CHAPTER I

SCIENCE, RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY

I

What is philosophy? It is not easy to give an exact definition of it, either by the nature of the problems discussed, or the results arrived at; for the problems are as many as there are sides of experience, and the results are none of them universally accepted. The clue in the nature of philosophy lies in the method pursued. Philosophy is obviously an intellectual attempt to deal with the nature of reality. In the words of Hegel, it is a thinking consideration of things. It is a systematic study of the ultimate nature of reality. This definition of philosophy distinguishes it from science on the one hand, and art and religion on the other.

Science aims at a systematic study of reality, but not of the whole of it. The philosopher as the spectator of all time and existence aims at giving a unified account of the world as a whole. The scientist concerns himself with aspects of reality and studies them in abstraction from the whole in which they belong. Philosophy contemplates experience as a whole and attempts to comprehend it under its scheme. But each science has its own special field and special problems to explore and investigate, and does not feel called upon to take up the whole field of reality for its problem. So it is generally said that science deals with abstractions and not with reality. This statement is true in more than one sense.
The qualities studied by the several sciences do not exist separate from one another, but live in close and intimate union. The chemical constitution of an object which chemistry investigates is indissolubly blended with its physical properties which physics studies and its organic nature which physiology has in view. In the live reality, they do not exist separately though for purposes of science we view them as if they were separate. Again, science treats facts purely from the objective point of view, while philosophy treats them as items of experience in relation to the interests and aspirations of the thinking subject. Philosophy studies experience as a whole, as a subject-object relation, as the unity of things with the mind which is conscious of them. It cannot be said that philosophy is only an aggregate of the conclusions of sciences, in the sense that, as the several sciences deal with their bits, the more assemblage of all these conclusions will constitute the nature of the whole. For in every object we have a whole vision besides the partial visions. There are properties of the whole as a whole, which are not considered by the partial views. For example, the question: What does all our experience come to? Is there any ultimate purpose in the universe? are not touched by the sciences. We require a discipline which shall investigate the ultimate nature of reality, God, the highest good. We cannot piece together the conclusions of sciences and put down the product to philosophy. Nor again can philosophy be looked upon as the study of the highest abstractions common to all the sciences. It is the business of philosophy as the critic of the sciences to reconcile the conclusions of sciences. If the science of nature compels us to conclude that everything in nature acts according to law, and that the principle of mechanical necessity is supreme in the universe, then it comes into conflict with the science of ethics which takes for granted the relative freedom of man. It is not possible for one part of our knowledge to conflict with another. Our intellectual house cannot be divided...
against itself. It becomes the function of philosophy to reconcile the conclusions of sciences by delimiting their spheres of validity. As the ultimate questions which arise when man exercises his mind, viz. the whence and the whither of things, are not considered by the sciences, we are sometimes told that sciences do not care to go to the roots of reality, but swim only in the surface phenomena. In their pursuits, they make assumptions without inquiry, which philosophy cannot do. Physics assumes that there is such a thing as self-dependent matter; geometry takes for granted space. Even philosophical sciences like logic and ethics postulate ideals of truth and goodness. It is the task of philosophy to find out how far the premises assumed by the sciences are valid. It asks whether matter and space are real or ideal. The postulates of sciences become the problems of philosophy. Philosophy must give a logical defence of every premise that it demands. It requires that every conclusion, before acceptance, shall be carefully considered and justified before the bar of reason. It starts with experience and builds its whole structure on its basis without the aid of uncritically assumed premises. This is what Kant means when he says that philosophy ought to be critical and not dogmatic. Scepticism is a better preparation for philosophy than dogmatism. When dogmatism holds that there are some conclusions which we may not question but must accept without inquiry or reason, scepticism rightly revolts against this attitude and condemns it as unphilosophical. Criticism is the breath and being of philosophy. Dogmatism is the enemy of truth and knowledge. We may be asked whether it is possible to philosophise without partial theories or suggestions. Of course not. But the theories we start with should not be theories which appeal to us on account of their serviceableness in extra-philosophical relations. They must be theories which are suggested by the facts and which claim to render experience intelligible. Philosophy cannot be carried
on by mere logic; it has to depend on the constructive suggestions received from half-formed insight, intuition, etc. Philosophy as an interpretation of experience cannot spin out its theories by shutting itself in a dark room away from the world of experience. It looks at experience, takes note of the suggestions forced by it on the mind of man and confirms them as theories, if they possess the requisite explanatory value. While science is an intellectual attempt systematically to study facts, philosophy is deeper than science in that while science takes certain premises on faith, philosophy is under an obligation to prove everything that it requires. As philosophy goes to the root of the matter and thinks to the bitter end, it is more than merely a science within the intellectual spirit of inquiry. It is one with science in that it is not satisfied with the first appearances of things, but transcends the view of things as they immediately present themselves to us in perception and seeks to arrive at a deeper view of them through objective laws and principles. Philosophy assumes a scientific attitude towards the whole of human experience, and not merely to the positive facts extracted from mechanical science. It is because science is confined to facts which gravitate, and is unconcerned with deeper facts of life and experience, that sincere souls are misled into thinking that science is the enemy of philosophy and religion. The exclusive worship of the positive facts of science leads to what we may call scientific metaphysics, which is the worst kind of metaphysics.

