CHAPTER II

RECENT TRENDS IN PHILOSOPHY

I

In Chapter I, we have seen how philosophy is distinguished from science by its subject-matter, and from religion by its method. It is the application of the logical method of explanation that gives philosophy its distinctive nature. If we abandon this method, philosophy becomes identical with religion and mysticism. The philosophical attempt which aims at constructing an objective and necessary theory of the universe has to follow the guidance of logic, even though in so doing it comes into conflict with popular beliefs and prevailing religion. We do not demand of a philosopher religious favour or moral earnestness, but only logical seriousness. But this spirit of philosophic inquiry is not adopted by some present-day thinkers, but is even severely rebuked by them. As an instance we may quote William James: "The besetting sin of philosophers has always been the absolutism of their intellects. We find an assumption that was the soul of scholasticism, the assumption, namely, that anything that is necessary in the way of belief must be susceptible of articulate proof, as rampant as it ever was, in the irreligious agnosticism of to-day; and we find it, moreover, blossoming out into corollaries, as, for instance, that to believe anything without such proof is to be unscientific, and that to be unscientific is the lowest depth to which a thinking mind can fall" (Preface by William James to Paulsen's Intro...
 Recent Tendencies in Philosophy. In short, James asks us to be content with faith and religion, and not seek for logic and proof, to disown philosophy and substitute distrust of intellect for the absolutes thereof, as the latter leads to 'irreligious agnosticism.'

II

What has led to this change in standpoint, to this new habit of soft thinking? Why is religious hotchpotch or servility made the test of truth? For this change in the conception of the function and method of philosophy certain historical accidents are responsible. For long philosophy had been under the spell of mathematics. Descartes, Spinoza and Kant wished to reach in their systems of philosophy mathematical certainty. But the end of this tendency was reached in Kant who clearly established the possibilities of human knowledge. Intellect dominated by the mathematical ideal, Kant showed, busied itself only with the external show, the unreal shadow. God, human freedom, etc., could not be established by reason but only be felt by the heart. Thus Kant sounded the danger to human values which the mathematical ideal of knowledge carried with it. Pascal's and Bosseulus, Rousseaus and Humbertus rose up and sought refuge in faith and feeling, for faith alone could support the validity of the values of spirit. But Hegel who came later clearly established the limits of the mathematical ideal. The soul of philosophy which was lulled into sleep in the theology-ridden universities of the middle ages, and had not come to its own but was wandering in other fields even in the days of Kant, regained its consciousness in Hegel. It was reborn when Hegel negated the narrow standpoint of Kant. With Hegel's emphasis on life

1. Locke opposed intellectualism in the interests of ethical and religious needs. According to him we must look to the highest form of mind for the fullest revelation of reality. Moral life in the world of values is the true basis of metaphysics.
and purpose, it was recognised that philosophy spelt no danger to human values. Though in Hegel philosophy recovered its lost soul, it did not come into prominence till late in the nineteenth century. For one thing, the anti-intellectual movement of the post-Kantians, led by Jacobi, Herder and Schopenhauer, led to the importing of other considerations into philosophy. As a reaction against the dominance of this intrusion of faith into reason, and religion into philosophy, against the church’s guardianship over science, against the tendency to suppress intellectual demands for logic and demonstration, proof and inquiry, materialism and positivism spread like wildfire. The reaction went to the other extreme, so much so that the Rationalist Press Association thinkers and the no-God men had the ear of the public. Scientific progress and evolutionist philosophy emphasized this spirit. Mill and Spencer, Huxley and Leslie Stephen in England, Lange, Fecherbach, etc., on the Continent, gave a materialist turn to philosophy and the last word was no less than ‘irreligious agnosticism.’ Science swept everything away. The earth was bare and the heavens empty. There is no doubt that Hegelian idealism shook to its foundations the scientific empiricism of the nineteenth century. But the entrance of democracy into philosophy resulted in making both scientific empiricism and Hegelian idealism stand on a par, for both of them failed to satisfy the aspirations of the human heart. While the former spoke of the vast cosmos as a huge machine of which the individual formed an insignificant part, the latter regarded the world process as the realization of an absolute purpose. Both are at one in chilling the heart, and they considered man’s yearnings and aspirations, his loves and hates to be mere incidents in the world process. Human values—which the man in the street feels to be of supreme moment were not conserved by either. Hence the sudden reaction in favour of religion in philosophy which is expressing itself in a fascination for things misunderstood and the fashion of intuitive
mysticism, which, whether true or not, warms the heart of the plain man, and helps him to live better in his own estimate. The future is declared to be for faith as the past was for science. All this may seem a help to religion, but is it not a certain loss to philosophy? and is it really a source of strength to religion? If we strike reason to the ground, does not the all-dissolving doubt smile religion too?

