but with partial realms. It is argued that even matter is dualism, provided we re-attach it to the whole to which it belongs.

Duration, according to Bergson, should be predicated of the material systems which science isolates; provided such systems are reintegrated to the whole. Parts cut off from the whole are abstract; they have to be fitted into the whole in becoming real. It is the task of science to bind parts to parts in wholes. So intuition, which is supposed to give another kind of knowledge, is only intellect more thorough and radical than what it is when it deals with parts. If the scientific method is pursued to its end, we get the philosophical view. Bergson admits this when he says: "The more physics advances, the more it erases the individuality of bodies, and even of the particles into which the scientific imagination begins by decomposing them; bodies and corpuscles tend to dissolve into universal interaction" (p. 360). Certainly, then, the philosophical point of view is not opposed to that of science. The philosophic method is just the scientific method carried out more vigorously. Intuition is not opposed to intellect but is only intellect at its best. Intellect at its lower stages deals with parts, and is called scientific; at its higher stages it deals with the whole and is called intuition. The difference between the two is one of degree and not kind. Intuition is more of intellectability, but science and philosophy are expressions of the one type of experience. There is no break between them. "There is no essential difference between the intellect and the intuition itself." (p. 350). Thought is adequate to the grasp of reality as a whole.
That there is a higher capacity than understanding which enables us to grasp the concrete in its wholeness is admitted by most philosophers at the present day. The question is only about the nature of that capacity. Bergson considers it to be more perceptual than conceptual. To him knowledge of reality as it is in its individuality and concreteness, can only be perceptual. It cannot be conceptual to him as he views conceptual knowledge in an abstract and unreal manner. But we are afraid that it cannot be even perceptual. For with him perception is occupied with the object as a number of assembled features. The sense organs by their selective activity break up the object: "Our eye perceives the feature of the living being, merely as assembled, not as mutually organised. The intuition of life, the simple movement that runs through the lives, that binds them together and gives them significance, escapes it" (C. E. p. 180). So intuition which should be synthetic cannot be perceptual. What else is it? Bergson tells us it is integral knowledge which makes a whole of the abstract relations discovered by intellect, and the thinghood grasped by instinct. Intuition combines the fruits of instinct and intellect. Instinct deals with things and intellect with relations. Instinct has direct contact with reality. It is moulded on the very form of life. If questioned it would give up life's secret. But this is purely an assumption. Why should we think that instinct is adapted to life? Life is full of novelty, contingency and unforeseeability, and instinct has none of these features. How then can it give us the secret of life? Instinct is automatic and stationary while life is mobile and progressive. How can we further life, the mobile and the progressive, by an appeal to instinct, the immobile and the stereotyped? If Bergson is correct in thinking that instinct is moulded on the very form of life, then we should say that life is a machine as instinct is mechanical.
If life is novelty then instinct will not help us. But to
Bergson instinct has direct contact with reality; only
being undifferentiated it does not seek reality as a whole.
Intelect on the other hand seeks reality as a whole, but
by itself is not able to grasp it. Intuition is instinct
become self-conscious, or intellect become disinterested.
Intuition is the disinterested knowledge of the object in
its wholeness. "If there is a means of comprehending
a reality absolutely instead of knowing it relatively, of
centering into the object instead of selecting points of view
over against it, of having an intuition of it instead of
making analysis of it, in short of grasping it independently
of any expression and any translation or symbolic repre-
sentation; that is metaphysics itself, and this meta-
physical knowledge can be had only in intuition. An
absolute can only be given in our intuition." (Introduction
to Met.). Instinct rises to intuition with the aid of
intelligence. "Without intelligence, it would have re-
ained in the form of instinct, riveted to the special
object of its practical interest and turned outward by
it into movements of locomotion" (p. 173). With
intelligence it becomes integral knowledge. Intuition is
neither perceptual nor conceptual but a combination
of both. It is something like the artistic perception
of a soul freed from practical necessities. It is the
aesthetic feeling. "That an effort of this kind is not
impossible, is proved by the existence in man of an
aesthetic faculty along with normal perception." (p. 150).
It is aesthetic intuition that can catch hold of the con-
tinuity of life. But this aesthetic feeling springs out of
reason. The greatest works of art are the most rational
and involve a good deal of training. It is not due to our
immediate perception, but is due to the exercise of reason.
The finished portrait embodies thought and reason (see
C. E. p. 7). It is true that before the work is finished it
could not have been foreseen. But this failing to fore-
see is not incompatible with reason. The new creation is
a unique synthesis of given elements. Though we know
the product must be rational: we would not be able to say beforehand in what way the rationality will express itself. There are so many ways of being rational. When Bergson compares intuition to the creative genius of the poet or the artist's vision or the trained instinct of the literary writer who synthesises in the desired form the mass of material collected by him, it comes very near reason and intelligence. There are positive descriptions of this philosophical intuition which clearly bring out its intellectual affinities. Bergson compares it to the creative vision of the scientist. The scientist, when he perceives the working of the universe in the particular, grasps reality as it is in its individuality, and this is intuitive or integral knowledge. When Bergson claims that we owe to this faculty all the greatest discoveries of science, when he tells us that in every system of philosophy we have facts which are vivified by intuition (C. L. p. 231), when he puts it to us that a successful practice of intuition requires previous study and assimilation of multitudes of abstract data, we feel that his intuition is not much different from our scientific imagination. It is nothing mysterious. Dr. Carr, the best-known interpreter of Bergson in England, describes it thus: "It is the most common and unmistakable fact, and we only fail to recognize it because it is so absolutely simple that it requires a strong effort to turn the mind from its intellectual bent in order to get this non-intellectual vision" (The Philosophy of Change). But it is not non-intellectual vision but a vision in which abstract analysis has already done its work. It is creative imagination (M. and M. p. 76). Bergson is not a supporter of mysticism which goes against intellect, but he says, "If by mysticism is meant (as it almost always is nowadays) a reaction against positive science, the doctrine I defend is in the end only a protest against mysticism" (quoted in Lindsay's Philosophy of Bergson, p. 29). Bergson is not willing to identify it with mystical experience. It is a kind of intellectualism. To quote Bergson himself: "There are two kinds of intellectualism, the true which
lives its ideas and a false intellectualism, which immobilizes moving ideas into solidified concepts to play with them like counters" (ibid. p. 19). Where intuition is completely extraintellectual then it becomes subjective sensation and cannot pretend to be a philosophic method. But the whole of this long discussion indicates that in Bergson intuition seems to be both the necessary condition of psychical activity, as scientific hypothesis is, and the summit of the work of thought, as the philosophic vision of the whole is.