Yet, after all, the method of philosophy is just the method of science. Philosophy is distinct from science mainly because of its subject-matter; it attempts to study the whole of experience. But are these not other attempts to grasp the whole? Has not religion also a similar aim, and how then is it different from philosophy?

Both religion and philosophy ask the why and wherefore of things. Both try to grasp the sum total of things and understand the good of it all. Yet, the end in view is
different. While the salvation of the soul is the end of religion, the discovery of truth is the object of philosophy. Also the method of approach is different. Though true religion is independent of authority, being based on the insight born of meditation, still large numbers do not have any such immediate spiritual vision but take their religious views at second hand from the prophets. So they do not ask for criticism and inquiry. They accept the views because religion claims to be revealed. Religion becomes a system of dogmatics. While philosophy is a product of thought and inquiry, religion turns to be a product of poetry and fancy. Philosophy answers the problem of the whole by logic, while religion answers it by faith. Philosophy tries to interpret the meaning of things by the concepts of understanding while symbols which satisfy the heart are the field of religion. Religion happens to insist on more authority, the religious prophet does not try to vindicate the views of his religion, but merely gives them. When he steps forward with the Bible or the Koran in his hand, he does not argue, but calls upon his hearers to believe whatever it says. He opens with the silencing appeal of "Thus saith the Lord." The religious attitude suppresses the logical. It warms the heart but silences the mind. Philosophy arises out of the logical demands and aims at theoretical satisfaction. While the philosopher reasons and argues, the religious man believes and acts, lives and loves. Whatever philosophy might say the worship of the Madonna and

3 With special reference to Christian dogma, "Verbum esse" observes: "Religious faith leaves the contradiction in its crudest form, the everlasting symbol of a Divinity slandered by a Demon of his own creating, rebelling against by his other creature Man, and having lost Paradise (as Malachi 3:16 tells us) in the exercise of the principle of evil, making man's mortality into God's opportunity, and leaving himself in partial atonement for the monstrous sin in the expression of a demon to himself in explanation of man's disobedience. This discrepancy religious looses and enshrines in every metaphor, in every verbalism susceptible of moving human emotion; and having silenced the sense of logical contradiction in this overpowering union of harmony of feeling, religion insists that there is no contradiction" (Phil. Disc. vol. i. p. 286).
the Child will continue to attract the mass of mankind. Religion, as it appeals to the emotions, has a large following which philosophy cannot hope to have.

II

But the spirit of popular religion is detrimental to the interests of philosophy. Faith unsupported by reason is the suicide of reason, though religious fanaticism urges that reason should completely submit to religion as answers to religious questions are given by supernatural revelation, while reason is the instrument of finite man and as such cannot be infallible. According to this view there is no need for philosophy at all. There was a time when religion was giving its opinions on the world of sense. But soon it understood that its authority would not be tolerated. Should it continue to deliver judgments on the world of science? Galileo held that the earth moved contrary to the text of the scripture; he cared for truth and so did not adhere to the popular belief which was committed to the immobility of the earth. The biblical world has been shaken constantly all these centuries. So in sheer self-defense religion withdrew from the world of sense, made truce with science and declared that while the world of sense was the province of understanding and reason, that of the unseen was the province of faith and revelation. Thus science and religion entered into a treaty, and the quarrel broke out between philosophy and religion as both deal with the unseen world. The sphere of reason is limited to the finite world, and it cannot say anything of the world to come. Were we to read in the verdict of reason, it is urged, with what logic do we know, there is no other world than the one we see before us. Whatever amount of value this attitude might have possessed as an antidote to the eighteenth-century rationalism of Europe, which treated with scorn and contempt faith and religion as superstition and myth, and called upon man not to surrender his pride and birthright, the use of reason and
make a slave of himself to the idols of the tribe and the church, it is beyond question that the interference of faith in reason and authority in philosophy is fraught with dangerous consequences. We are told that in worshipping God, the ideal of perfection, all doubts of the worshippers are dissolved, and to ask for rational explanation would only cause unsettlement and chaos. But philosophy which is cast in the logical mould cannot allow itself to be consumed in religion which does not insist on founding its faith on logic. Where the logical motive in human nature predominates, we have the philosophic temper with its passion for truth, and it cannot be suppressed by any thing extralogical.