In the middle ages philosophy was playing the servant's role to Aristotle and the Bible. It rebelled against this bondage and came under the influence of mathematics and logic. Later, biology exerted a good deal of influence over it. Now it is practically identified with religion. In the last twenty-five years there has been the re-establishment of the presuppositions of religion, and much of the good work done in the field of philosophy has been under the auspices of the Gifford Trust for natural religion. Philosophy now goes after religion and is anxious to strengthen its foundations.

I see men's judgments are
A parcel of their fortunes; and things outward
Do draw the inward quality after them,
To suffer all alike.

Shakespeare.

Here Shakespeare emphasizes that most real relevancy of environment to faith. After a great wave of materialism, agnosticism and atheism, we see in Europe to-day a revival of the religious spirit. This new tendency has affected men's judgements. As it is believed, that materialism, etc., were due to the scientific and the philosophic temper, modern thinkers wish to guard against the possible degeneration of the wave of religion by the pursuit of pure philosophy. So with the very noble idea of preserving moral and religious values assumed by unreflecting common sense, these start with a preconceived metaphysics and prejudices against intellectualism, etc. With a naïveté which is astonishing in philosophers, we find them taking for granted religious ideas and beliefs and trying to defend them at any cost. Anything which
chimes in with their desires is regarded as true. It is
forgotten that philosophers are primarily lovers of truth
and as such should treat their problems scientifically and
seek for objective truth. But in the eagerness to regain
the attention of the ordinary man extra-philosophical
demands enter into philosophy and spoil it. Since the
adventurous individual of the twentieth century believes
in the reality of time, the significance of change, the open-
ness of the universe, his own separateness, freedom of
action and a God like himself, this region is marked off
as the field where the philosopher has only to submit.
Certain forms of belief are determined beforehand where
we cannot meddle though beyond them we have a wide
range for the discretion of intelligence. Within the
fabric nothing should be altered. Every reasonable
system of philosophy ought to grant these convictions of
the average man. With the ultimate scheme of things
settled, with certain values taken for granted, the philo-
sopher now approaches his task. Like the mediaeval
schoolmen who accepted Aristotle and the Bible as
authorities, and then gave themselves the luxury of
intellectual discussion by asking how many angels could
dance at the point of a pin, even so our philosophers
accept certain beliefs as true, and give themselves intellec-
tual recreation by philosophising in other matters.
It is indifferent to them if this procedure of marking off
a particular portion and demanding in this sphere nothing
else than a justification of the common-sense belief's
involves a surrender of the true method of philosophy.
But we cannot imprison men's minds for all time. They
will sooner or later break through the spheres of illusion
to discover truth. To add to our difficulties, the en-
lightened man's religion is not crude and undeveloped
as it once was. Religion itself has become highly philo-
sophical, and we do not feel so fully and poignantly
the opposition between the two. Philosophy was easily
emancipated from the trammels of mythology and religion
in the days of antiquity, since the mythical and religious
conceptions of the world were crude and gross, unscientific and unphilosophical. With the progress of philosophy, the prevailing religions have assimilated much of philosophical thought, so that it has become well-nigh impossible to see clear of religion. But the progress of true religion requires a clear delimitation of the spheres of religion and philosophy, and if trained thinkers take shelter in the highly philosophical character of the prevailing religion, it will be hard to remedy its defects and improve its tone.

III

What are the effects of the change in the angle of vision? The first to be noted is the democratic tendency of the present-day philosophy. Plato set up the tradition that philosophy should be aristocratic. While religion is for all, philosophy is not. Religion is adapted to the needs of the plain man, since it demands faith and acceptance. To the philosopher, faith must show its dependence on profound insight and thought. Philosophy is an art quite as much as shipbuilding or shoemaking. As a specialised discipline requiring thought and training it cannot be practised by any except the specialists. It is now transferred from the forum to the street. When it becomes democratic, philosophy gets mixed up with religion, knowledge with opinion, truth with dogma. Philosophy becomes quite useless to all, the masses included. At the present day philosophy has become fundamentally plebeian or democratic. Its one self-chosen aim is to arrange the life of the ordinary man. If he requires a God, philosophy supplies him with one; if a ghost, it will also be supplied. The prejudice of the plain man is the seed of the plant of this new philosophy. The democratic movement has come to stay, not merely in politics where its value is undoubted, but also in art, literature and philosophy. Cheap literature, fiction, etc., fill the book-stalls more than serious and high-minded works of art and creative geniuses. We do not like any
serious literature, classic or drama that makes us think. We long for sensational novels which excite us, or the film that thrills us with breathless escapes, or the drama that evokes volleys of laughter. We do not want high thinking or serious purpose, but are satisfied with excess of emotion and extravagance of sentiment. In philosophy there is a distrust of intelligence and order, but faith in life, will, immediate experience, novelty, change and creative evolution. Intellectuals are supposed to be out of touch with the actual interests and emotions of mankind. James speaks of a "rationalistic philosophy that indeed may call itself religious, but that keeps out of all definite touch with concrete fact and joys and sorrows" (Pragmatism, Lecture I). And so he wants us to have a philosophy which is true to surface appearances. Such philosophic theories will be, in the words of Professor Bosanquet, these "of the first look of the man in the street, or of the traveller struggling at a railway station, to whom the compact self-containedness and self-direction of the swarming human beings before him seem an obvious fact, while the social logic and the spiritual history which lie behind the scene fail to impress themselves on his perceptive imagination" (Philosophical Theory of the State, p. 59). The natural separateness of human units strikes the vision of the popular mind most. As a result of it we have the political movement of democracy which wants to give each man a vote and decide issues by counting heads, and the economic ideal which seeks to allow to each man the necessary opportunity to perfect himself. The chance must be open to every man to become an artist or a philosopher or a millionaire. It is because the faith of democracy insists that each man has in him the promise of a philosopher that systems are required to be judged according as they suit his fancies or not. It is supposed that the plain man is logical in his views, and to systematise them is the task of philosophy. The man in the street is the centre and everything else revolves round him. Philosophy and thinking must supply his needs. It is
dangerous to differ from him, especially as he has political power in his hands. Systems of philosophy become mirrors of the plain man’s faith. James and Bergson, representatives of the two great democracies of the world and respected names in philosophy, express this democratic tendency, in the endeavor to satisfy the popular demands and support the prevailing notions. “In a word, to James belongs the glory of having first divined the secret of the plain man, and ministered to his desire for a knowledge that is relevant to action and to life” (Mind, No. 86, p. 242).