We may here note the remarkable fact that, following the absolutist tradition and in opposition to the empirical current of thought, Bergson holds that practicality and action are opposed to the attainment of the highest level of insight and intuition. To become metaphysical we must cease to be practical. Pluralists and romanticists preach that in practice we come across reality and all speculation is the source of illusion. The search after truth requires, according to the absolutist tradition, freedom from Maya or detachment from the illusions of ignorance and selfishness. This means only that in the world of practice we are absorbed by the details and have not the detachment for catching the universal. To gain an insight into the mysteries of the universe we require periods of contemplation. In meditation we become conscious of the inner nature of freedom. Freedom alone can comprehend freedom. In intuition we have a direct vision of reality, life envisaging itself. The detachment necessary for it is emphasized when we are asked to turn away from the world of practice and abstract reasoning. But the products of meditative insight vindicate themselves at the bar of reason. Bergson employs the absolutist device when he proves the inadequacy of intellect by pointing to the deadlocks and contradictions in which the exclusive use of intellect lands us. Bergson asks, "Would the idea ever have occurred to us to doubt the absolute value of our knowledge, if philosophy had not shown us what contradictions our speculation meets,
what deadlocks it ends in?" (C. E., Introduction, pp. vii-ix). From the contradictory nature of the conclusions of reason, Bergson argues, truth must be sought in intuition. But the logical inference from this is fallacy, namely, is that if parts with which intellect deals set themselves up for the whole, then antinomies arise to point the moral that they are parts and not whole.

When all is said and done, Bergson's conclusion comes to this that there are aspects of reality which our understanding cannot comprehend. Bradley, the greatest living absolutist, tells us that there are problems which are inexplicable and insoluble. For example, the relation of a finite centre of experience to other centres and the whole. To him a universe which would reveal its secret essence to a finite understanding would be a poor substitute for the actual one. "The complete experience which would supplement our ideas and make them perfect is in detail beyond our understanding." (Truth and Reality). Intuition should be supplemented by the other sides of consciousness it would reach its end. Man's whole consciousness is needed to feel the central reality. There is more than logic in life. But philosophy simply points out the logical necessity of a whole which is of the nature of a concrete universal. These philosophy ends, and intuition gives the experience and confirms philosophy. For this experience one has to raise himself above the narrow, practical and utilitarian point of view and see life as it is. But this does not mean that practicality and action are opposed to truth and knowledge. It only means that we have to lift our souls above the business of life to find out its hidden secrets. In such an experience we free ourselves from the trammels of abstract antinomies; we have there an evanescence of the intellectual activity.

Regarding this question, we are at one with Bergson if he means by his term "Intelligence" not thought or mind or reason in general, but only that phase of thought which deals with abstract identities, what
Hegel meant by "Understanding" or Croce means by a thought which works with pseudo-concepts. Intellect so conceived operates by synthesising abstract universals reached by analysis. Then insight into concrete universals can be acquired only through intuition. But in his polemic against such an abstract "Intelligence," Bergson has almost nothing new to say which idealist writers have not said before him. No doubt there is some novelty about his view of intuition. Bergson is right in contending that this rational insight is not reached by a mere synthesis or adjustment of partial and abstract concepts. It requires the exercise of powers of mind higher than those of understanding. It is true that intuitive or integral perception helps us here. But we hesitate to follow the lead of Bergson in his extreme opposition of intellect and intuition. He himself admits that when once the rational insight is reached, it is easy for our intellect to discover how the partial concepts are to be found in the whole. Then intuition and intellect become the higher and lower phases of mind and that is precisely the contention of the absolutists.