It never strikes the unphilosophical temper to question the prevailing form of religion; it has a sort of good faith in whatever obtains. Philosophy fails of its purpose and is unfaithful to its ideals if it assents that particular religious beliefs should be accepted. The temper which acquiesces in the given code, and does not ask for its reasons, may show a bias disposition or a good sentiment, but it does not show a philosophical attitude. Loyalty to philosophy requires that if a sincere philosophic endeavour results in the repudiation of popular beliefs such as faith in God, etc., these should be surrendered without any sample. The whole tradition of philosophy is a witness to the antagonism of popular beliefs and theoretical convictions. Diogenes asked, when a certain philosopher was praised, "What great result has he to show, who has so long practised philosophy and yet has hurt nobody?" If the supremacy of religion and popular prejudice over truth and philosophy had been rigorously maintained, there would have been no growth in either religion or philosophy. It is because the true philosopher has been able to think for himself, irrespective of the religion in which he is born, that he has been able to improve religion. From the beginning philosophy has appeared as a reaction against religion. Though the two were originally intertwined, they had to separate very early
for each to grow. Xenophanes, in the true philosophic spirit, observed that the origin of religion is in man's frailty; "It is men who have created the Gods, for in these latter they find again their own shape, their feelings, their speech; the negro thinks of them as being flat and black-nosed, the Thracian as fair and blue-eyed. If men knew how to depict, they would give to their gods the form of oxen." Protagoras, the sophist, declared: "It is not for me to seek out either if the gods exist, or if they do not exist; many things hinder me from this, notably the obscurity of the subject and the shortness of human life." Surely Protagoras would not accept the popular creed. He confessed that he had neither the time nor the competence for the inquiry into the existence of God. We admit that philosophy by its very nature can appeal only to a select few and cannot therefore secure the hold on the public mind which religion has. It very generally happens that the philosophical truth contradicts the popular religion and gets itself suppressed. But there is no denying that in the interests of true religion philosophy should turn aside from merely traditional faith and beliefs. Free thinking is the only guide to truth, but it is a risky game. It is far easier to defend popular beliefs and prejudices. The names of Socrates and Jesus, Bruno and Galileo, Descartes and Spinoza, Hobbes and Locke, Hume and Kant, Voltaire and Rousseau are witnesses to the traditional opposition of religion to philosophy and of the state to truth. These testify to the conservatism of man and the danger of free thinking. From the time of Socrates downwards it has been the lot of philosophers to criticize the popular conceptions of religion and suffer for the sake of their ideals. The powers of church and state were from the beginning of time employed to suppress philosophical heresies, but without success. It is supposed that temporal power is no longer so anxious to proceed against disagreeable philosophical opinions as of old, but the tyranny of popular beliefs and religious practices we now have in republican countries is much worse than
that of the worst despot. How much truth is generally at the service of prejudice is strikingly brought home to us by the statements of the intellectuals of every country, trained to still evidence and see truth, when they assert with a naïveté which is disconcerting to a degree, that their own country is right and every other wrong in the present war. They are using their intellects to justify the policies of their countries and pour out vials of wrath and invective on their enemies. Integrity of thought is lost and truth-seeking has become the handmaid of state policy. In the belligerent countries at the present day the intellectuals must think, if they think at all, in one particular way. If they show any independence they do so at the risk of their lives or their freedom of action. There is no use of making any profession of impartiality. We must think to order. It has become notorious how in Germany no philosopher will be tolerated who does not deify the German state, and if there are men who feel conscientiously that this war is an evil, they cannot thrive even in free England. In some cases even universities have become state dominated. The state does not seem to have any concern for truth. It supports what is useful to it, whether it be truth, half-truth or error. The Church follows the state and philosophy follows both. It has become a department of state. Before our eyes we see how intellect has become the servant of diplomacy. It looks as if the intellectual forces were also mobilised in this war. Spiritual powers are being exploited for temporal interests. Religion is made to turn the mills of state authority. We have another evidence of the same tendency of thought to be unlike in the many attempts made at the present day to reconcile Christianity with war and force. The Sermon on the Mount is a counsel of perfection, as a state conducted on its lines cannot, as Bismarck declared, last for twenty-four hours. Jesus, the saint of non-resistance, is the fiction of the theologian. We can pity him but not admire him; we can love him at best, but not worship him. The real
Jesus is not the one who bade us turn the other cheek, but the one who used the scourge in the temple. Christianity is muscular and militant. We are but using the swords lent us by God. Thus is Christendom mocking the pure and spiritual religion of Christ. Philosophy has truly become "the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct" (Brücke). If our instincts lead us to support the use of force, we make our philosophy do so; if they lead in the direction of non-resistance, philosophy would give reasons for that. It dignifies feeling and faith and confirms prejudices and partialities.