The reality of evil has become a part of the accepted code of philosophy. Suggestiveness to pain and suffering is a peculiar feature of our age, thanks to the propaganda of humanitarianism. Who can withstand the temptation to regard evil as a fundamental reality, who that lives in this age to witness the rape of Belgium and other such unspeakable atrocities of civilised Europe in the twentieth century? Who can say that the struggle of the European battlefields is a blunder light with a blunder power? It has become impossible for the modern man, keenly sensitive to pain and suffering to dismiss evil as an illusion. He has no patience with systems of religion and philosophy which explain it away or set it aside. The absolutist who, while admitting that evil is the essence of moral life, is not prepared to grant that it is a characteristic feature of life divine is put down as a philosopher who disdains to walk the streets of earth, but longs to float in the chasm of Elysium. But the difficulty that if evil is real, then the appearance of evil conquering good will also become a fundamental reality does not impress him much. Were this appearance real, there is not much chance for man to gain victory over evil, for that which is absolutely real cannot be negated. The plain man does not know that granting the reality of evil would involve the absolute supremacy of evil in the world struggle. But logic is nothing to him. He feels evil to be real and philosophy must submit.
It follows that the idealist doctrine that the world is an idea is also a sham. How can the solid-seeming world with its wonderful setting of streets and skies be looked upon as a floating dream or a fragment of imagination? The world is not a thought-product, not an appearance, but a reality quite independent of human experience. Even when we stop thinking about it, it is there, a permanent and imposing structure. The empirical tradition has yielded to the realistic doctrine that the world is apart from all consciousness.

From the preceding account of the nature of evil and the world it follows that we must hold to the conception of a finite God. If evil is not an accidental phenomenon, but something forming part and parcel of life's very structure, how can its existence be reconciled with the control of the universe by a Being of absolute moral perfection? Can this world with all its evil and imperfection be the creation of a perfect and good God? Can such things as the recent European war be, if the true God is just and merciful and good? How dare we say that he is a power of righteousness? Professor Gilbert Murray cites an interesting example: "I remember a dreadful incident in one of the Consular reports of the Armenian massacres of 1895. At that time the universal dread and horror throughout Armenia sent most people praying day and night in the churches. But the Report tells of one woman who sat by the road and refused to pray. 'Do you not see what has happened?' she said. 'God has gone mad. It is no use to pray to him.'" (International Crisis, p. 39). If God is the author of Nature, is he the author of evil also? The modern mind is not willing to lay the responsibility for evil at the feet of God. It is referred to something else than God. Were not evil due to some other force, God would not tolerate it and look on passively without interfering. A dualistic philosophy which is not in harmony with the world has the attention of the public at the present day. A finite God struggling along with
man to overcome evil is the only way of escape from this
contradiction. God is confronted by the prince of darkness, the principle of evil. The dualism of Ormuzd and
Ahriman is the only rational hypothesis. Mr. Britten
in Wells's novel says: "How can God be a person? how
can he be anything that matters to man unless he is
limited and defined and human like ourselves, with things
outside him and beyond him." That is the conclusion
of Wells's hero in the face of the great war. A
merciful God will not allow a war in which the flower
of the highest nations in the world is cut off. We must
say that as the best men with the best of motives were
not able to avert this world catastrophe, even so God was
not able to do it. He is not omnipotent. "The real God
of the Christians is Christ, not God Almighty; a poor
mocked and wounded God nailed on a cross of matter...
God is not absolute; God is finite ... a finite God who
struggles in his great and comprehensive way as we
struggle in our weak and silly way—who is with us—that
is the essence of all real religion. If I thought there was
an omnipotent God who looked down on battles and
deaths and all the waste and ruin of this war—able to
prevent these things—doing them to amuse himself, I
would spit in his empty face" (Mr. Britten says it
Through, p. 327). A finite God who struggles with man
can alone satisfy these tempers. God fights with evil
as light with night, life with matter, existence with
non-existence. He is working under limitations, though
we for the sake of his divinity prefer to call these
definitely imposed limits self-imposed. No other con-
ception can relieve the human mind of its familiar embar-
ra ssment and perplexity. Mr. Wells in his later volume
on God: the Invisible King, voices the modern conception
of religion. He has no sympathy with the logical and
necessary concept of the Absolute, the Great Power behind
all things; for the plain man knows nothing about it.
The real God is a person like ourselves, our Friend and
Comrade and King and Leader and Captain. ". . . If
a figure may represent him, it must be the figure of a beautiful youth, already brave and wise, but hardly come to his strength. He should stand lightly on his feet in the morning time, eager to go forward, as though he had but newly arisen to a day that was still but a promise; he should bear a sword, that keen discriminating weapon, his eyes should be as bright as swords; his lips should fall apart with eagerness for the great adventure before him, and he should be in very fresh and golden harness, reflecting the rising sun. Death should still hang like mists and cloud-banks and shadows in the valleys of the wide landscape about him. There should be shewn upon the threads of gossamer and little leaves and blades of the turf at his feet." God is courage and love, beauty and youth. "God is a person whom we know as one knows a friend, who can be served, and who receives service, who partakes of our nature; who is like us, a being in conflict with the unknown and the limitless, and the forces of death; who values much that we value and is against much that we are pitted against. He in our king to whom we must be loyal, he is our captain, and to know him is to have a direction in our lives. He feels as and knows as we; he is helped and gladdened by us. He hopes and attempts... God is in instruction nor trick of words, no infinite. He is as real as a bayonet thrust or an embrace" (ibid. p. 67). And this God grows as man grows. He is a God of becoming, full of youth and energy, fighting evil and darkness along with man. Such is Mr. Wells's conception of God. Dr. McTague thinks that if there be a God he must be a non-omnipotent, non-creative God. Canon Randall believes that he is non-omnipotent but not necessarily non-creative. James takes refuge with Mill in a finite God who is not fully master of the world. For only such a hypothesis can account for the growing evil and imperfection of the world. The world is not completely a divine order. There are non-divine elements in it, and in them perhaps are due the evil and suffering of the world. Dr. Howison
supports the conception of a non-creative deity, and
propounds a radical solution by tracing evil not to one
fundamental prince of darkness, but to his many
worshippers. "Indubitably we stand in need of a new
idealism, which shall be thoroughly pluralistic . . . and
which, while it refers Nature and all its woes derivatively
to minds, presents these as the minds other than God . . ."
(Philosophical Journal, i, 121). In the face of the insatia-
bility of human misery and suffering, it is thought that
anything else than a finite God is intolerable. "Mani-
chaelism cannot be called from the actual belief of
mankind" (Lucas Stephen).

The reality of moral distinctions and the significance
of moral effort confirm the belief in a finite God. The
plain man who feels the light of life to be a real one
experiences God from this necessity, and makes him stand
above and apart from the conflict of the world. He
neither gains nor loses—as the work of the world moves
on or backward. But the interpreters of the plain man's
faith quite logically make God a growing God. James
says: "God himself may draw vital strength and increase
of very being from our fulness." Mr. Web has also a
similar idea. "He has his own ends for which he needs
us" (The Invisible King, p. 42). Christian doctrine
which makes God manifest himself in the world and share in
the suffering which it involves, helps to strengthen the suggestion. He himself takes part
in the conflicts and sorrows of finite creatures, but
a perfect God in whom there is no difference between
duty and desire, law and fulfilment cannot be subject to
the ills to which the finite creature who feels the obligation
of an ideal hovering over his finite will is open. We
cannot attribute to God suffering, imperfection and
growth which are incidents of human life. But it is
argued, an infinite God or an absolute that is the all,
cancels the existence of the many individuals. But God
as the existent reality is only one of many existences. It is
impossible that his existence can also be the existence of
others. God cannot be other gods nor can the other gods be God. God as an existent reality can only be a finite entity opposing others.