At the present day a system of philosophy is judged not by its truth and objective value, but by its conformity with the prevailing religious views. Systems of philosophy like absolutism which fail to satisfy this test are dismissed as dangerous. They are rejected as reprehensible not because they are untrue, but because they encourage the idols of the tribe and corrupt the youth of the country! The prejudice of religion has penetrated so deeply into the world of philosophy that a discipline which ought to be the most unprejudiced in the world has become blinded on account of the tyranny of dogma or the herd instinct. The philosophic conscience is violently sacrificed to the religious instinct, and the free spirit of inquiry has been replaced by slavish imitation. The independent voice of philosophy becomes the echo of the street cry. We think in conformity with a Christian church, a German court or a mob-cry. Wherever this tendency has prevailed, philosophy has suffered. The Medieval Roman Catholic tradition thought that Aristotelianism was the only true philosophy because it alone was con-

1 Cf. Mr. Wells In God the Inaccessible King. "We of the new faith repudiate the teachings of non-resistance. We are the militant followers of, and partly ourselves, a militant God. We can appreciate and esteem the greatness of Christ, the great being in whose nobility the theologian bides. But submission is the venerated theology of all from our God, and a modelled figure is the complete inversion of his likeness as we know him. A Christianity which allows for its daily symbol Christian and triangling spiritually on a broken cross would be too much in the spirit of our worship." (pp. 182-3).
sistent with the Christian religion. Any other theory which could not be fitted into the framework of Christian religion and revelation was anathema. "The result of it was the arrest of philosophic development. If the crude and undeveloped religion of the man in the street dominates philosophy, it puts down all philosophy as a waste of effort and energy. Speculation about supermundane things is pointless. But philosophy insists that we have no right to take a thing as true simply because the religion in which we were trained believes it or we could not be happy unless it were true. In philosophy truth is our goal and logic our guide. It admits only the one ideal of truth and is subject to none else. The philosophical attempt must be carried out in the spirit of scientific research. The philosopher acknowledges nothing higher than truth however frightful and disconcerting it may be. But whenever he bends the knee to a state policy or a religious view, he subordinates truth and wants something else to be higher than that. True philosophy then disappears and the sordid type appears on the scene, and if it passes current and appeals to even the trained thinker, this only shows the low level at which most of the intellectual minds move. The system of philosophy should be the result of thorough and logical inquiry, founded upon a universal examination of reality. The philosopher has no practical end in view. He cares not for gain or fame. His one duty is to search for truth and destroy error. "Life resembles a spectacle. Some attend it in order to participate in the merriment; others to do business; the best to look on; so it is in life. The vulgar seek fame and money; the philosophers truth" (Diogenes Laërtius, Præm. 8, viii. 66). Philosophy is its own end, and to make it a means to anything external to it is to mistake its function. The mental habits of present-day philosophers prove that they have not the right view of the nature of philosophy. Non-logical elements help to make their intellectual views. Prejudices and traditions, suggestions and motives which
cannot be strictly assimilated with the central philosophical spirit, continuing to give the systems of philosophy the forms which they have. Nietzsche observes: "And behind all logic and its seeming, sovereignty of movement there are valuations, or to speak more plainly, physiological demands for the maintenance of a definite mode of life" (Beyond Good and Evil, i. 2). Present-day thinkers force, unconsciously perhaps, their interpretations into the scheme of things and justify what they want arbitrarily and unreasonably. Philosophy has become a list of beliefs held by faith and run a materialistic system of metaphysics. Independence of thought, which is the breath and life of philosophy, has become rare, and the progress of philosophy is checked. And so a few philosophers with the true vision arise and call to order the stray sheep, and tell them that philosophy should pursue the method of science in an attitude of ethical and religious neutrality. "It is my belief that the ethical and religious motives, in spite of the splendidly imaginative systems to which they have given rise, have been on the whole a hindrance to the progress of philosophy and ought now to be consciously thrust aside by those who wish to discover philosophical truth. It is, I maintain, from science, rather than from ethics and religion, that philosophy should draw its inspiration" (Scientific Method in Philosophy, pp. 3-4; see also Our Knowledge of the External World, chapter 1). Mr. Bertrand Russell is quite right in emphasizing the need for freeing philosophy from the trammels of external creeds, traditions and institutions. If philosophy requires us to give up the sacred heirlooms of humanity, we must do so without hesitation or scruple. It is its task to give us a true estimate of the purpose of life. Truth is its motive and inspiration. It must develop in obedience to this one standard. It may lead to disagreeable results, but that does not matter. Logic is like a calculating machine producing results which were never anticipated, and if we adopt it, we must follow it right through whitherse-
ever it leadeth us. But now we do not care to ascertain whether an opinion is true or false, but only whether it is "life-furthering, life-preserving." We start with a certain view of life, think of a few things as necessary to it, and conclude that they are true and objective. Philosophy becomes a mere arrangement of man's hopes and fears. They (the philosophers) all pursue as though their real opinions had been discovered and attained, through the self-evolving of a cold, pure, divinely indifferent dialectic; whereas in fact a prejudiced proposition, idea or suggestion, which is generally their heart's desire abstracted and refined, is defended by them with arguments sought out after the event (Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, i. 3). Impulse to knowledge and love of truth cease to be the motives of philosophy, and some moral ideas or religious prejudices which we wish to defend ever at the cost of logic and consistency take their place. Philosophy wants to prove those ideas by which their authors think they would be able to live better. Even Hegel, himself a representative of the new spirit, recognises that life has to be seen, viewed as it is, without reference to practical needs and utilities. It is because he believes that intellectual habits and forms of thought are suited to attain what he asks us to dispense with them, give up our prejudices, go to experience at its source and grasp its nature before it is turned in the direction of practical needs. We have to install ourselves in experience pure and simple to feel its truth and reality. The true philosopher should be pitilessly just to truth and not consider anything of value except truth. We want literal and straight thinking and not soft or emotional or sentimental thinking. Philosophy must prove logically derived conclusions and not defend at all costs pious wishes and pleasing imaginings. Philosophy should say what is true—it does not matter whether it pleases or irritates. "The mere fact that a theory leaves no room for freewill, pluralism, immortality or God does not make it false, even though belief in such