The religious needs require that this finite God shall also be a person. In his despairing grief man requires the help of a loving, struggling, suffering God who works with him. Perplexed by the reality of evil, man questions and seeks after a God who takes sides, has plans and purposes, has pity for man's frailty and grants his prayers. Only a personal God can be of help to a broken heart. Only a personal God of limited power explains the facts of experience. It alone gives us a chance of genuine cooperation in the cosmic struggle with God. The absolutist conception of God as a close and vivid presence, "closer to us than breathing, nearer than hands and feet," is brushed aside as good for nothing so far as the demands of religion are concerned. God is not so much in us as with us (compare the title of Royce Gibson's volume God with Us). In matters of science we do not adopt the views of the plain man, but consult the specialist. The specialists in religion, viz. the mystics, do not require a personal godhead. "The existence of an outside providence who created us, who watches over us, and who guides our lives like a Merciful Father, we have found impossible longer to believe in. But of the existence of a Holy Spirit saturating upward through all animate beings, and finding its fullest expression in man, in love, and in the flowers in beauty, we can be as certain as of anything in the world" (St. Francis vonhroughus, Within). If God as infinite reality, as the all-embracing whole, satisfies the passionate quest of the sincere mystic soul, it ought to be taken as the highest conception of God, whether it satisfies the plain man or not. In religious thought, emotions and practical needs are regarded as more fundamental than logical necessity and theoretical satisfaction. As a matter of fact religious faith is self-contradictory, and throughout religious consciousness we find the dualism of logic and emotion to be the govern-
ing factor. The two are set side by side without being organised into one whole. Theoretical logic demands the presence of a fundamental principle at the back of things. To it God is the great universal presence; he is the All, for a limited God is a contradiction in terms. God is illimitable. Emotional demands ascribe to this principle, sympathy and righteousness, goodwill for man and suffering for his sake. They make of him a finite personal God who struggles and through the struggle grows. At once the question arises, who is the author of evil? God is good and righteous. A wicked devil is posited as the necessary complement of a good God. The play of the universe is due to the interaction of these two forces. Logic asks us to rise to the impersonal conception; but the emotional demands can be satisfied only at the expense of logic. Our philosophies are the reflections of our souls which are more emotional than logical. We do not reckon the cost at which our hearts’ desires are being satisfied.

From all this it follows that the monistic conception of the world should be replaced by a pluralistic one, for it is just a step from dualism to pluralism. To the common-sense man the universe is a congeries of individuals sometimes fighting with one another, sometimes trying to live in peace. Society is a sum total of selves. The plain man who is a personalist in theology, a democrat in politics, a realist in regard to the existence of evil and the world is necessarily a pluralist in metaphysics. Pluralism in philosophy is the logical development of the spirit of democracy; for he who has respect for the uniqueness of individuality will not be inclined to sacrifice this uniqueness for the sake of the absolute. Every individual is a unique existence with not much in common with others. We feel that each of us is a self, but do not feel the reality of an infinite all which wraps us round, involving in some mysterious whole both the selves, and that by which they are faced. The common-sense man who lives and loves, daces and dies, strikes and suffers, feels the reality of
merely solvents, and not of one spirit. It is nothing to the
pluralist if the thinking men of the world, with rare
exceptions who prove the rule, have declared for a
single spirit. If it is said that the craving for unity has
not been a universal one, no craving has been that, not
even the craving for common good. But argument is of
no avail.

As every individual is a free being, having it in his
power to make or mar his future, he requires a world
where there is freedom, where he can take risks to realise his
ideals if he has any. Such a world our immediate experi-
ence reveals to us, and there is no reason why it should
give place to the spick-and-span world of the absolutist.
Our immediate experience gives us a world which satisfies
the will of man by bending to his needs, and it is true and
real. Any philosophy which has no room for play and
freedom, risk and adventure, chance and novelty, in
short for the romance of the twentieth-century life or the
unregenerate man, is untrue. Absolutism has no room
for individual initiative:

The ball no question makes of Ayres or Notes,
But how he finds the player goes;
And he that tossed you down into the hole,
He knows about it all he knows—to knows.

This view is unsatisfactory, as it ignores the outlines of
human personality and sacrifices the dignity of the soul.
The Absolute may be free, but who cares for the freedom
of the Absolute? What is of moment to us is not the
freedom of God, but of man.

From the free man and the plastic world which allows
itself to be moulded by him, it is only a step to the theory
of the world as increasing flow and creative change. The
scientist tells us that the whole world is in motion. We
feel that we are changing every moment of our life. The
principle of the universe is a principle of change. Change
is the central factor of the universe. We are so much in
love with it that we make a God of it. Evolution or
change is the object of our worship. The modern type of
mind which wants sensation and more, for which change and mobility have a glamour, reduces the whole universe to life and movement. In our passion for change, the love for permanence is lost, and we forget that there must be something that changes, a permanent underlying the mutable. The kaleidoscopic whirl of mental states we call civilised life at the present day is mirrored in the aimless and randomly busy cosmic principle so beautifully described in Bergson's *Creative Evolution*.