ideas should happen to help us over the dismal places in life” (Prof. Thilly, Philosophical Review, xvi. 123). Intellectual freedom is the greatest hope of the world. It is the duty of the ‘intellectualia’ to emancipate thought from its bondage to state or church or wealth or instinct or prejudice. Only intellect will enable us to see without glasses life, as it is and ultimately make us feel that a “gloomy truth is a better companion through life than a cheerful falsehood.” It is absurd to think that suffering humanity cannot live without some lie or other to console it. We should not corrupt our minds with soothing illusions. We must, as George Eliot says, try to do without opinion. We cannot discredit intellect simply because it does not give us what we want. “It is not rational to discredit the intelligence because it fails to give us the world we want or the heaven we want or the God we want. The direct need cannot make black white, though it may persuade us to paint it white, nor does the fact that hypotheses happen to please the will to believe or succeed in this sense make these hypotheses true” (ibid. p. 122). The most daring and logical empiricist, Hume, observes: “There is no method of reasoning more common and yet more blameworthy than in philosophical debate, to endeavour the refutation of any hypothesis by a pretense of its dangerous consequences to religion and morality. When an opinion leads into absurdities, it is certainly false, but it is not certain that an opinion is false because it is of dangerous consequences” (Enquiry, pp. 136, 137). Hume showed himself a devoted votary of truth when he declared that his philosophy could not satisfy practical needs. Arguing from consequences alone, is not a valid procedure. So many things which we thought must be true have been proved to be false. On so many occasions the votaries of religion confidently prophesied the deluge if certain beliefs were abandoned. We have abandoned them and yet the world has not come to a stop. It is going its normal rounds.
It is urged that philosophy has no business to confine its attention to the intellectual demands as there are other aspects of human nature, feeling and will. Certainly, but philosophy is an intellectual attempt to organise the whole of experience, intellectual, emotional and volitional. It takes into account other sides of human nature than the cognitive and their needs. In tracing the psychological genesis of man’s attitude to reality, philosophy knows that the promptings of the heart, feelings towards nature and aspirations towards the unseen determine his outlook. Emotions generally control ideas. The true nature of reality will be revealed not merely to man’s intellectual nature, but to the other sides as well. From this it does not follow that philosophy should cease to be intellectual. In philosophy we do not sing or muse but think. It is its intellectuality that distinguishes philosophy from art and religion. To say that philosophy should cease to be intellectual would be to surrender the philosophical attempt and admit the disunity of reason. So long as we believe that the universe is an intelligible reality, that it will answer to the demands of reason, the attempt of philosophy cannot be abandoned. While philosophy deals with feeling and immediate experience, it ought not to trust itself to them. They may not possess the value which the subject in his ignorance attributes to them. Matthew Arnold says: “Nor does the being hungry prove that we have bread.” Professor Varisco writes: “The Psychical fact of feeling may be evidence of a reason, the manner in which a reason of which a subject has no knowledge, or at least no clear knowledge, authenticates itself to his consciousness. But it may also be that the value of that fact is very different from that which the subject in his ignorance attributes to it. For instance, one child is irritated by an injustice done him, another by a scolding which he has deserved. As observed facts, the two feelings will be very similar;
but the first is reasonably justified whereas the reason of the second lies in a mental disposition which might not to exist. The feeling of the Divine is justified, as we shall see; yet not all the opinions based upon it—opinions which in a man incapable of deep reflection could have no other foundation—are justifiable" (The Great Problems, p. 8). "The true nerve is the genuine thought; and only when the thought is true can the feeling be of a genuine kind" (Hegel). Philosophy as the study of experience as a whole takes note of feelings, etc., but attempts to render full reasons for everything it accepts. Religious feeling must also pass through the fire of metaphysical thinking. "Religious experience, peculiarly so-called, needs, in my opinion, to be carefully considered and interpreted by every one who aspires to reason out a more complete philosophy" (James, Pluralistic Universe, p. 90). It is undoubted that experience has improved by the discovery of much of its irrationality. Unanalysed or undismissed experience is not conclusive as much of it may be irrational. If philosophy should neglect extra-intellectual aspects of human life it is open to condemnation. If reason in the interests of theory concerns itself only with theory, then the distrust of it is justified. A philosopher who neglects non-rational sides of experience is the chartered metaphysician of Lord Morley who is ever in hurry after he knows not what. Philosophy is not merely a piece of consistent thinking or cogent reasoning, for fantastic fairy tales may be consistent though not true, but a fruitful rendering of the meaning of experience in its entirety. The empiricist who trusts to experience believes in the operation of reason in it; only he is not quite consistent. While he is vacillating in his faith in the reasonableness of experience, the philosopher is wholly in earnest about it. It is unjust to discredit philosophy when in the interests of theory it studies the whole of experience. Philosophy is an attempt to construct a theory about reality as a whole.

As the axiomatic systems of philosophy which deny
the surface views about the world, God and man, are mostly rationalistic. James declares that philosophy should be empiricist, radically empiricist if possible. There is no doubt that philosophy should be empiricist in the sense that it must arise out of and be built upon experience. The difference between true empiricism and false is that while the false insists on confine experience to the world of sense or the world at its surface, the true takes for its field the whole of experience. False empiricism believes in sense phenomena, immediate feelings, impressions, and rejects deeper realities. True empiricism is radical in that surface phenomena are highest religious intuitions both form its data. The scientific empiricism of the nineteenth century viewed experience as limited to the world in space and time. As it did not believe in the sphere beyond the physical, religion then went to the wall. But now when radical empiricism asks us to confine our attention to the immediate certainties and felt intuitions of life, the higher interests of truth are jeopardised. The former resulted in atheism and materialism; the latter in religious dogmatism and idolatry. The term 'experience' is ambiguous. The scientist calls himself a believer in experience. But he confines experience to the objective facts, eliminating all the subjective factors. Everything else but the object, though not unreal, is neglected by him. He argues that if these subjective fears and aspirations and ideals should interfere, then the scientific attitude is given up, and the religious attitude adopted. Final causes and other expressions of the subject's feelings which are regarded as unsatisfactory are just the data for religious experience. While science investigates the order of nature, religion concerns itself with the salvation of the soul. Science is satisfied with one side of experience, the side which is open to scientific law; religion is satisfied with feelings and aspirations. The ideal of science is abstract irreconcilability; that of religion satisfaction of human feelings. These two become opposed as their fields are really abstractions
from experience. In experience the subjective and objective sides exist together. While science and religion are justified in employing different conceptions in their spheres, they are not justified in refusing reality to what is outside their scope. Religion which considers its facts to be most immediate, real and concrete cannot dismiss the physical facts as unreal; nor can science dismiss the subjective side of experience as non-existent. The whole of experience, scientific and religious, is the problem of the philosopher. But if he starts with predilections on the side of either science or religion, and if, in the process of his pursuit, he does not get over this bias, the cause of philosophy is ruined. When a philosopher identifies himself with science in the narrow sense of the term he ends as a materialist or something in that neighbourhood. Witness Descartes. He was untrue to the ideal of philosophy when he thought that only those things were true which could be reduced to mathematical form. His philosophy became a dogmatism which the critical philosophy eliminated, though, unhappily, not for good. The narrow scientific spirit which starts with a prejudice against religious experience, and thinks the inward life of the mystics to be a worthless dream, is not the true philosophic spirit. The data of science and religion, observation and meditation are the field of philosophy. We cannot say that scientific experience alone forms the basis of philosophical speculations as art and moral life are equally vital and profound. Science is not the sole truth and religion is not a tissue of illusions. Radical empiricism consists in taking note of all sides of experience, facts of religious faith, moral ideals and spiritual intuitions, as well as the crust of the earth and the stars of the sky. The modern system which goes under the name of radical empiricism is solicitous only about the claims of the plain man. Early English empiricism wished to come to terms with science, dogmatic rationalism with religion, but modern empiricism with the plain man’s faith.