Quite naturally what is looked upon by the thinking few as the curse of modern society, its hurry, its fever, its restlessness, its excitement which blinds us to the divine in things and gives us no breathing time for self-searching or worship of the unseen, is defined by these systems. Leisure for disinterested contemplation is incompatible only with a different outlook on life. The absolute idealists may dream sweet dreams of the unity of all life and the mystic apprehension of the infinite. But these have no place in a philosophy where restlessness is regarded as the truth of things. Men are suffering from the fever of violent motion and so they make a philosophy of it. In one way or another, the 'new' philosophers advocate action for the sake of action. Pure contemplation, aesthetic ecstasy or reflection on the end of life is dismissed as mystic raving or poetic dreaming. What counts is action, and we need not pause to think about the end action is to achieve. For if Bergson's lead is followed, action which realises a plan chosen to be true action, a new creation, the activity of Kantian Criticism and the practical of William James and the pragmatists represent this tendency. As we shall see in the sequel, action to be of any value must be inspired by some vision, some conception of the end which it tries to realise. It is beyond us to imagine how we can go on working blindly, renouncing all reflection as an irrelevance. Incisive thoughtless action leaves us nothing to rejoice in and thus defeats its own end.
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The conception of pluralism, with its emphasis on the reality of the individual, with its insistence on change, with its love of democracy, cannot but adopt an ethical, the economic or militaristic view. What profit is it to us? What bearing has it on man's life? The inevitable evil must meet us everywhere. We have to suffer an age of materialism in life, realism in art, prose in literature, and pluralism in philosophy.

It does not mean that philosophy has no care for the plain man's needs. There is no doubt that his needs should receive respectful attention, but this is not to make them the standard of truth. We would offer him real help and consolation rather by declaring to him the truth about things than by pandering to his tastes and making him the measure of the universe.

IV

Distrust of intellect is the characteristic note of recent philosophy. If all our convictions are to be supported by philosophy we cannot pursue it in a spirit of free thinking and disinterested inquiry. It must support them, and if reason does not do it, then philosophy must become extra-intellectual. Since Hegel this tendency to reduce thought to a position subordinate to feeling has been growing. In the hey-day of philosophy it started with an enthusiastic faith in the powers of human reason. To-day we have nothing else than contempt for the tribe of thinkers. Instead of reason-philosophers, we have faith-philosophers. It has become the fashion to idealise impulse over reason, sentiment over thought, and to denounce all system-making. The age with its craving for excitement and sensation is longing for unconventional systems of philosophy. We have lost all love for rule and convention, order and reason, but are in raptures over novelty and romance, life and impulse.

The overthrow of reason has resulted in a universal doubt which does not spare religion. The anarchy pre-
vailing in the world of thought, due to the idealisation of impulse, may be illustrated by the examples of Nietzsche who propounds a new ethics, Meredith who rejects God and immortality, and asks us to worship Mother Earth, and Bernard Shaw who repudiates the whole structure of our morals and science and announces a new religion of life force. As intuition is the final authority, we cannot call in question these theories. Faith in intuition leads us in subjectivism, as there is no higher power to sit in judgement over the findings of intuition. When therefore cold-blooded intellect is disregarded simply because it gives us severely cheerless conclusions, it cannot be in favour of impulse which gives us no guarantee that it will remodel the scheme of things in a manner answering to our hearts' desires. The inevitable attempt of conservative minds is to make reasonable and respectable to themselves the faith already held by them, and bring forward considerations to support and supplement it. This goal, as we have seen, cannot be reached by disowning intellect and falling back on intuition. The temptation arises to use intellect as a means to our ends, to use philosophy and reason to support one's own religious feeling and experience. This is what unconsciously takes place every day, but the new philosophers have christened the old way of popular thinking with a new name, Pragmatism.