Religion is a subject to be investigated by philosophy
as is any other side of experience. It is more essentially the problem of philosophy as it assumes a system of values which philosophy has also to consider. Religious facts have therefore more significance for philosophy than any other. Religion is an aspect of human nature deeper than intellect. While religion dogmatically asserts its scale of values and rests its proof on the feeling of the heart, philosophy tries critically to estimate them and evaluate their worth. Religion is one practical attitude in life as materialism is another, materialism a third and so on. If some men feel assured that there is a God, others with equal vehemence assert that they do not feel any need for God. There are men who have honest doubts about the existence of God, who are willing to subscribe to the agnostic's prayer, O God, if there be a God, save my soul if I have a soul! It is the task of philosophy to estimate the values of these several attitudes to life. When philosophy sets about its task of constructing a theory of the universe it meets with the prevailing religious creeds. It comes across the sacred books of the East as well as those of the Hebrews and the Christians. It has to scrutinise the stock of superstitions and sophisms with which the mind of man has entertained itself in its upward spiritual ascent. It does not accept religious intuitions at their face value, taking them for inviolable truths. It accepts no view unless it be with the consent of logic. While the religious manliness is entitled to recognition at the hands of philosophy, still as institution, however valuable it may be for life, is entitled to until hard reasoning justifies it. 1

We see how baseless is the charge that philosophy which is intellectual leads to a divorce between theory and

1 "On this, in its especial degree, the age of criticism, and to such criticism everything must submit. Religion through its sanctity, and inspiring through its majesty, may seek to exempt itself from it. But how then awaken just suspicion, and cannot claim the divine respect which reason accords only to that which has been able to sustain the test of fair and open examination" (Preface to Kant's C.P.R., 1st edition).
life. This change that metaphysics is discontinuous with life has been urged since the time of Aristotle. The term ‘metaphysics’ is apt to suggest that to philosophise means turning one’s back upon the natural or the scientific world. It has been thought that metaphysics as dealing with things airy and unsubstantial has no basis in experience. Aristotle did not mean by it anything like this. He meant a study of pure being which has existence even outside the realm of science. Philosophy is the science of being in general and not of matter or of nature. Aristotle, opposed as he was to Platonism, took his stand on experience and tried to account for it. Philosophy is not divorced from life as its problem is provoked by life and as its validity is tested by its adequacy to account for life. It is a confusion of thought to suppose that because philosophy is interested in theory it revels in theory. Philosophy is no doubt a theory, but it is not a theory of theory, but a theory of life, and therefore it is at home in life and not in a far-off region of false abstractions. It starts with the given, comprises all the given in a totality, and from that total vision redescends to the given to understand it and transform it if necessary. Simply because it insists that ethical and religious conclusions should control philosophical discussions, it does not follow that philosophy has nothing to do with ethics or religion. After all, we think to live, but do not live to think. Views of philosophy will have an effect on life and conduct, but views of conduct and life need not disturb the philosopher’s vision. Philosophy which estimates the meaning and purpose of life will have some significance for life and religion. Religion is ultimately dependent on philosophy, and the two cannot be kept in separate compartments. Religion is only an application of a metaphysical to life. And no philosophy is worth its name if it does not furnish an explanation of religion. It is better if religious beliefs are in agreement with reasoned metaphysical thinking. Instead of trying to make philosophy religious, we should make religion philosophical if possible. If thought does
not help us to support our beliefs, it does not follow that we should seek for their basis somewhere else than in thought, in emotion, will or immediate experience or intuition. If thought does not give us the religion we want, it does not mean we may believe what we like.

IV

It is irrational to think that the ordinary feelings of religion are the criteria of truth, especially in view of the fact that religion has changed as a result of philosophic growth. The vast changes that have marked the history of religious progress are due to the attempt to rationalise religion, the impulse to bring reason and religion into harmony. A religious creed which has no rational philosophy underlying it is bound to fail. Religion is a matter of feeling, and for it to be shared with others an objective philosophy is needed. Feeling in and by itself is private and dumb. It cannot render an account of itself. Though essentially it is a cry of the human spirit or a sentiment of the heart, it requires to be buoyed up by intellectual consistency, to live and spread. Religion is the poetry of thought, according to Cardinal Newman. It is thought touched with emotion. Repeatedly the feeling of the religious believer has to be tested and checked by reason. Religious views have changed in obedience to philosophical demands. Fetishism was possible with a low culture. But fetishistic and animistic ideas were soon replaced by a polytheism. The primitive gods were petty, local and partial, being the early idealisations of uncivilised and half-civilised peoples. Later in development we come across the beautiful figures of Apollo, Aphrodite, etc., which represent more profound intuitions of the human mind. Development of the conception of the uniform reign of law knocked the bottom out of the polytheistic religion which believed in numberless gods and demons with powers to interfere with the causal nexus. Soon a radical theism, best represented
by the early Hebraic doctrine, displayed polytheism. The later shadowy fiction of Christianity is a compromise between the Absolute of philosophy and the God of religion. In the Old Testament itself the God of Moses is not the God of Isaiah; in the New Testament the Father revealed by Christ is not the Word incarnate of the Fourth Gospel. At the present day the religious mind seems to be perfectly satisfied with a theistic religion of a modified type, and it is not impossible that something more satisfactory from the philosophical point of view may replace it. When enthusiasts for particular religious beliefs look upon philosophy as an unsettling force, they have only to be told that philosophy has been that from the beginning. It has been disturbing faith and introducing new Gods. Were religion in the ascendant, persecution would have been the fate of all philosophers, and there would have been no growth in religion.