"What is the truth?" asked Lady Chetram of Mrs. Cadwallader in Middlemarch. "The truth. He is as bad as the wrong physic, nasty to take and sure to disagree." This great lady seems to have given the direction of thought to the modern pragmatists. They somehow feel that the logical truth to be attained by the scrupulous adoption of the intellectual methods is "nasty" to practise, and "safe to disagree" with the ideals and hopes cherished and nourished by average humanity. So they suggest an overhauling of the method of inquiry, and the ideal of truth. We need not ask as to why we believe in anything. The question is why we believe is irrelevant. We believe, and that will do. If
an explanation is wanted, it is this, that the fact gives the
right. A belief is true because it is useful. As in politics
whatever policy requires is supposed to be just, so in
philosophy whatever instinct requires is supposed to be
ture. Philosophy has become a policy. James says that:
"whatever is expedient in the way of our thinking is true
as whatever is expedient in the way of our behaving is
good." Though James here makes truth to be what is
expedient in the way of our thinking, i.e., intellectually
expedient, still in developing his theory he makes it
equivalent to what is practically expedient. The
truth of an idea is constituted by its working. The
test of a theory is its practical consequences. "If
theological ideas prove to have a value for concrete life,
they will be true for pragmatism in the sense that they are
good for so much" (Pragmatism, p. 73). Again, "On
pragmatic principles, if the hypothesis of God works
satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word—experience
shows that it certainly does work—it is true" (ibid.
p. 293). We can believe in miracles if the belief helps the
weak man to live his life better. If pure
reason discards popular conclusions, pragmatism rein-
states them in the form of valuable errors, desirable
extravagances that make life better. In pragmatism, truth becomes
identical with moral cultivation, practical utility, emotional
satisfaction, and religious fruitfulness. Pragmatism is a
kind of millenarianism in philosophy. Here we first give
the judgements and then seek for the reasons. We feel
that certain ideas have a claim to truth and the whole of
reality must bend to make them true. We have the belief,
and that is a sufficient reason for its truth. Reality must
accept it or else it is not an idea. Reason
is given to man, just to enable him to invent reasons for
what he wants to believe and do. Philosophy becomes
a catalogue of acts of faith. Logic becomes
a foundation to ethics, and philosophy a supplement to religion.
While it is true that "the possession of a truth is not an end in
itself, but only a preliminary means to other vital satis-

factiones," still the philosopher is interested in truth for its own sake, more for the light it brings than for the fruits it bears. The suggestion of pragmatism is to be repudiated as its adoption deprives philosophy of its characteristic method and makes it one with art, aiming at the construction of an imaginary universe conformable to the desires of man. The attitude of believing anything which is in keeping with man's higher interest, and refusing to consider alternatives, is possible in the ordinary man, but a philosopher cannot be content with it. He cannot abandon the attempt to understand, simply because such an attempt is likely to unsettle his religious beliefs. To him, religious beliefs, like other bits of experience, are a challenge to intelligence.

While the pragmatists distort the theory of truth so as to make it serve the ends of life, James and Bergson reach the same goal by taking experience as their guide. To both logic is not the pathway to reality. Intuition takes us to the heart of things. To Bergson it is the inward intuition of life or consciousness that grows and ripens every moment, which gives the clue to reality. Logic does violence to reality, as it does not accept it as it comes. Experience gives us opposition, diversity and multiplicity, while logic presents to us a clean coherent universe. Intellect suffers from an original sin which prevents it from knowing the face of reality as it is; it can only be saved by the grace of intuition. But we are not sure what exactly Bergson means by intuition. If it should be independent of intellect, then it leads us in subjectivism; if it is the crown of the intellectual process, it becomes solely a revised edition of the absolutistic doctrine which admits the need for an extra-intellectual attempt to grasp the nature of reality. But this necessity for intuition is the result of consistent philosophical thinking. We cannot but admit the need for intuition if a reflective view of the world tells us that there are matters beyond the grasp of human understanding. To James, outward intuition of the life of
self-experience is the guide to reality. His outward vision reveals to him a conglomerate of countless individuals, independent of each other. His empiricism takes things at their face value, gives him a pluralistic vision. As logic denies it, he gives it up.

It will not be an unfair characterisation of these writers, if we say that in them we have the verbiage of the plain man’s philosophy for securing independence of logic. These have a message for the age, and that is the declaration of independence from the claims of intellect. They put the plain man on the back, and give him a philosophy which would justify his beliefs about the world. They tell him, We do not force on you any scheme of metaphysics, but give you only a method or a way of dealing with things, and you are free to fashion the method to any system of values. They fix no standpoints, and profess no theory. They are philosophical anarchists doubting all thought and believing all facts.

If there is any one thing more than another which forms the point of contact binding together these thinkers, it is not any positive feature of belief in pluralism or reality of evil or distrust of intellect, but it is the negative one of positive dislike for absolutism. Absolutism represents the classical tradition, but love of novelty which is a characteristic of the new age induces them to stray away from the high roads to the exploring of new paths. They have a prejudice against the faith of their fathers and the orthodox tradition in philosophy. Absolutism which makes mind the central reality and reduces the world of nature and individual subjects into partial differentiations thereof is as bad as naturalism. Whether we view the movement of things as a purely natural process or a logical process of the cosmic reason, the freedom of the individual is destroyed. The individual comes to be thought of as a mere link in an external process, rational or natural. To a small or great degree, all these thinkers adopt a protestant attitude to both naturalism and absolutism. James and Bergson, Ward and Huxley, Schiller and Balfour,
Eucken and Rashdall set themselves against the absolutistic theory of the universe. Anti-absolutism may be set down as the chief characteristic of the new philosophies, for absolutism embodies in them all objectionable features. It advocates the universality of law, the unity of the whole, and the relative unreachability of the particular. It is believed that the vital interests of the human spirit are jeopardized in a system of absolutism. Logic is not with the absolutist a means to the support of external beliefs. The romanticists, mystics and pragmatists urge that the absaulutists exalt intellect at the expense of the other sides of human nature, and call them ultimatum, or over-intellectualists, unmindful of the charge that the latter bring against them that they substitute logic and adopt the sophistic device of making the worse appear the better reason. They attack the absolutist's position, and put it down for an abstract imaginary scheme which does not do justice to man's beliefs in the pluralistic universe, the diversity of things, the inconsequence of events, the personality of God, etc., which are the root principles of the religious belief of the contemporary enlightened man of the Mediterranean coast. As his beliefs and ideas which are also facts of experience and immediate consciousness are not guaranteed by the system of absolutism, it is not a philosophy at all, whatever else it may be. It may be a refined system, "Refinement is the characteristic of intellectual philosophies. They exquisitely satisfy their craving for a refined object of contemplation, which is so powerful an apposite of the mind. But I ask you in all seriousness to look abroad on this colossal universe of concrete facts, on their awful bewilderments, their surprises and cruelties, on the wildness which they show, and then to tell me whether refined is the one inevitable descriptive adjective that springs to your lips" (James, Pragmatism, p. 22). The system constructed by the absolutists, "is far less an account of this actual world than a clear addition built upon it, a classic sanctuary
in which the rationalist fancy may take refuge from the intolerably confused and Gothic character which mere facts present. It is no exclamation of our concrete universe, it is another thing altogether" (5th.). Absolutism is unphilosophical, unscientific, unempirical, and contrary to common-sense, since it dismisses the solid world of reality with all its wealth and richness as unreal. Where are we now? A philosophical system should satisfy the scientist with his partial vision, the empiric with his attention confined to outward appearances, the common-sense man with its theory born of habit, prejudice and training. The demos has to be satisfied, and absolutism cannot win the polls. Therefore rationalist absolutism is slowly giving place to romantic empiricism. Absolute idealism, before which English empiricism and the dogmatic rationalism of Germany went down, which was in the ascendant even in the nineteenth century, is fast receding into the background. It has become the fashion of the day to break away from its tradition and build systems which run counter to it. The new systems consider it a matter of pride to be called anti-intellectualist and anti-absolutist.7 They may as well call themselves antiphilosophic. In their crusade against absolutism they do not care for truth. They adopt their fables to paint the moral of the futility of absolutism. In sober philosophy it is not right to stir up feelings and raise the battle-cry as we do in voting campaigns. Modern absolutists do not dismiss the world of reality as unreal and illusory. It is wrong.

7 Anti-intellectualism is not so prominent a feature as anti-absolutism. What the phenomenists are up against, is not so much reason as the results of reason. For Gombrich, Herbert and Ward are content that their supporters though they employ reason in support of their phenomenological schemes. Most of the moment, when they retain their central assumptions, ask us to surrender intellect and resort to intuition. Belief in logic takes them a long way, but not all the way. At the end of the course we are asked to go beyond and seize the truth by an effort of intuition, but only because they do not at present-day thinkers do not show a friendly attitude to them. We cannot even say that, inasmuch they are hostile to, but in that case we will not have the beautiful chapters on Leontin and Bergson in James's book. These writers are opposed to absolutism, tradition and routine, Plato, Spinoza and Hegel.
to assume that they cancel the existence of the Many for the sake of the One. All that absolutism says is that the One is the pervading life and the moving soul of the world. This is not to say that the world of life and change is unreal. When the romanticist represents absolutism as a philosophy which clings to an immutable dead abstraction, they are setting up a straw figure to be knocked down. Hegel was fierce against Spinoza for the latter’s advocacy of an abstract absolutism. He condemns Spinoza’s substance, as it does not in his opinion contain within itself the principle of the manifold. When the critics urge that the absolutist’s theory of the fundamental unity of the universe is equivalent to the peculiarity of everything else, they commit a leap in logic, but in them logic is nothing, as fashion is everything.

The effort of philosophy is being wasted and is not giving its full benefit, as an unconscious attempt prevails to subject philosophy to religion and truth to dogmas. True philosophy has to fight now against the wave of romanticism as it fought in the middle of the nineteenth century against the wave of empiricism. And the fight will be hard and tough since the unphilosophical attitude is quite congenial to man’s temperament. The mind of man is not willing to be shaken in its religious habits, and is ever ready to put on excuses to believe in theories which reason wants us to disbelieve. Tradition is contagious and fashion is catching. The general tendencies which prevail are so often and so strongly urged that our mind automatically adopts them. Man is only too ready to follow faith unreasonably. But we contend that in so doing mind is untrue to its nature as mind. We shall show in the sequel how the philosophical discussions of the representative writers of this age are vitiated by their unphilosophical attitude of starting with certain prejudices and trying to vindicate them. While their logic leads them in one direction, their bias takes them in the other. Their writings form the theatre where the struggle between logic and prejudice is played out.