V

True philosophy will result in true religion, as ultimately there cannot be any conflict between faith and reason. The religion is true not because it is a particular religion, but because it is a philosophical religion. When we say that true religion and true philosophy will agree, we do not mean that the religious experience of the primitive savage and the Euler worshipper will be acknowledged to be valid by the philosopher. We mean that the specialist in religion, the mystic with his experience, wisdom and insight will agree with the rational thinker. After all, as Royce said, the mystics are the only 'thoroughgoing empiricists.' Reality reveals itself in two different forms to the mystic and to the thinker, and ultimately the two should harmonise with each other. Unity and harmony ought to mark the relation of true religion to genuine reason. There is no secret hostility between the different sides of human nature. Philosophy when most itself will be religious, and religion in its deepest aspects will be
philosophical. A religious system, though the terminus of philosophic study, should not be its governing influence. It does not augur well for the future of either religion or philosophy if religion becomes the starting-point and dominating motive of philosophy.

VI

It is the case that many philosophers approach the problems of philosophy from the direction of ethics and religion. Hegel, for example, had a very keen appreciation of the aims and objects of religion. But he did not adopt without inquiry the dogmas of the religious consciousness of his time. He sought to find a philosophical justification for them. While the absolutist thinkers generally approach philosophy from the side of ethics and religion, they do not make ethics and religion the criteria of their philosophy. These set the direction of their thought but they do not pursue them to greater lengths. The fact that the greatest absolutist thinkers of modern philosophy, Spinoza and Hegel, who both started from the side of ethics and religion, ended in conflict with the prevailing religious creeds shows that they did not use logic and philosophy to support the religious convictions of their times. Sheer logic compelled them to assert that all is one in God, and the world of plurality is subordinate to the fundamental unity of spirit. Whatever charges may be urged against the absolutist, it cannot be said with any propriety that their philosophies were biased by their religious convictions. Though they approach philosophy from the side of religion, still they pursue the method of dispassionate research and do not make ethical and religious considerations interfere in their attempts.

Though it is admitted on all hands that Spinoza came into conflict with the prevailing religion, the case is not quite as obvious with Hegel. The fact that his system requires us to introduce modifications in Christian theology is enough for our purpose.
VII

Simply because we say that religion rests on faith and not logic, it should not be thought that it has no value. Religion is necessary to educate and ennoble man, and help him to rise above his baseness and work upwards. It serves as a balm or an ointment to the troubled soul, securing for it peace of mind and solace of heart. The conception of God as a judge and the fear of hell have their effects on the mind of man. It is to be noted that religion has been used throughout the world from the beginning of history, as a means of overcoming resistance in the exercise of authority. The worst kind of slavery has been perpetrated and defended in its name. This has been possible because we do not ask reasons for faith. If religion should be rid of its evil effects and serve the purpose which it has in view, it should be supported by philosophy.

VIII

Philosophy as the pursuit of truth has a practical interest, since truth gives intellectual comfort. The world we see around us is bewildering and chaotic. The presence of evil, misery and suffering in it makes it a riddle to be solved. There are no people who are impervious to the demands of this world. If the world’s evil did not make an appeal to us, we would not have any interest in theology. As a rule, we are interested in religion, and this shows that the problem of philosophy also has its meaning and value for us. The individual is conscious of the inadequacy of the finite world. He feels it to be incomplete and in need of supplementation. He falls back on religious faith for the needed complement. Instead of relying on the dogmas of religion, the philosopher tries to think about it all and get intellectual

1 Cf. "Some things which a highly cultivated intelligence would probably discard, and discard without danger, are essential to the moral being of multitudes." (Lecuy, The Map of Life, p. 227).
satisfaction. An unphilosophical or irreligious temper would look upon the universe as a fearful conflict between two opposing forces and would believe that this struggle is the alpha and omega of the world of reality. But even this attitude becomes a philosophy, though it is not called philosophical. It is unphilosophical, as the view is not the product of any systematic reflection on the facts but is only excited by the crude observation of the surface world. It is the view of vague unarticulated common sense. As the nature of man is to think, he cannot but philosophize. He cannot but feel the duty to doubt. Philosophy is not something that a man can put on or off as he chooses. Every human being who lays claim to a level above that of animal life will have a philosophy. The intellectual nature of man cannot rest until a systematic solution of the world problem is reached. Man is not only a political animal but is also a philosophical and a religious animal. We are by nature a metaphysical being. He is not content to live a life of feeling and will or drift with the current, but feels an impulse to see his life in the light of the central reality. He cannot but ask, What is the truth of it all?